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Digitized by the Internet Archive 
in 2011 with funding from 
The Library of Congress 



http://www.archive.org/details/humanics01coll 



HUMANICS. 



BY 



T. WHARTON COLLINS, ESQ., 

PBOFESSOE OF " POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY," UNIVERSITY OP LOUISIANA, EX-PRESIDINO 
JUDGE CITY COURT OF NEW ORLEANS, ETC. 



N 

" The proper study of mankind is Man." 



? 




NEW YORK: 
D. APPLETON AND COMPANY 

846 & 348 BROADWAY. 
LONDON: 16 LITTLE BRITAIN. 

1860. 






^ 






Entered, according to Act of Congress, in the year 1860, by 

D. APPLETON & COMPANY, 

In the Clerk's Office of the District Court of the United States for the Southern 

District of New York. 



CONTENTS. 

— ♦— 

PAGE 

PROLOGUE, ........... 1 

VITALITY, 15 

SENSATION, 69 

EMOTION, 110 

THOUGHT 173 

ACTION, 328 

RETROSPECT, 353 



Vegetal) ty or 






Animality or 



Humanality or Tl 



Existence 

Alimentiveness 

Approbativencss 

Cautiousness 

Combativeness 

Secretiveness 
J Acquisitiveness 

Destrnctiveness 

Philoprogenitiveness 

Inhabitiveness 

Adhesiveness 

Constancy 

Amativeness 
^ Constructiveness 



Motion 

Weight 

Eesistance 

Change 

Connection 
Substance 

Extension 

Locality 

Form 

Severalty 
Quality 

Density 

Savor 

Color, &c. 

Sound and Tune 

Odor 



Hope 

Watchfulness 

Conscientiousness 

Firmness 

Intent 
Faith 

Veneration 

Marvellousness 

Sublimity 

Ideality 
Charity 

Imitation 

Sympathy 

Joyousness 

Language 

r Quantity 

Eelation 
[ Mode 

Order 
I Progress 



Vitativeness 1 



Selfishness 



Causality 
Eventuality 



Comparison 



Individuality 



Truth 



Science 



of Nature 
of Self 
\ of Society 
of the Soul 
of God 



Beauty 



f Morality 



Utility 



ACTION 



in Arts 
in Economy 
in Politics 
in Morals 
in Ecligion 





















Existence 


1 










f 1. Absorption and 










Alimentiveness 


1 










Involution 










Approbativencss 


Vitativeness 










| 2. Respiration 










Cautiousness 












■g 


S. Ingestion 










Combativeness 












1 


4. Circulation 










Secretiveness 












■a o ( Functional Organism ) 


5. Assimilation and 








Instinct of 


Acquisitiveness 


1 

1 




' SCIENC 






Growth 










Destructiveness 


or 






Vegetality or 


Vitality or ■ 


§ 1 •••■'by < V or 
,2 g ( Sympathetic Nerves ) 

.8 


6. Evolution 
T. Exhalation 

8. Secretion and 

Excretion 

9. Generation and 










Philoprogenitiveness 

Inhabitiveness 

Adhesiveness 

Constancy 

Amativeness 


Selfishness 




j 






Reproduction 
10. Dormancy and 
Death 








*■ Constructiveness 






















Motion 


1 








■S 


r Touch 










Weight 
Resistance 


i Causality 








1 


Taste 










Change 


Eventuality 








Sulfation or Sensibility to 'g bv Sensuous Nerves or 


Sight 










Connection 


J 








| 


Oyer 










Substance 










1 


Smell 










Extension 






H 

CO 












Consciousness of 


Locality 
Form 


Comparison 










3 


r Phenomena "| 






Severalty 
















■a 


Space 


i Properties i 




Quality 


■ 


5 


Animality or 


n 




Time I 


is } Contents V or 




Density 




1? - 


Q 




§ 




1 


Force 


( Process ' 




Savor 




c, 


fc 










. Law J 






Color, &c. 
Sound and Tune 


Individuality 


'■3 


1* 














I Odor J 






« 




2 


Love of Being 


















§ 


Love of Having 










Hope 
"Watchfulness 






13 




. Emotion, or Sensibility to •§ by Motor nerves or . 


Love of Doing 


















1 


Love of Knowing 
Love of Speaking 










Conscientiousness ' 

Firmness 

Intent J 


Truth 






























Ideation 








Consensibility of - 


Faith I 
Veneration 












Definition 










Marvellousn ess i- 


Beauty 










Proposition 










Sublimity 

Ideality J 










a 


Analogy 


















_© 


1. Numeration 


Association 










Charity 










i 


2. Addition and 


Synthesis 










Imitation 










'g f Number 


Multiplicat'n 


Analysis 










Sympathy 


Morality 






*• Hnmanality or 


Thought, or 3 oftbeUnitof 1 and 

~J ' Measure. 


3. Subtraction 
and Division 


Classification 
Abstraction 








I 


Joyousness 
Language 


I 








4 Reduction 


Induction 










| 




ACTION 




5. Ratio 


Generalization 


















g 


Deduction 








r Quantity 
| Relation 


1 








"S 


Inference 


















Reflexion 








Ideas of -j M °a.e 

| Order 


Utility J 










Computation 






























I 


Progress 









of Nature 
of Self 
of Society 
of the Soul 
of God 



in Arts 
in Economy 
in Politics 
in Morals 
in Religion 



HTJMANIOS. 



PKOLOGUE. 

"The proper study of mankind is Man." 

At the beginning of European Philosophy, (whether 
we start from the seven sages, or from Pythagoras,) 
" Know thyself " was the precept first given in charge 
to man ; and, from that day to this, the injunction has 
been ever reiterated, and its wisdom has always been 
admitted. 

Has the precept been obeyed? In aspiration it 
has, if not in realization ; for every struggle of philoso- 
phy has been to obtain a more distinct conception of 
human nature and destiny. Indeed, philosophy, from 
its origin to this day, has been but an effort to solve 
the problem of man's moral, intellectual, and social con- 
stitution — an attempt to make the ethical and rational 
elements of humanity, when once discovered, subser- 



V HUMANICS. 

vient to humanity's progress. In reading the books of 
the founders and expounders of the systems, theories, 
and schools of philosophy which have been before the 
world, we find them all devoted mainly to the discus- 
sion of man's sensation, sentiment, reason, and action. 
Every point is investigated : searching and deep analy- 
sis, encircling and archcasting synthesis, inventive and 
fanciful analogy, have been called to the aid of wisdom 
and genius seeking to know if man is the mere recipient 
of sensation and impression, or the glorious radiator of 
a light within. Wherever divergence or contradiction 
is possible, modified and opposite opinions break forth ; 
and the products are the theories of the Presentationists 
and Representationists, Unitists and Dualists, Material- 
ists and Idealists, Absolutists and Nihilists. 

Thus far, philosophy has hardly dared to assume 
any other name than the one its founder modestly 
adopted to express a candid confession of incertitude, 
and a sincere desire of knowledge. The philosopher 
even at this day contents himself with being designated 
" a lover of wisdom ; " and diffidently asserts the exist- 
ence of the science of " Surnames" 

Yet Humanics should be permitted to erect a school 
in the field of knowledge ; for, if no complete and per- 
manent edifice can as yet be raised, sufficient materials 
are nevertheless on hand to begin the work of con- 
structing a " Science of Human Nature." 

But if we erect Humanics into a science, what 
would be left to Philosophy ? 



PROLOGUE. 3 

Much, very much ; and indeed a concession of ter- 
ritory to Humanics, instead of injuring Philosophy 
would leave her in the clear and undisputed possession 
of her great and legitimate domain ; and her true 
object and supreme scope, heretofore clouded, would 
plainly appear. 

Literally, the word Philosophy means the love of 
wisdom ; but, in its full sense, it means the science of 
universal truths ; and thus the philosopher, who is not 
too presumptuous, claims the merit of being, at least, 
a searcher of universal truths. 

I use the word truth as synonymous with the word 
fact. If therefore any truth or fact is known which 
does not pervade all the sciences, it is not comprised 
within the purview of Philosophy. For instance, the 
proposition which enunciates that the three angles of a 
triangle are equal to two right angles, is a truth rang- 
ing only through certain sciences and arts, such as 
Geometry, Astronomy, Mechanics, &c. ; but falling 
short of universality, it does not belong to Philoso- 
phy 

I do not mean to say that Philosophy never con- 
siders or investigates these limited facts. If it could 
dispense its adepts from obtaining this kind of knowl- 
edge, it would enjoy a privilege which no other science 
possesses. All the sciences and arts are connected 
with each other — relate to and run into each other; 
but when Philosophy examines and expounds limited 
facts, it does so collaterally and subsidiarily, by way 



4 HUMANICS. 

of illustration or proof, to show a dependency upon 
some unlimited truth, or for the purpose of arriving by 
induction at some supreme principle. 

So far, then, from being independent of all other 
sciences, Philosophy is the science of sciences ; for in 
order to find the truths which are common to all sciences, 
it searches through every one of them. 

Hence the domain of Philosophy is immense ; but 
it does not absorb Humanics, Logic, Ethics, and Reli- 
gion. These sciences remain perfectly distinct, so far 
as they apply facts, limited or universal, to one distinct 
subject or bearing. These sciences, like every other, 
deal with many universal truths, borrow many limited 
facts from kindred sciences ; but have also particular 
facts exclusively their own. The collection of the 
whole into one synthetical body, forms a separate science 
which is not to be confounded with Philosophy ; for 
Philosophy claims only such ingredients of Physics, 
Humanics, Theology, &c, as are applicable to all the 
sciences, and leaves the rest to its true owners in the 
ledger of human knowledge. 

To give an example in a certain class of sciences : 
The proposition that "the whole includes a part," is 
a universal axiom, and belongs to Philosophy ; but so 
far as it is used with one or more lesser facts in demon- 
strating the laws of number and extension it is a mathe- 
matical truth ; and the mathematician, in this view, 
need not trouble himself with the consideration of its 
universality. 



PROLOGUE. 5 

A converse example would be equally demonstra- 
tive. It is a fact that the power of water as a motor is 
in proportion to its height. Now if this fact were found 
in the case of water only, it would belong exclusively 
to the science of Hydraulics ; but observation extends 
it to all liquids, also finds that it is a law of every fall- 
ing body ; then that it is the law of weight in general ; 
and finally, that it is resolvable into the great laws of 
universal gravitation. 

If Philosophy in general be viewed only from a 
single point, and that point be taken as a beginning or 
pivot of all knowledge, a system arises characterized by 
a distinctive idiosyncrasy which admits only such facts 
as adapt themselves to the initial idea. Thus we have 
Scholastic, Theistical, Skeptical, Sensational, Ideal, 
Mystical, Eclectical, Positive, and Metaphysical Philo- 
sophy ; and thus too, each school defines the science to 
suit its own theory. Here it is the science of the soul, 
there the science of thought, elsewhere the knowledge 
of self or of man ; with one it is the critique of pure rea- 
son, with others the science of the infinite and absolute, 
with many it is the knowledge of the cause, nature, and 
principle of things, existence, &c. ; and with some it 
is the doctrine of the origin of ideas. 

. The definition with which I started, viz., that 
Philosophy is the science of universal truths, shows 
that I have attached myself to none of these systems, 
nor do I exclude any of them. My definition, I con- 
sider, escapes the fault which can be imputed to the 



6 HUMANICS. 

others, viz., breadth without sufficient precision, or 
precision without sufficient breadth. 

If, for instance, we say : " Philosophy is the science 
of the causes, principles, and nature of existences and 
things," we would make it embrace all sciences in their 
generalities and in their details ; for, each science is 
an aggregation of harmonious principles and causes, 
more or less general, relating to a definite subject. If, 
on the contrary, we define Philosophy as the science 
of soul, or of thought, or of man, we confine it to a cir- 
cle which would seem to be that of Psychology, &c. 

On the one side we would invade and take exclu- 
sive possession of the dominions of every particular 
science — so that to write a complete philosophical 
treatise would be to compose an encyclopedia. On the 
other hand, if we adopt any one of the above less 
general definitions, we usurp the place of a few limited 
sciences and leave the rest out of view. 

Thus Philosophy would have no ground of its own, 
no individual mission. 

Now I would fain avoid all this confusion ; yet far 
from starting any new and exclusive system, all I seek, 
by the definition proposed, is to classify for the sake of 
clearness, and by this classification to make a funda- 
mental division of Philosophy into two parts. The 
first I assign to Universal Philosophy — the second to 
Special Philosophy, such as the Philosophy of Ethics, 
Physics, Law, &c. 

By this division we may, in a degree, be better able 



PROLOGUE. I 

1o know the ground we survey, and more readily know 
what to do with the materials we gather. 

The division of Philosophy into universal and special, 
tends to induce a search for universal analogies, gener- 
alizations, and harmonies ; and through the discovery 
and clear enunciation of general laws, to bring together 
facts which now appear isolated and disconnected, and 
thus perhaps reconciling ideas heretofore held to be 
contradictory. 

For example, what two things could appear more 
disconnected than the fall of an apple and the revolu- 
tions of planets ? Yet by the mighty grasp of Newton's 
mind, through a rigorous process of generalization, 
these two facts are shown to be identical in essence, 
and assignable to the same universal law. 

Before then how many and how unsatisfactory were 
the theories invented to explain the movements of the 
planetary system ; but the discovery and proof of a 
universal fact, or rather the well-grounded generaliza- 
tion of an infinite variety of apparently independent 
facts under one universal law, removed dissensions, 
cleared the rubbish of ages from the current of intellec- 
tual progress, and allowed it to flow into broader and 
deeper beds. 

Our idea of Philosophy is therefore simply this : it 
is the searcher and enumerator of universal truths ; 
and, as such, it attends to the classification of science 
in general. 

So when universal truths are considered in them- 



8 HUMANICS. 

selves and independently of any particular science, or 
when facts (general or limited) are considered as with 
reference to any synthetical view of all science, or for 
the purposes of unlimited generalization, then we are 
within the purview of Philosophy proper, or as I w r ould 
prefer to term it, " Universal Philosophy." 

But should general ideas, or the general connection 
of all things, or the dependency of each thing upon all 
things, be considered with reference to any particular 
science, or should we syncretize the facts of that science 
so as to reduce them to one or a few primary principles, 
then we have its especial philosophy. Hence the ex- 
pressions Philosophy of Language, Mind, Morals, Gov- 
ernment, Law, &c. 

Now that we have defined Philosophy, and ascer- 
tained what really belongs to it, in the apportionment 
of science, let us resume the subject of Humanics. 

Humanics is the science of man. 

As with regard to Philosophy, let us be careful not 
to give greater extension to Humanics than properly 
belongs to it. 

"We are apt to look into nature only so far as it con- 
cerns or affects us ; or, considering all things, from the 
weed and worm to the stars and sun, as made for man 
alone, we are prone to view all distinct sciences as mere 
details of the science of man ; but the immensity of 
creation soon crushes our presumption, and we must 
dwindle into a limited sphere, contenting ourselves with 
being— what we really are — a small, but wonderful 



PROLOGUE. 9 

portion of God's work : high, no doubt, in the scale, 
yet only a single term of an infinite series. 

Hence, recalling the fact that all sciences are con- 
nected and dependent upon each other, let us endeavor to 
mark the place of Humanics. To do this, let us find, 
if possible, the traits which it does not borrow from any 
other science or from Universal Philosophy. 

Every science bears the impress of our nature ; for 
no science can be framed without calling into service 
the powers of our physical, moral, and intellectual con- 
stitution. 

Yitality and the love of Self, or egotism, assert the 
claims of life and liberty developed in Jurisprudence, 
Government, &c. 

Sensation and the love of Truth, or of reality, gather 
the concrete and abstract contents of all knowledge. 

Emotion and the love of Society, or social feelings, 
furnish the moral and spiritual motives which prevail 
in Ethics, Political Economy, &c. 

Thought and the sense of Utility, give the processes 
and the forms disclosed by Mathematics, Logic, JEs- 
thetics, &c. 

Action and the love of Evolution, impel to the prac- 
tical uses of our bodily organization, and to the con- 
crete formation of the Arts, Language, &c. 

Every science involves in itself our physical and 
moral constitution — every art is the work of that consti- 
tution. Hence, sciences and arts necessarily conform 
to human nature itself, and are moulded agreeably to 



10 HUMANICS. 

it as their matrix and author ; but it is not the province 
of any science, except Httmanics, to study man in the 
aggregate, and in every particular, as a distinct or 
pivotal subject of knowledge. 

Indeed, in teaching Mathematics, Logic, Physic, 
Ethics, Art, &c, the essential elements of humanity 
from which they arise are only incidentally noted : 
sometimes all mention of them is entirely omitted. 

Thus, it is clear, a place in the classification of 
knowledge is necessarily marked for the science of Hu- 
manics. "While, without its contributions, the other 
sciences would be imperfect ; and while they all appeal 
to it for grounds and rationale, they do not singly or 
together profess to embrace its contents. Hence, Hu- 
manics is not only a specific science, but of great dig- 
nity and value. 

It singles out man from among the Zoological reign, 
and makes him the subject of especial study. "While it 
analyzes every detail of his organization and essence, 
it attaches itself principally to his distinguishing char- 
acteristics, and seeks to find their synthesis. 

Zoology herself sanctions the concession of a distinct 
place to Humanics ; for zoology has found it necessary, 
even when studying man as a mere animal, to set him 
apart from all others in a class by himself. 

If we considered any science to include, as a part of 
itself, all that is necessary to its proof or elucidation, 
then each science would comprise every science. All 
things are blended, interlinked, seriated, and reciprocal 



PROLOGUE. 11 

in the scheme of nature. Nothing can be absolutely 
isolated. Every atom relates to all atoms. Any fact 
belongs and relates to every other fact. For example, 
a vein of the body belongs to and depends upon the ag- 
gregate circulation of the blood. To explain a vein, the 
whole of anatomy, &c, must be studied. 

Hence, if other sciences must appeal to Humanics 
for proofs and landmarks, Humanics in turn must, for 
the same purpose, resort to them all. 

How then are we to know what properly belongs to 
Humanics, and what is merely collateral ? 

Simply by keeping in view our design, which is to 
know man as distinguishable from all the rest of ani- 
mate and inanimate nature. 

Every fact, every relation which enables us to do 
this, must be considered ; but the differentia and gen- 
eralizations, as applicable to man's nature, are alone 
the property of Humanics. 

With this delineation of the scope of our subject, 
and with this index to the object of our work, it will be 
impossible to confound Humanics with Philosophy. 
On the contrary, it seems to me that the distinction 
drawn, in another part of this prologue, between Special 
and Universal Philosophy, renders it useless to argue 
any further to show that the special philosophy of Hu- 
manics does not disturb the functions or diminish the 
sphere of Universal Philosophy. Hence, without fur- 
ther discussion, I refer to what I have already said 
above, merely adding : 



12 HUMANICS. 

Humanics brings all truth, to bear upon man ; seeks 
to prove his title to all that is peculiarly his own ; makes 
him the focus of intellectual vision. 

Philosophy, on the contrary, gathers all truth to 
generalize, independently, upon all existing things ; 
seeks to find the common property of all existences and 
phenomena ; displays the light of an intelligence all 
over the Universe. 

Humanics brings many truths to converge upon 
man. 

Philosophy views all truth as radiating from some 
grand principle, which man and every thing else must 
rely. 

Hence, Humanics must look into the whole nature 
of man. 

Zoology describes him only so far as he belongs to 
the series of sensational organisms. 

Psychology contemplates him only as an intellectual 
being. 

Ethics regards him only in his emotional char- 
acter. 

Physiology observes him only as the vehicle of vital 
functions. 

History depicts him as performing action. 

But man is not merely sentimental, moral, vital or 
automatic : he is all of these together. Hence it is 
necessary, in order to know him, to bring back these 
elements to their common centre, and to reconstitute 
the human unit. 



PROLOGUE. 13 

Let us therefore study each of the constituents : their 
co-ordination with the whole — their points of connec- 
tion as a body — their respective reaction as parts of the 
totality — their combination into a single man. 

And thus taking man as sensation, thought, emo- 
tion, vitality, and action forming together one organism, 
we proceed to our investigation. This division into — 

1. Vitality, 

2. Sensation, 

3. Emotion, 

4. Thought, 

5. Action, 

is the most radical, and withal the most adequate I can 
find, in the least number of general terms, to comprise all 
the phenomena exhibited by man as an organic entity. 

A lesser number would exclude many facts — many 
realities; so that a portion of the whole truth being 
omitted, we would often fail to make a just estimate 
or explanation of whatever we may be striving to 
solve or expound. 

A greater number of parts, we find upon trial, 
would only give <m&-divisions of the elements we have 
stated, obliterate clear marks of distinction, and thus 
create confusion. 

Vitally man embodies the conditions and processes 
of vegetative life : he has organs of generation, respira- 
tion, secretion, nutrition ; and so have plants, and like 
them he grows, lives, reproduces himself, decays, and 
dies. 



14 HUMANICS. 

Sensationally, man embodies the conditions and 
processes of animal life. Man feels, tastes, smells, 
hears, and sees ; and so do brutes. Like them, he has 
bones, muscles, nerves, blood, &c. Like them, he is 
locomotive, &c. 

Emotionally, man embodies not only the animal 
propensities, but also human sentiments. On the one 
side, he is the creature of instinct ; on the other, a 
moral agent. Thus, there is in emotion a link which 
connects with brute feeling, and another which unites 
with intelligence. 

Intellectually, man embodies distinct elements, and 
becomes essentially himself, finding ground to hope for 
a total severance of the thread which ties him to 
matter. 

Actively, man combines all the elements of organic 
evolution, Life, Sensation, Emotion, and Thought, for 
the purposes of Truth, Beauty, Art, and Progress, and 
constantly vindicates on earth his claims to a Divine 
Parentage. 

Before proceeding, I submit the following table of 
the view I have taken of man, in this volume : 



VITALITY. 

I begin with this proposition : 

The distinction between Vegetable and Animal or- 
ganization is, that Vegetation does not, while Animality 
does, embody Sensation : their common attribute being 
Vitality. 

Plants have Vitality. 

Animals have Vitality and Sensation. 

Man (we note it here in advance) has Vitality, Sen- 
sation, and Thought. 

This differentia is conceded, tacitly or expressly, by 
all physiologists, and is a primary law of their classifi- 
cation. The moment they detect in any organism, 
however simple, an apparatus of sensation however 
embryonic, they give the organism a place in the 
animal kingdom ; but if it is devoid of any medium of 
sensation, it is conceded to vegetable nature. 

The difficulty they meet with, and which I will 
strive to overcome, is to draw the true demarcation 



16 HUMANICS. 

between vital and sensational acts. They are embar- 
rassed by some of the active phenomena that seemingly 
obliterate their line of distinction. In the lower grades 
of animal life there are organisms which naturalists 
have hesitated to rank above plants, so incomplete and 
dull is their sensibility ; while some plants are so vital, 
they seem to exhibit sensation. 

Hence they have, in doubtful cases, resorted to a 
more minute investigation. In the lower varieties of 
Radiata and Mollusca, Infusoria and Polypi, a number 
of other conditions proper only to animal life, are 
found ; while in the highest development of sensitive 
plants — the Mimosa, Venus-Ely-Trap, and others 
showing tokens of sensibility — every analogy of form 
and process serves to identify them with vegetable 
life. 

Thus one plurality of signs belongs to vegetation, 
and another to animality. Each reign has indicia pe- 
culiarly its own ; and wherever a single phenomenon 
is apparently inconstant, a reference to the multiple in- 
dex, and to the assemblage of analogies, dispels every 
doubt. Every item of the index is not, however, found 
in every individual, yet there are always a sufficient 
number to make the test conclusive. 

The great number of these indicia, and the imper- 
fection of the words used to describe them, make it 
difficult to frame a summary definition of either class 
of organisms. Practically, however, our knowledge of 
the marks which belong to one kingdom or to the other, 



VITALITY. 17 

precludes any error. We know from constant experi- 
ence the peculiar forms and modes of each ; and, thus 
looking upon nature, we never fail to distinguish a 
plant from an animal. 

The certainty and ease with which this is done by 
means of the multiple index and the sum or assemblage 
of types found in each individual, has dispensed Phi- 
losophers from a strict allotment of the attributes of Vi- 
tality, Sensation, and Thought ; and they are not clearly 
separated from one another. 

Hence great confusion and doubt arises when we 
seek to assign certain acts either to life, instinct, or 
reason. 

In a psychological, ethical, religious, humanic point 
of view, it is important that this confusion and doubt 
should be made to disappear. 

To do this my method is very simple. I will take 
man as a sum total, subtract from this totality all the 
phenomena exhibited by vegetation ; and these I will 
class as the attributes of Vitality. Then subtracting all 
the phenomena exhibited by sub-human animals, I will 
class their attributes as Sensational; and will assign 
the clear remainder, if any I find, to Thought — to Hu- 
manity. 

When this operation is performed, we will then see 
that we have been too prone to consider all acts per- 
formed by man as dictated by thought — that when we 
see a sub-human animal do any act that man does, we 
have been too prone to regard it as the work of intelli- 



18 HUMANICS. 

gence — that we have not raised instinct in man suffi- 
ciently high, whilst we have drawn the inferior limit of 
Thought too low ; thus refusing to life and instinct due 
credit for much they do for us, and charging thought 
with deeds to which it never degrades itself. 

The certainty with which we can fix the limits of 
vegetable, animal, and human life physically, will en- 
able us to fix the same limits psychologically. The phys- 
ical circle will serve us to ascertain the metaphysical 
boundaries ; and though yielding (to matter or to vi- 
tality and instinct) all and every act and deed ever 
done by plant or sub-human animal, there will still re- 
main a mind for man alone — a pure and glorious mind 
which may claim a child-to-father-relationship with 
God. 

Why accept this physical boundary between Vital- 
ity, Sensation, and Thought ? "Why accord to Vitality 
all and every phenomenon exhibited by Vegetation — 
to Sensation every other phenomenon exhibited by sub- 
human animals — and leave to man, as his own essential 
property, the residue only ? We answer, simply be- 
cause the distinction is visible, is dictated by the real 
and direct state of the case, and has the merit of being 
the work of Nature's God himself. We have no right 
to obliterate or disturb the lines drawn in nature. Phi- 
losophers profess to base their systems on nature itself 
— to find in nature the proof of their ideations. Hence 
they ought not to allow the vagueness and imperfection 



VITALITY. 19 

of language to confuse them ; and hence, after once 
affixing the terra " Vitality " or " Life," as entering into 
the definition of a plant, as being the essential content 
which distinguishes a plant from inorganic matter, they 
cannot, when they behold in man any phenomenon, 
force, process, or act previously observed in plants, at- 
tribute these phenomena to any other force or law than 
that of Vitality. The consistency and plainness of lan- 
guage requires this. If what is merely vital in plants 
ceases to be so when discovered in man, an insoluble 
contradiction arises : language no longer enunciates 
any distinct conception : one thing receives several 
names, and these names become expressive of ideas sug- 
gested by the other terms " Sensation " or " Thought ; " 
and thus the things themselves become confounded or 
irreconcilable. When we admit, once for all, that every 
organic action seen in plants is vital, no matter how 
complex and wonderful it may be, we will not be em- 
barrassed to distinguish vital from sensational forces in 
the acts of animals ; and the boundary between vegeta- 
ble and animal kingdoms, between Vitality and Sensa- 
tion, will be as plain in philosophy as it is in physiolo- 
gy. Is the shrinking of the mimosa, the motion of the 
sun-flower, a vital or a sensational phenomena ? Phi- 
losophy by her definitions of terms has left this doubt- 
ful. To solve the doubt, let us. try the effect of a posi- 
tive determination of the extent of each term — let vital- 
ity and vegetation embrace the same purview ; and, 
allowing nature to speak for herself, let us hope that 



20 HUMANICS. 

she will, in her admirable consistency, enable us to un- 
derstand man better than we do. 

As between Sensation and Thought let us adopt the 
same rule — let all acts of sub-human animals be yielded 
to Yitality and Sensation ; and let these be the purview 
of instinct and consciousness in man as well as beast. 
Is the act of the " Dog of Montargis " wholly sensa- 
tional, or is it intelligent ? If the latter, then where 
does instinct end and thought begin — then what distinct 
and exclusive claim can man assert to the immortality 
of the soul? Is it not plain, that if we do not give 
away to vitality and sensation, (to their forces and laws.) 
all that the Dog of Montargis did, the line between An- 
imality and Human nature is effaced, or becomes doubt- 
ful, so that instinct and thought could hardly be distin- 
guished. 

It is well settled that if we wish to understand our- 
selves, reason clearly, and be understood by others, we 
should as much as possible avoid using words in an am- 
biguous or equivocal sense. Hence, if we sanction the 
term " intelligent " as applicable to the actions of a 
Dog, we must be at a loss to find some other term to 
express the peculiar nature of the superinstinctive acts 
of man. Even the word rational would not do : for ra- 
tionality and intelligence import one another. Thus, if 
we wish to avoid in Hiyiianics, the fallacies of ambigu- 
ous middle, &c, so often denounced by scholastic logic, 
we must cease to designate the actions of sub-human 
animals, dogs, &c, as "intelligent;" or must restrict 



VITALITY. 21 

the term to the faculty of direct perceptions — to imme- 
diate sensation alone. If the term must embrace the 
tricks of a Fox, as well as the manifestations of God's 
mind in the Universe, the sooner it is discarded, for ob- 
scurity and uncertainty, the better. Rather than cheat 
ourselves and others by the use of such terms, new 
terms of exact and limited meaning should be invented. 
We might, for instance : 

Instead of Vitality, say Veoetality ; 

instead of Sensation, &c, say Animality ; 

instead of Intelligence, &c, say Hitmanality ; 
and place in each of these terms the phenomena pecu- 
liar to itself : that is to say, from Humanality exclude 
all that man has in common with the other animals, 
and from Animality all that the animals have in com- 
mon with Plants. 

Thus, in the conformity of language with reality, we 
may harmonize philosophy with nature. 

Is it not absurd to attribute to the intelligence of 
man any of the processes or acts which plants accom- 
plish as thoroughly as he does ? Is it not plain that 
none of the evolutions of a plant can be attributed to 
an intelligence or will of its own ? — that a plant's evolu- 
tions are involuntary and mechanical ? — that the same 
evolutions in man must be also unintelligent and instinc- 
tive ? It seems very idle to ask such a question ; yet it 
is too true that the neglect to ask it gives place to con- 
tinual and manifold error, and even to great systems 



22 HUMANICS. 

of philosophy. It is because we habitually refer all hu- 
man action, however involuntary it may appear, to our 
rational faculty and voluntary powers, that Locke, and 
Hume, and Condillac, and their successors, have suc- 
ceeded in establishing their school of " Sensationalism." 
For instance, finding that man prefers to eat the 
fruit of the trees, and never thinks of pasturing on the 
grass of the fields, they are prone to attribute his choice 
to reasoned experience, rather than to the instinct which 
clings the infant to his mother's breast ; and thus, hav- 
ing confounded our thought with our instinct, the sen- 
sationalist cannot discern any attribute in man which 
beasts do not also possess. 

AH the internal or external movements of which 
plants are capable are phenomena of Vegetality. Ev- 
ery thing a plant does is vital — and nothing else — 
nothing more. 

None will dispute this proposition ; but the conse- 
quences which it produces are of the greatest impor- 
tance, and require the close attention of every philoso- 
pher. 

"What are these movements of plants ? Can plants 
do any thing ? Can they do any thing which we are 
in the habit of attributing to Sensation and Thought ? 

How much of what we usually accord to Animality 
or Humanality must we restore to Vegetality ? How 
much of the constitution of man must we set apart as 
belonging to mere Yegetation ? What forces, organs, 



VITALITY. 23 

processes, and acts are common to plants, animals, and 
men ? In fact, when we shall have performed the oper- 
ation of subtracting these from the snm of man's con- 
stituent elements, may it not appear that we have here- 
tofore been confounding the workings of our vegetative 
organism with the higher display of sensation and 
thought? 
Let us see. 

Plants are capable of : 

1st. Absorption and involution of heat, light, and 

electricity ; 
2d. Respiration of aerial gases ; 
3d. Ingestion and preparation of aliment; 
4th. Circulation of nutritive elements ; 
5th. Assimilation and growth ; 
6th. Evolution and radiation of heat, light, and 

electricity ; 
7th. Exhalation of aerial gases ; 
8th. Secretion and excretion ; 
9th. Generation and reproduction ; 
10th. Dormancy and death. 
Plants have functions common also to animals, as if 
a plant were, to that extent, an animal; or, as if an 
animal were, to that extent, a plant. The plant — 1, 
gathers warmth, &c. ; 2, breathes ; 3, eats and drinks ; 
4, bleeds ; 5, digests and assimilates ; 6, radiates ; 7, 
exhales ; 8, sweats ; 9, copulates and breeds ; 10, sleeps 
and dies; and, in these respects, plants are alike to 
animals. 



24 



HUMANICS. 



The fact that the plant eats and respires the very 
things which animals excrete and exhale, not only fur- 
nishes a beautiful example of the economy, equipoise, 
and co-ordination of nature, but also makes proof of a 
correspondence of functions in the two kingdoms of the 
organic world. 

On this point, I call attention to the following 
parallel, which I find at page 141 of Professor Allen's 
admirable work, " The Philosophy of the Mechanics of 
Nature : " 

" Antagonistic forces and functions developed oy the oppositely 
modified propagation of the electro-dynamic action of the sun y 
through the mechanisms of the organs of plants and of the 
organs of animals. 

" The electro-dynamic action of the sun when propagated 
through the modifying agency of the organs of — 



PLANTS, 



{Carbon, 
Oxygen, 
Hydrogen, 
Nitrogen, 
From their natural fluid j Water, 
inorgani-c static con--< Carb. Acid Gas, 

ditions of ( Nitrog'n of Air, 

To the constrained solid i Vegetable or- 
organic static con--; ganic forma- 

ditions of ( tions ; 

and continually sustains these groupings 
of atoms of vegetable formations in the 
variously modified conditions of 

Cohesion, as exhibited J pi^' 
m '-- •• I Cotton, &c. ; 

{India Eubber, 
Wooden 
Springs, &c. ; 



Acids, do., 
Alkalies, do.. 



do., 
do., 



Food, 
Fuel, 



do., do.. 



do., do., 



Lemons, 
1 Sorrel, &c. ; 
j Morphine, 
j Strychnine; 
i Cereals, 
•< Fruits, and 
( Grasses ; 
I Wood, 
1 Peat, &c. ; 



ANIMALS, 



f Carbon, 
! Hydrogen, 



Restores the same, ^ 

atoms of 1 Oxygen 

[_ Nitrogen, 
To their natural fluid I Water, 
inorganic static con--< Carb. Acid Gas, 

ditions of ( Nitrogen, 

From their constrained i Vegetable or- 
solid static conditions «j ganic forma- 

of ( tions ; 

and continually sustains these groupings 
of atoms of animal formations in the vari- 
ously modified conditions of 

Cohesion, as exhibited j Silk, 
*i 1 Wool, &c. ; 



Elasticity 


do., 


do., 


j Whalebone, 
| Horn, &c. ; 


Acids, 


do., 


do., 


J Oils, 

1 Fat, &c. ; 


Alkalies, 


do., 


do., 


| Saliva, 

\ Gastric Juice 


Food, 


do., 


do., 


J Meats, 

"1 Fishes, &c. ; 


Fuel, 


do., 


do., 


I Oil, 

( Fats, &c. 



VITALITY. 25 



during the recoil of all these groupings of atoms of both vegetable 
and animal organic formations to their natural static condition of 
carbonic acid gas and water, the inorganic reaction popularly recog- 
nized as the phenomena of 

Fermentation, 

Combustion 

Heat, 

Light, 

Electricity, 

Steam Power, 

Animal Motive Power." 

And he should have added, vegetable motive power ; 
for we shall show that plants have also MOTIOE". 

The forces which the professor mentions as " antag- 
onistic," are, doubtless, identical, for he describes them 
under a single term, " the electro-dynamic action of the 
sun." At any rate, they r are harmonic, and reciprocat- 
ing in their work ; and there is a parity in the mechanism 
of their instruments of production. 

I will not extend the limits of this work to repeat 
what may be found in any work of comparative 
physiology, in order to show how nature has framed the 
first germ-cells, or embryonic net- work, for nutrition, 
respiration, generation, &c, in the plant ; and how, by 
specializations more and more complex and definite, 
it becomes possible for individual organisms to live 
without having roots in the ground, and to move from 



26 HUMANICS. 

place to place. It may be noted, however, en passant, 
that at the boundary between vegetation and animality, 
among the zoophytes, for instance, the animal is 
attached to a root ; while, among the zoospores, for 
instance, the vegetable moves freely in space. 

In fact, I may safely assume, on the authority of 
the best physiologists, that plants have throats, lungs, 
ducts, pores, intestines, seminal parts, &c. ; all the 
apparatus necessary for their rudimentary process of 
nutrition, respiration, and reproduction ; else how could 
they perform these functions ? 

Hence, a portion of man's nature is vegetal. 

On this point there can be no doubt, and discussion 
would serve to make it more and more evident ; for 
natural history and natural science abound with facts 
— analogies, seriations, and equations — to exemplify 
and demonstrate it. 

But what of MOTION? Does vegetality import 
motion f Is the force which sustains vegetality pro- 
ductive of motion ? If it does so, then to what extent 
are the motions of animals attributable to the principle 
of vegetality ? 

These are questions which it is necessary to solve 
with clearness, in order to disentangle the science of 
man. Yet these questions have been much neglected ; 
and to this neglect must we assign much of the obscuri- 
ty and uncertainty of Psychology. While we have been 
constantly comparing man with the lower animals ; 



VITALITY. 27 

while we do not hesitate to find analogies between him 
and the insect, the reptile, the fish, the bird, and the 
beast, we too often omit, and even seem to dread, to 
extend onr comparisons to the herbage and trees which 
live around us, and which, perpetually for our use, 
elaborate the breath and bread of organic life. Surely, 
many a debate upon instinct and volition, voluntary 
and involuntary action, would have been saved, had 
the functional motions of plants been studied, and had 
their connatural identity with the functional motions of 
animals been, at the same time, ascertained. 

We should have remembered, that if we move at 
all, we owe our power of doing so to the vital forces 
within us. The vital forces are, in animals, the motors 
of every functional process ; but they work in plants as 
well as in animals. Plants have the vital force — plants 
have life — they contain no other principle of functional, 
physiological, or organic motion. Hence, if plants 
exhibit any movement, it must be attributed to the 
automatic forces of vitality only ; and hence, too, the 
same forces must be capable of producing the same 
movements in animals as in plants. Hence, all the 
acts of man of which plants are capable, are the evolu- 
tions of his vegetality / and, to that extent, man's nature 
is identical with that of vegetation. 

Plants seek the light. — By an instinct of self-pres- 
ervation, they always direct their stems towards the 
points from which they may best obtain the luminous 



28 HUMANICS. 

ray necessary to their vitality. They strive to expose 
the surface of their leaves to the greatest light ; that is 
to say, towards the southern sky. The sun-flower greets 
the rising orb of day, and follows him in his course. 
The hedysarum gyrans has movements which vary 
according to light and shade ; for, in the sun light, the 
central leaflet of its petioles is erect, and, in the shade, 
or in the night, it is depressed ; while, on the other 
hand, the two lateral leaflets of the petioles have an 
oscillating motion, which, incessant during both day 
and night, increases or diminishes in rapidity with the 
degree of heat, being slower in cold, and quicker in 
warm weather. 

If, in a cellar, we place tuberculous roots, such as 
potatoes, they will sprout on the side opposite the trap 
door or window. 

Mustel, the naturalist, planted a jessamine vine in a 
flower-pot ; placed the flower-pot in a high box ; pierced 
loop-holes in the sides of the box; carried it into a 
cellar, which had only one opening to admit the light, 
and left the vine to grow. It grew towards the light y 
and came out through the loop-holes on that side. 
Then he turned the box, so that the loop-holes which 
had been on the dark side, became exposed to the 
light, and so that those which had been opposite the 
window were thrown into darkness. Thereupon, the 
vine turned its stem, changed the direction of its 
growth, re-entered the box, then grew across it, and 
came out again through the loop-holes of the recently 



VITALITY. 29 

illuminated side. Mustel repeated this alternation of 
light and darkness several times, making a series of 
loop-holes at each change of position ; and the effect 
continued till the interior of the box became filled with 
a mat-work of vine. 

Was there not an instinctive power in that vine, to 
thus pursue that light ? 

Plants extract {from Water, Air, <&c.) the Heat 
necessary to their preservation and growth. — The ob- 
vious fact that snow at the foot of a tree melts sooner 
than snow at a distance, proves that plants possess a 
temperature higher in winter than in summer. That 
the temperature is lower in summer is equally well 
proved by the coldness of the fluid which is discharged 
from many vines and vine-like plants when cut across. 
These phenomena have been examined with great care 
by many celebrated naturalists ; and the result has 
been the universal admission that the heat of plants in 
winter is several degrees higher, and in summer several 
degrees lower, than that of the external air. 

In winter, the temperature of the earth and of the 
water below its surface, is higher than that of the at- 
mosphere ; and, therefore, pump or suck up only the 
water, &c, they can obtain from the ground below. In 
summer, the water in the earth is cooler than the air ; 
and the plants, having absorbed it by their roots, evolve 
it through their stems and leaves, dispensing freshness 
around us. 



30 HUMANICS. 

To germinate, plants concentrate heat in their seeds 
and germ-cells — to generate, they collect it in their 
pistils, stamens, and sperm-cells. During both these 
processes in plants, the heat is greatest in those parts 
which perform the function in progress. 

" May we not therefore conclude that nature has 
given to plants the power of extricating for themselves 
an additional supply of caloric, at the important periods 
of hybernation, germination, and impregnation % " 

Let us note, en passant, that the organisms of plants 
(as well as of animals) are varied with, and adapted to, 
the temperature of the localities in which they are 
found. 

Thus geographers are able to divide the world into 
regions of altitude, of latitude, and of surface, to which 
certain plants, animals, and races of men are aboriginal : 
they class the Proteacea, the Kangaroo, and the Aus- 
tralian in one group — the Banian, the Elephant, and 
Hindoo in another, &c. Different plants, like different 
races of men, have their appropriate climates ; but cli- 
mate, as a cause, is not sufficient to explain the varie- 
ties ; so that the design of God, and the intervention of 
his Wisdom and Will in the distribution of the laws of 
organic motion and formation must be proclaimed. 

Plants are actually sensible to Electricity. — It has 
long been known that Electricity influences the growth 
of plants. Pouillet's experiments demonstrate that 
during the process of vegetation, electricity is constant- 



VITALITY. 31 

ly generated ; and this, also, during the process of 
decomposition. " If a wire be placed in apposition 
with the bark of a growing plant, and another be passed 
into the pith, contrary electrical states are indicated, 
when tested by an electrometer. If platinum wires 
be passed into the two extremities of a fruit, they will 
be found to present opposite conditions. In some fruits, 
as the apple or pear, the stalk is negative and the eye 
positive, whilst in such as the peach or apricot, the 
contrary state exists. If a prune be divided equato- 
rially, and the juice be squeezed into two vessels, the 
portions will in like manner indicate opposite electrical 
states, although no difference can be perceived in their 
chemical qualities." 

Now, the author from whom I have copied this 
passage, adds : " All that has been said of the effects 
of vegetation, in producing a disturbance of electric 
equilibrium, will manifestly apply to the nutritive pro- 
cesses of animals also ; and there is no deficiency of 
indications that such is the case."* 

Nor does he fail to recite them. 

The respiration of carbonic acid gas, and the expi- 
ration of oxygen and carbon, by vegetation, is too well 
known to need any description here ; but, let it be noted, 
that the breathing of animals is an act or movement as 
entirely involuntary and automatic as it is in plants. 

* Carpenter's Com. Anatomy, p. 462. 



32 HUMANICS. 

Yet it is motion or action in both. 

E"o volition or design of the individual has any thing 
whatever to do with it. It goes on passively, just as a 
machine does when supplied with the element of pro- 
pulsion. Inside the organism, as in a steam engine, 
there is a chemical force or action which seizes and de- 
composes the fuel. The only difference is, that in one 
case the fuel is carried to the furnace by the act of 
man, and in the other it is supplied by the act of God. 

In both ca&as the instrument, whether machine or 
organism, vegetable or man, is unconscious of its own 
movement in reducing the aerial gases to their elements. 
Man may know that he breathes, but his knowledge 
takes no part in the action. In fact, the breathing of 
animals goes on during sleep / and Buffon very forcibly 
says : 

" A plant is an animal asleep." 

Yet, with all this unconsciousness, the leaves (those 
bronches or lungs of plants) must, to fulfil their functions, 
be free to assume a suitable position, and are capable of 
motion to place themselves in that necessary position. 

The upper surface of a leaf is provided with a tough 
and glossy cuticle, which serves as a protection to its 
delicate pores and cells. Now, if we try to change the 
relative position of the two sides of the leaf, if we place 
the upper side down, so as to expose the tender parts, 
soon will we see the leaf turn upon its axis to resume 
its original and proper attitude, and finally set its shel- 
tering roof again towards the sky, so as to shed the rain 



VITALITY. 33 

and reflect the light. Like the sleeping man who 
" turns in his bed," the unconscious plant has an in- 
stinct to put the body in the best posture for the com- 
fortable play of its organs. 

Plants procure their food. — It is erroneous to suppose 
that when a plant is in want of nutriment, it remains 
passive. On the contrary, it seeks its proper food and 
takes it, if within its reach. 

If a rose-tree is planted on the verge-line between 
two different soils, this fertile and that sterile, the 
roots, as soon as they adhere to the earth, will begin to 
spread in all directions ; but soon those which have en- 
tered the sterile ground turn off from their course, as if 
they had found out that their mates enjoyed better fare. 
A bend is formed, and the roots grow in the direction 
of the richer ground. Now, if (to prevent these greedy 
travellers from interfering with their well-fed neigh- 
bors) a ditch is dug on the line of demarcation, the 
poorly-fed roots will grow first downwards, and then 
under the ditch, till they reach the more congenial 
juices they started to obtain. 

Plants drink.— Who is not familiar with the effects 
exhibited when the dry ground around plants is moist- 
ened from the watering-pot, or by a shower of rain ? 
The thirsty vegetation, with the tiny throats of its roots 
and epidermis, takes up the liquid boon, and becomes 
refreshed and invigorated. Call this absorption if you 



34 HUMANICS. 

please ; but remember that special organs are appro- 
priated to the purpose. The " spongioles " are the or- 
gans specially destined for introducing the fluid nutri- 
ment into the system. These spongioles are located in 
the root of the plant, and are beautifully adapted to the 
object. Many of the lower animals are no better pro- 
vided, and some (the Actiniform and Alegonian polypes, 
for instance) receive water by simple transudation. 
Man also has his absorbent vessels operating impercep- 
tibly to him. But it is said the higher animals seek 
for, find and swallow the water they need. Yea ; and 
so do the higher plants. 

" Thus," says the Journal of the Eoyal Agricultural 
Society, "it was noticed that when the water of the 
New River was conveyed through wooden pipes, that 
if these pipes were carried within thirty yards of trees, 
the roots would find the joints of the pipes, and fill the 
interior with foxtails of fibres." "It is well known to 
the Agriculturalist," says the Gardener's Magazine, 
" that the course of large drains, even at a considerable 
depth in the ground, is liable to be interrupted by the 
extension of roots not only from trees, but also from 
apparently insignificant plants. Thus at Saucethorpe 
in Lincolnshire, a drain nine feet deep was filled 
up by the roots of an elm tree which was growing at 
upwards of fifty yards from the drain." The Magazine 
cites many other examples, and among the rest : " a 
lime tree which grew at a distance of about fifteen feet 
from the shaft of a well, sent a single root through the 



VITALITY. 35 

soil in a direct line towards a point of the shaft at 
which there was a small aperture left l>y the deficiency 
of a lynch : this aperture was at a height above the 
level of the water in the well, but the root having past 
through it, divided into a bush-like mass of fibres which 
descended into the water, and formed a large mass at 
the bottom of the well." Countless instances, fully as 
remarkable as this, might be adduced ; but it is useless. 
Every cultivator and botanist knows full well, that 
plants can and do "go to drink." As the plant cannot 
remove itself to a new situation, it overcomes this diffi- 
culty by an elongation of its radial fibres. 

Hundreds of instances parallel to the above might 
be selected from the natural history of animals. 

Here is one extracted from a recent number of the 
" Scientific American : " 

" Fishes Travelling by Land : — Dr. Hancock, in the 
Zoological Journal, gives a description of a fish called 
the fiat-head hassar, that travels to pools of water when 
that in which it has resided dries up. Bose also de- 
scribes another variety which is found in South Carolina, 
and, if our memory serves us well, also in Texas, which, 
like the flat-head, leaves the drying pools in search of 
others. These fishes, filled with water, travel by night, 
one with a lizard-like motion, and the other by leaps. 
The South Carolina and Texas varieties are furnished 
with a membrane over the mouth, in which they are 
enabled to carry with them a supply of water to keep 
their gills moist during their travel. These fishes 7 



36 HUMANICS. 

guided by some peculiar sense, always travel in a 
straight line to the nearest water. This they do with- 
out the aid of memory, for it has been found that if a 
tub filled with water is sunk in the ground near one of 
these pools, which they inhabit, they will, when the 
pool dries up, move directly toward the tub. Surely 
this is a wonderful and merciful provision for the 
preservation of these kind of fishes ; for, inhabiting, as 
they do, only stagnant pools, and that too, in countries 
subject to long and periodical droughts, their races 
would, but for this provision, become extinct." 

Now, if we attribute the action of the new-born 
child who instantly begins to suck his mother's breast — 
the action of the sick dog cropping the herb which 
makes him vomit — the action of the young duck resort- 
ing to the water — the action of the fox dodging and 
misleading the hunters — the action of the bee and 
beaver building their cell or dam, to intelligence of 
any kind, consistent reason would oblige us to confess 
that the action of plants, in seeking food and drink, is 
also intelligent; for the two courses of action are es- 
sentially alike. "We would thus tacitly or expressly 
admit that plants possess a quantum of intelligence in 
themselves, sufficient for the uses of their organism ; 
but knowing that such is not the case, that it would be 
doing violence to language and fact to apply the term 
''intelligent," to any act or motion of plants, we find it 
necessary, absolutely necessary to reverse the case ; and to 
find in the " vegetative " functions and forces of animals 



VITALITY. 37 

the laws of their action in seeking, selecting, and con- 
suming their food, etc. By this reversion, order at 
once appears ; and the impulses of vitality and instinct 
(in man, as well as in other animals and vegetables) 
being once known, however complex they may be, as 
distinct from the deliberations of thought, they may 
then be comprehended. 

Plants copulate and breed. — To fulfil this function 
they are capable of movements or acts of great com- 
plexity, similar to the movements and acts of animals 
in the process of fecundation and reproduction ; and it 
is impossible to discover any essential difference, in 
this order of phenomena, between vegetable and ani- 
mal organisms. 

To show this — to show that there is nothing especi- 
ally animal in the act of generation, but that it is with 
every functional and sensible motion connected with it, 
equally vegetative, it is only necessary to make a com- 
parison between the two kingdoms — taking the animal 
as the pivot of the comparison. 

1. Animals have two sexes. 

Since more than a century the distinction of gender 
is known to exist in plants. 

2. Some animals are hermaphrodites. 

A great number of plants are in the same con- 
dition. 

3. Some animals (the Helix and other univalves) 



38 HUMANICS. 

have both sexes distinct in each individual, but to be 
impregnated they require another individual having 
also this double sex, and the act of conjugation is done 
by the double pair. 

The Mulberry and other Linnsean Monaecia are 
adapted to this mode of generation. 

4. In many classes of animals, and indeed in the 
greatest number, the individuals are of different and 
separate sex. 

All the Dioecia are in this state ; the sexes in this 
class of plants being not only in separate flowers, but 
in different individuals. 

5. Many animals fecundate by couples, and by 
approach and conjugation. 

At the period of fecundation of certain species of 
confer vse, the two tubes which are the sexual organs 
of the plant, approach, meet, and intergroove ; and 
then, the male tube ejects a thick, greenish liquid, 
which enters the female tube and there coagulates ; 
but in time, it breaks the sheath, and comes forth a 
ready formed, though tiny, plant. 

6. The fecundation of many birds, reptiles, &c, 
consists in mere contact. 

So it is with some plants which are reproduced by 
the mere contact of " germ cells," and " sperm cells." 

7. The male among fishes casts its spawn upon the 
waters ; and the current or wave carries it to the eggs 
the female has left upon the sand. 

Similar to this is the well-known fact, that there 



VITALITY. 39 

are male flowers which cast their pollen into the air, 
and that the winds convey it to the distant female. 

8. Many animals are viviparous, producing a live 
progeny. 

The lilies and other such plants, produce little plants 
already formed at the moment of birth. 

9. Many animals (birds, reptiles, &c.) are viviparous ; 
that is to say, are reproduced by eggs. 

The seeds of plants, are really vegetable eggs. 

10. Animals in the act of generation evince signs 
of the most energetic sensibility. 

So do plants : the Arum, for instance, evolves a 
burning heat, and changes color during the process of 
conjugation. 

11. The polypus is multiplied by division. 
Plants are reproduced from cuttings. 

This parallel might be carried much further ; and a 
volume of details might be adduced to show that the 
generation of animals and of vegetables should be re- 
cognized physiologically as identical phenomena. If 
the modus varies among animals, it also varies among 
vegetables ; but an essential parity can always be 
pointed out. 

At the same time, I call attention to the fact, that 
vegetables move themselves — perform visible movements 
to accomplish the generative function. 

It is generally known : 

That the " stamen " bends itself to kiss the " pistil," 
and impart the " pollen." 



40 HUMANICS. 

That the " spore " detaches itself— the " spiral- 
filiment " whirls itself out of its own cell to enter into 
the " germ cell," or female organ. 

That a " capsule " when its seed is ripe, will sud- 
denly open itself, curl its palms inwards, and as by a 
spring cast or scatter its seeds to a distance around. 

Thus, among animals, when the male chases the 
female — when he courts her favor — when in heat she 
gladly yields — the act that takes place must, I contend, 
be considered as purely automatic, and to be determined 
by impulse, emotion, instinct. Though the animal may 
be conscious of these acts, they are none the less involun 
tary and vegetal ; for if they were not due to vegetality 
alone, and if sensation were requisite, plants, not being 
possessed of sensation, could not perform them, with 
such complication as we find revealed by vegetable 
physiology. 

Plants sleep and die. — They require sleep to re- 
cuperate their vital elements, and they use the forces 
thus collected to resist with energy the advent of 
death. 

No fact is more fully conceded than the sleep of 
plants. When night sets in, vitality seems to retire 
from their periphery ; and the greatest number indi- 
cate by the drooping position of their leaves, the closing 
of their flowers, and the suspension of their inhalation 



VITALITY. 41 

of carbonic acid, that they are resting in sleep. Eor 
is this merely the effect of the absence of light ; for it 
has been ascertained that the leaves of plants kept con- 
stantly in the dark, open and close at regular intervals 
as during sleep. De Candolle tried the effect of artifi- 
cial light upon them, and often failed to disturb the 
regularity of the alternation. Some plants, (like Bats, 
&c.,) sleep during the day and watch at night. Others 
have their accustomed hours — some go to sleep in the 
morning or at mid-clay, some at midnight, &c. Thus 
naturalists, by selecting certain flowering plants, whose 
hours of sleep were different, have been able to com- 
pose the celebrated " Dial of Flora" which (by the 
opening and closing of the flowers of each plant in its 
turn) gives precise indication of the hour of the day or 
night. 

This phenomenon was discovered by Linngeus, under 
the following circumstances : Having sown some Lotus 
seed, he watched the progress of the plants, and at last 
discovered upon one of them two flowers. When 
evening came he could not find the flowers again, and 
supposed that some one had plucked them. On the 
following morning, to his great surprise, he beheld 
them again, and they once more disappeared at evening. 
He then examined the plants with care, and saw that 
at evening the leaflets had approached each other, and 
thus concealed the flowers from view. Struck by this, 
he pursued the investigations it suggested ; and the 
sleep of plants became a scientific fact. 



42 HUMANICS. 

Tlie death of plants is, like that of animals, occasioned 
by every cause which disturbs their organs and func- 
tions ; and like animals plants are able to resist, within 
certain limits, the attacks of disturbing agents. 

The calandala arvenisis folds its leaves at the ap- 
proach of a tempest. The Mimosa eburina lets its 
foliage hang down as soon as the shadow of a cloud 
threatens it with rain. Thus these, and other flowers, 
guard themselves against the weather. When the 
storm threatens, the movements of plants clearly indi- 
cate acts of self-preservation. The Quinque folia 
spreads its golden petals in the form of a tent so as to 
shed the water, but as soon as the rain ceases, she lifts 
her petals towards the sky, — the Umbelliferce fold into 
the form of a cap, — the Infundibiilce reverse their 
funnels toward the ground, — the Caryophylw hang their 
heads, — in short, every plant seems to foresee the dan- 
ger, and to use the means which nature has provided 
them with to avoid it. 

It is not only against the weather, but against many 
other accidents that plants are capable of self-protec- 
tion. 

Yine-like plants have tendrils which serve them to 
grasp and hold upon points of support, so that they 
cannot be thrown down. 

The Dioncea municipala or Yenus fly-trap, can de- 
stroy the insects that attack them. Their leaves are 
provided with double lamina fringed with slender hairs, 



VITALITY. 43 

and spread out like two wings, but which suddenly 
close as soon as touched by the aggressive insect, which 
is thus imprisoned and destroyed. 

The Chinese Pitcher JPlant, which grows in dry 
places, does' not waste the water it extracts from the 
ground, but its leaves are formed in the shape of a 
pitcher, having a regular lid, and hanging by a tendril, 
so as to hold the water and preserve it from evaporation, 
for future use. 

The Mimosa pudica is so vital, that it is commonly 
known as the " Sensitive plant," and has been cited as 
an example to show that plants are capable of sensa- 
tion ; while, on the contrary, it enables us to understand 
the muscular contractility of animals as a phenomena 
of their Vegetative nature distinct from their nervous 
or animal sensibility. The pinnated leaves of this plant 
shrink from the hand, or from any other substance or 
force which may touch them ; and no explanation of 
this movement will bear examination except that which 
attributes it to the recoil (automatic though it be) of a 
self-preservative disposition in the organism. 

The Boots and other organs of Plants suffer and die 
under the influence of poison and other uncongenial 
substances, such as arsenic, corrosive sublimate, opium, 
chrosine and the like, which produce upon them much 
the same effects as upon animals ; but they are as ca- 
pable of rejecting this injurious matter as they are of 
selecting their proper food. Bonnet and Dutochet 
proved this by many experiments, in which they used 



44 HUMANICS. 

fluids and soils impregnated with a variety of solu- 
tions, sucli as acetate of lead, common salt, &c, and 
they found that the roots would refuse or throw back 
ail substances unfit for their economy. 

VEGETALITY IN ANIMALITY. 

The preceding facts are sufficient, I think, to au- 
thorize an attempt to make a more definite division 
between vegetal and animal nature conjoined, but dis- 
tinguishable in animals themselves. 

It has been contended that an animal is a reversed 
vegetable ; that the central organs of the animal are 
found at the circumference of vegetables ; that the in- 
testines of animals have the functions of leaves and 
roots of animals ; that the intestines which are placed 
below the diaphragm of animals to adsorb and deposit 
Caebon and excrete Oxygen, correspond with the leaves 
of plants which are above the earth ; that the lungs of 
animals and the roots of plants, one at the upper and 
the other at the lower part, correspond in absorption of 
Oxygen and excretion of Caebon ; and so on. Whether 
this counter-similitude can be traced throughout, even 
to the process upon Hydrogen and Nitrogen, is unes- 
sential to our purpose ; for certain it is that the vital 
organs of animals are inside the body, and that there- 
fore they cannot be immediately moved into activity, 
as those of plants whose vital organs are on the out- 
side y and in direct contact with the elements on which 



VITALITY. 45 

they depend for life and activity. Hence, for animals 
there must be a medium to enable their organs to take 
in, and inosculate with, those elements. Hence, in order 
to enable them to communicate with the external world, 
the organs of respiration, digestion, circulation, genera- 
tion, &c, in animals are provided with nerves which 
impel those organs to the necessary acts of appropria- 
tion ; but we find upon investigation : 

1°. That these necessary motions for appropriation, 
&c, are not performed by the nerves, but are executed 
by the Muscles — uncontrolled by thought. 

2°. That the Nerves are only the medium of com- 
munication ; and so far as the vital functions are con- 
cerned, the nerves serving them perform their duty, 
independently of the will, and even of consciousness. 

The Muscular Tissues of the human body are the 
instruments of its movements — the nervous threads 
convey the stimulus to or from the muscles ; and this 
is done sometimes with and sometimes without the dic- 
tate of the will. 

For all the operations of the vital organs — -for all 
those operations which plants, as well as animals, are 
known to perform — the will (whether instinctive or 
rational) has no control — the whole movement inter- 
nally is purely mechanical ; and I hope to show here- 
after that even the external movements of sub-human 
animals are only the evolutions of an instinctive-will, 
however complicated they may be. 



46 HUMANICS. 

The action of muscle is accomplished through its 
power of " contractility" The muscular fibres, when 
irritated, draw themselves into a condensed form ; and, 
when the stimulus is discontinued, they relax into their 
normal tonicity. This corresponds with the contraction 
and relaxation of certain vegetable tissues, (Dionse, &c.,) 
of which the component cells, when irritated, produce 
a movement by means of a similar change of form. 

" Contractility " is a property of the muscle itself — 
" a power belonging to it in virtue of its peculiar struc- 
ture ; " * for numerous experiments have been made 
upon fibres when, separated from nervous connection ; 
and it is well settled their isolation does not destroy 
their energy and mobility. Even a single fibre, when 
isolated, may (by the aid of a microscope) be seen to 
contract and relax ; and when the severed leg of a 
Frog or Babbit has been set in motion by galvanism, 
and has ceased to move though the galvanism is con- 
tinued, it will recover its power if allowed to rest, and 
the movement will re-occur during several intermitted 
trials. 

The fibres of each muscle are arranged in the direc- 
tion in which it is destined to act ; and while all the 
muscles exhibit this disposition, a difference in the com- 
plexity of threads, gives two kinds of muscle — 1°, the 
striated, which act when stimulus is applied by the will 
through the nerves ; and 2°, the non-striated, which the 
will cannot influence. 

* Carpenter's Elements of Physiology. 



VITALITY. 47 

When a single striated fibre is touched by any irri- 
tating substance, it contracts singly and alone, and does 
not communicate its motion to any other; but when 
the stimulus is applied by the will, through the nerves, 
all the striated fibres composing the muscle will con- 
tract simultaneously. 

When a non-striated fibre is irritated, its contrac- 
tion will communicate itself to the others successively, 
so that by a single touch a wave of contraction and re- 
laxation is transmitted in the direction of the length of 
the muscle. 

Thus, it seems, there are active muscles — muscles 
which move, and yet are purely vegetative; while there 
are others which, though retaining their vegetality, are 
modified so as to be roused into action by the signals 
of animal sensation or the dictates of animal will ; and 
hence we might here draw a line to distinguish the 
striated fibres as animalized muscle, and the non-striated 
as vegetative muscle. 

But let us pursue our inquiry into the independent 
activity of muscular tissue. 

Contractility persists for a time after death, particu- 
larly in the limbs of cold-blooded animals, whose respi- 
ration, like that of plants, is low. The heart of a Frog 
will continue to beat many hours after its removal from 
the body ; and the Sturgeon's heart hung up to dry, has 
been seen to continue beating until the auricle had be- 
come so hard as to rustle during its movements. 



48 HUMANICS. 

Contractility exhibits itself when the fibre is touched 
by any strong chemical or even any solid inert sub- 
stance. The same result is produced by heat, cold, and 
electricity. 

Nor is contractility the only active power possessed 
by the unsentient tissues of the body. They have a se- 
lecting energy, which enables them to seize their appro- 
priate materials in requisite proportion. Their differ- 
ences of density and contexture — the variety in the 
proportions of their elements — render it necessary that 
they should be able to make a proper and measured 
extrication out of the current of circulation, or that cir- 
culation should give to each organ its exact and special 
due ; yet the supply takes place from the common 
reservoir of chyle, &c, in precise accordance with the 
necessary quality and quantity. 

" Selectility " is, therefore, another active and admi- 
rable property of the vegetative tissues. It exists, as we 
have already shown, in plants, and serves more thor- 
oughly to identify the non-striated tissues with vegeta- 
tion. 

Nov is the choice of congenial elements the only 
evidence of the Selectility of fibrous tissues — the local 
effects and distribution of certain Medicines and Poisons 
are well known; and are forcible illustrations of this 
unconscious discrimination in the processes of Vi- 
tality. 



VITALITY. 49 

The Nervous System, physiologically studied, sus- 
tains our views of vegetality in animality. 

In fact, there are certain classes of nerves and modes 
of nervous activity purely mechanical, and entirely 
foreign to conscious sensibility. 

" It is," says Carpenter's Physiology, " easily estab- 
lished by experiment, that the active powers of the 
nervous system reside in the ganglia; and that the 
trunks serve merely as conductors of the influence 
which is to be propagated towards or from them. If a 
nervous ganglion is destroyed, all the parts supplied 
by its nerves are paralyzed, but if a nervous trunk is 
divided, and then the portion still connected with the 
ganglion is pinched, sensations are felt ; but it is not 
so when the severed portion of the trunk is irritated, for 
in this case nothing is felt, but a motor influence is 
communicated to the muscle." Indeed, it is now well 
settled, by the experiments of Sir C. Bell, that some 
nerves are purely sympathetic, transmitting the stimulus 
of vegetative functions ; that other nerves are purely 
motor, distributing locomotive impulse; that others 
again are purely sensitive, conducting the influences of 
the external world. 

The Sympathetic Nerves are those appertaining 
to the organs of absorption, respiration, ingestion, di- 
gestion, circulation, assimilation, exhalation, secretion, 
excretion, and generation, composed, as we have seen, 
of non-striated muscle, &c. This class of nerves do not 
4 



50 HUMANICS. 

belong to the sensorium proper, nor to the brain — they 
exhibit no sensibility; and thus in due and logical 
parity do we find the insensitive nerve connected with 
the insensitive viscera. "We say insensitive so far as 
communication with the brain is concerned ; for the 
feelings of pain or pleasure experienced by the viscera, 
&c, are only known to the sensorium through the irri- 
tation of tissue indirectly aifecting the sensory nerves. 
Hence the term " sympathetic" Under all circum- 
stances these nerves convey no knowledge of the vis- 
ceral movements ; for their duty is only to impress the 
other tissues with feelings of sexual ardor, atmospheric 
pressure, impeded circulation, necessity of nutrition, 
&c. ; and though they produce a reaction upon the 
sensitive nerves, they are positively independent of the 
motor ; or, in other words, they are not controlled by 
the will. 

Hence, in the veiled recesses of our body the wheels, 
cords, valves, pumps, furnaces, and regulators of heat, 
electricity, &c, move in harmonious evolutions, and 
are incessantly at their wonderful work without our 
help, and without our being able to know what they 
are doing. 

Hence when, in the lower orders of animals, zoos- 
pores, mollusca, &c, we behold vital and visible action 
displayed, though the animal has no nerves, or if nerves 
exist no senses, we may at last understand that the 
movements of organism are the attribute of vitality 
and not of sensation, for movement takes place with- 
out sensation and even without nerves. 



VITALITY. 51 

The office of sympathetic nerves merits our special 
attention. 

The nerves of sensibility hold towards the sympa- 
thetic nerves the same relation as towards the external 
world. 

The sensitive nerves are affected by external pheno- 
mena, bnt the senses do not in turn affect or influence 
outward things. 

The sensitive nerves are affected by the sympa- 
thetic nerves, but the senses do not in turn affect or in- 
fluence the sympathetic nerves. 

The motor system transmits no stimulus or motion 
to the sympathetic. 

Thus we find the circuit to be this : An original 
stimulus arises in the tissues of vegetative life ; — the 
stomach, lungs, and other viscera, by their own irrita- 
tion or relaxation : the sympathetic nerves call for nu- 
triment ; this call is distributed by the sympathetic 
nerves to their ganglia and to the spinal cord ; here 
the feeling is at once conveyed to the motor nerves, 
which immediately impress the muscular fibre with 
notice to comply with the demands of the viscera ; 
this stimulus imparted to the fibre is perceived by the 
nerves of sense, and these also join in carrying stimu- 
lus to the motors, and in enlightening them in their 
work. But neither the sensitive nor motor nerves act 
upon the viscera — they awake the limbs, &c, to out- 
ward action ; to gathering food, or seeking an object 
of sexual desire. 



52 



HUMANICS. 



The circuit passes to the external world before it 
re-enters the viscera in the shape of food, or is re- 
united in the form of sexual connection. 

This leads us to infer that the nerves which appear 
first in lower orders of animals, are of the sympathetic 
kind. As long as the fibres are so vascular that they 
can be excited by immediate contact with the elements, 
they need no nerves — hence certain mollusca have in 
fact no nerves ; but when the first envelope is thick 
enough to prevent immediate contact, the internal 
parts require nerves to carry their irritability to the 
circumference, and induce the contractility of the 
tunic. Hence we may, with the physiologists, con- 
sider a polypus as being only a stomach, having its 
sympathetic nerves to arouse the activity of its cortex 
for the ingestion of nutriment. 

Like vegetality, animality progresses in series of 
greater and greater complexity of primary organs 
and the accession of new ones. Every order as it 
ramifies from its proximate stem presents some pecu- 
liar development or superaddition ; but the original 
parts remain, and retain their initial properties. They 
retain their distinctness so as to afford us additional 
proof of the multiple nature of man. The vital nerves, 
for instance, are the only nerves found in the Hydra, 
an animal consisting only of a stomach ; but # when in 
higher animals we find sensitive nerves and members 
annexed, still the stomach and its nerves retain their 



VITALITY. 53 

distinctness. Its nerves remain so free that the sensi- 
tive do not command them. The sensitive nerves 
which are superadded in the progress of animality, in- 
directly receive impressions from the sympathetic sys- 
tem, hut cannot impart any to it. 

Hence, though a starving man may (through moral 
and intellectual conviction) resist the temptation to 
steal the food within his reach, yet his organs of nutri- 
tion will persist in their demands and provocation. So 
also with sexual desire, &c. 

The natural and spiritual body contend against each 
other for supremacy over the motor nerves ; and too 
often does the flesh prevail. 

The Motor nerves now require our attention. 
They proceed from the Spinal-cord, Cerebellum, and 
Medulla Oblongata. 

These nerves, though frequently under the direction 
of the thinking will of man or the instinctive will of 
animals, are as frequently the mere agents of uncon- 
scious reaction. 

They may be directly influenced by the irritation 
(not sensation) of the tissues. 

Of this fact the proofs are abundant ; for many in- 
stances of movement due to the motor nerves independ- 
ently of the sensitive, can be cited ; and without fur- 
ther preamble I will adduce a few : 

1. " If the spinal-cord of a Frog," says Carpenter's 
General Physiology, " be divided in its back, above 



54 HUMANICS. 

the crural plexus, so as entirely to cut off the nerves 
of the lower extremities from connection with the brain, 
the animal loses all voluntary control over these limbs, 
and no sign of pain is produced by any injury done to 
them ; hut they are not thereby rendered motionless ; 
for various stimuli applied to the limbs themselves will 
cause movements in them. Thus, if the skin of the 
foot be pinched, or if a flame be applied to it, the leg 
will be violently retracted. Or, if the cloaca be irri- 
tated by a probe, the feet will endeavor to push away 
the instrument. Still, there is no reason to believe 
that the animal feels the irritation, or intends to exe- 
cute these movements in order to escape from it ; for 
motions of a similar kind are exhibited by men who 
have suffered injury of the lower part of the spinal 
cord, and who are utterly unconscious either of the 
irritation which their limbs receive or of the actions 
which they perform." 

2. " If the head of a Centipede," says Carpenter, 
" be cut off whilst it is in motion, the body will con- 
tinue to move onward by the regular and successive 
action of the legs as in the natural state ; but its move- 
ments are always forwards, never backwards. They 
are carried on, as it were mechanically ; and show no 
direction of object, no avoidance of danger. If the 
body be opposed in its progress by an obstacle of not 
more than half of its own height it mounts over it, and 
moves directly onwards as in its natural state ; but if 
the obstacle be equal to its own height its progress is 



VITALITY. 55 

arrested ; and the cut extremity of the body remains 
forced up against the opposing substance, the legs still 
continuing to move." 

3. " If again the nervous cords of a Centipede be 
divided in the middle of the trunk so that the hinder 
legs are cut off from connection with the cephalic 
ganglia, they will continue to move, but not in har- 
mony with those of the upper part of the body," &c. 
a They are still capable of performing reflex move- 
ments by the influence of their own ganglia, which 
may thus continue to propel the body, in opposition to 
the determination of the animal itself.. The case is 
still more remarkable when a portion of the nervous 
cord is entirely removed from the middle of the trunk ; 
for then 1st, the anterior legs will remain obedient to 
the animal's control ; 2d, the legs of the segments 
from which the nervous cord is removed are motion- 
less ; whilst 3d, those of the posterior segments con- 
tinue to act through the reflex powers of their own 
ganglia, in a manner which shows that the animal has 
no power of checking or directing them." 

4. " If the head of a Centipede be cut off, and 
while it remains at rest, some irritating vapor (such 
as ammonia or muriatic acid) be caused to enter the 
air tubes on one side of the trunk, the body will be im- 
mediately bent in the opposite direction, so as to with- 
draw itself as much as possible from the influence of 
the vapor. If the same irritation be then applied on 
the other side the reverse movement will take place ; 



56 HUMANICS. 

and the body may be caused to bend in two or three 
different curves by bringing the irritating vapor into 
the neighborhood of different parts of either side. 
This movement is evidently a reflex one," &c. 

5. " Every one knows," says Carpenter, " that the 
adjustment of the size of the pupil to the amount of 
light, is effected without any exertion of the will on 
our part, and even without any consciousness that it is 
taking place. It is performed, too, during profound 
sleep ; when the influence of light upon the retina ex- 
cites no consciousness of its presence — when no sensa- 
tion, therefore, is produced by it." 

6. " A Dy tiseus (a kind of water beetle) having had 
its cephalic ganglia (or brain) removed, remained mo- 
tionless so long as it rested on a dry surface, but when 
cast into water it executed the usual swimming mo- 
tions with great energy and rapidity, striking all its 
comrades to one side by its violence, and persisting in 
these for more than half an hour." 

7. "That the Cerebro-Spinal-Axis is a distinct cen- 
tre of automatic action, and does not derive its power 
(as formerly supposed) from the cerebrum, is made evi- 
dent from a variety of crnsiderations. Thus infants 
are sometimes born without any Cerebrum or Cerebel- 
lum ; and such have existed for several hours or even 
days, breathing, crying, sucking, and performing vari- 
ous other movements. The Cerebrum and Cerebellum 
have been experimentally removed from birds and 
young mammalia, and all their vital operations have 



VITALITY. 57 

nevertheless been so regularly performed as to enable 
them to live for weeks and even months. In the Am- 
phioxus we have an example of a completely formed 
adult animal, in which no rudiment of a cerebrum or 
cerebellum can be detected." 

Dr. Carpenter, with these and thousands of other 
such facts before him, concludes as follows : 

" Hence, all the movements which are performed 
through the instrumentality of the Cerebro-spinal-sys- 
tem of ganglia and nerves are essentially automatic; 
and their character as Reflex, Instinctive, Emotional, 
or Voluntary, is entirely dependent upon the nature 
and seat of the impulses which respectively originate 
themP 

The Sensory Nerves are those which convey special 
sensations of Touch, Taste, Sight, Sound, and Smell to 
their internal centres, the Sensory Ganglia and Cere- 
brum. 

The sensory ganglia receive the influences of the 
external or objective world. 

The cerebrum converges and radiates these influ- 
ences, resolving them into the phenomena of conscious- 
ness. 

Consciousness is the essential property of the Cere- 
brum. Hence, as we have seen, the ablation of the 
Cerebrum removes consciousness only ; and leaves the 
sensory nerves and ganglia to their automatic action 



58 HUMANICS. 

of receiving the influences of the objective world — re- 
sistance, sapidity, light, sound, and order. 

In the absence of the cerebrum or of consciousness, 
the influences received by the sensory nerves and 
ganglia, act mechanically and directly upon the motor 
nerves, just as any stimulus acts upon the fibres of a 
plant or muscle — and the movements to which the motor 
nerves are adapted, are determined in harmony with 
the special nature of the external impulse. Under these 
circumstances, the animal (we repeat the fact) is not 
conscious of any feeling, evinces no knowledge of what 
occurs to or in his organism ; yet he lives and moves, 
and his nerves of sensibility convey propelling forces 
to the motor nerves to which they are adapted. 

The researches of Flourens have settled all this to a 
certainty. 

From all the investigations of the best physiologists 
of the present time, it may be safely assumed as proved 
that — 

The Cerebrum is the seat and radiator of conscious- 
ness, only. 

The Cerebellum is the receptacle and distributor of 
the reactions of consciousness — so that the ablation of 
the cerebellum only destroys all harmony between con- 
sciousness and motion. 

The Sensory nerves and ganglia are the receptacle 
and distributors of impulses from the external world. 

The Motor system is the complex instrument of 



VITALITY. 59 

motion, provoked either directly through the Sensory 
ganglia, or indirectly through the Cerebrum and Cere- 
bellum. 

The Sympathetic System is the mere auxiliary and 
distributor of vitality. 

These fundamental parts being all within one body, 
and being interwoven, necessarily affect each other me- 
diately or immediately, and it required careful analysis 
to distinguish their several portions, the links between 
them, and the course of action of one upon the other; 
but now that the lines of distinction are drawn, we find 
that the philosophers of old who thought that sensibility 
was everywhere, were misled by the universality of 
movement and of action and re-action. They confounded 
sensibility and movement, sensibility and conscious- 
ness ; though the three are clearly distinct. 

I have shown that movement takes place without 
sensibility or consciousness. 

I now show that movement takes place through 
sensibility, but without consciousness. 

The facts adduced above to show the results of an 
ablation of the whole brain, or of a severance of connec- 
tions between the brain and nerves, are already suffi- 
cient to demonstrate the diverseness of sensibility and 
consciousness ; but there are other facts still more direct. 

Flourens, the great French physiologist, says, that 



60 HUMANICS. 

when the cerebrum is carefully removed so as not to dis- 
turb or injure the other nervous centres, all consciousness 
is obliterated ; but nothing except consciousness ceases. 
The vital forces and special senses remain active. 

Life, with its processes of nutrition, respiration, 
sleep, &c, continues. Thus, if a Bird be the animal 
deprived of its cerebrum, 

— it maintains and recovers its equilibrium, 

— it walks when pushed, 

— it flies when thrown into the air, 

• — it sleeps at night, and for that purpose closes its 
eyes, and puts its head under a wing, 

— it eats when food is put into its mouth, but does 
not go to seek it, &c. 

But what is most to our purpose is the fact that the 
animal remains subjected to the performance of a va- 
riety of actions through the nerves of special sense : 

— it wakes and opens its eyes when noise is made, 
■ — its pupils contract and dilate with the increase and 

decrease of light, 

— it is attracted towards the light, for it moves it- 
self to the illuminated parts of the room, 

— it recoils from an offensive smell, 

— it resists the ingestion of substances distasteful 
as food, or adverse to nutrition, &c. 

Hence sensibility exists exclusively of conscious- 
ness. 

Eor does the Cerebellum have any share of con- 
sciousness. 






VITALITY. 61 

If the cerebellum is removed, and the cerebrum is 
maintained, motion is disturbed, but consciousness is 
unaffected. The movements consciousness suggests 
cannot be duly realized when the cerebellum is sub- 
tracted. It is then impossible for the animal, though 
he is perfectly aware of what he ought to do, to co- 
ordinate his motions, or make them harmonize with the 
dictates of his will : he loses his balance ; his gestures 
and steps are irregular and imperfect. He moves, but 
it seems that the nerves of special sense suffer a reac- 
tion which disturbs even the direct action they might 
have upon locomotion, &c. 

Hence motion itself is not dependent upon the cere- 
bellum, but only that motion which the consciousness 
of the cerebrum suggests. 

Hence the ablation of the cerebellum only severs 
and abates the indirect connection which consciousness 
and motion had with one another. 

Hence consciousness subsists unaffected by the ab- 
lation of the cerebellum, as long as the cerebrum ex- 
ists ; and while the animal is aware of the disorder of 
motion caused by the ablation of the cerebellum, he re- 
grets but cannot control that disorder. 

Hence consciousness is restricted to the cerebrum 
alone ; and the cerebellum belongs to the motor system, 
in which it is only the auxiliary servant of the cere- 
brum. 

The phenomenon of an organic or locomotive move- 



62 HUMANICS. 

ment resulting directly from the nerves of special sense 
and other sensitive ganglia, without the intervention of 
the ceredrum, takes place frequently even when the 
animal is in full and normal possession of all his cere- 
bral organs, including the cerebrum itself. 

Of this kind of motion the following examples are 
cited from physiologists : 

The start upon a loud and unexpected sound ; 

The sudden closure of the eyes to the dazzle of light 
or at the approach of injurious bodies ; 

The sneezing excited by an irritation of the nostril ; 

The convulsive laughter induced by tickling ; 

The vomiting caused by the sight, smell, or taste of 
something loathsome ; 

The yawning occasioned by ennui, depression of 
spirits, or imitation ; 

The scratching and handling of self, and the thousand 
and one changes of position of the body and its mem- 
bers, hands, feet, lips, &c, taking place unattended to 
by ourselves, though we may be wide awake. 

The body seems endowed with instincts (apart from 
any volition) to provide for its own preservation and 
comfort. 

Certain it is that we are not simultaneously con- 
scious of nine-tenths of the movements of our limbs ; 
and the fact that consciousness, or its seat the cerebrum, 
is not necessarily concerned with them, is made per- 
fectly apparent by their taking place during sleep. 

Yet, they do also take place while we are awake, 



VITALITY. 63 

and we are often perfectly conscious of their occur- 
rence ; but we are not thereby to infer that they de- 
pend upon, or are necessarily determined by conscious- 
ness. Consciousness may interfere with them, regulate 
or stop them ; but their causation is not in conscious- 
ness : else, how could they occur during sleep, or when 
unattended to, or in animals having no trace whatever 
of a cerebrum or cerebellum ? 

We are conscious of them just as we are conscious 
of the movements, &c, of another person, or of a 
machine under our control. Their mutations, &c, go 
on without our intervention, &c. ; but our conscious- 
ness, judgment, &c, might induce us to intermeddle, 
or we might choose to refrain. 

The acts arising from the medulla oblongata come 
under this head; so also do those coming out of the 
spinal cord. Breathing and eating, and even walking, 
can hardly be considered as being in the direct charge 
of consciousness. 

Hence, says Carpenter's Physiology, " the man who 
is walking through the streets in a complete revery, un- 
ravelling a knotty subject, or working out a mathe- 
matical problem, performs the movement of progression, 
&c, with great regularity. He will avoid obstacles in 
the line of his path, and he will follow the course he is 
accustomed to take, though he may have intended to 
pass along some very different route ; and it is not un- 
til his attention is recalled to his situation that his train 
of thought suffers the least intermission, or that his will 
is brought to bear upon his motions." 



64 HUMANICS. 

Hence, a man about to pass along a narrow plank or 
tree placed across a chasm, intuitively throws out his 
arms to balance himself; and if he pays any attention 
to the action of his arms, their adaptation of position to 
the necessities of the case is thereby disturbed : he be- 
comes giddy, and falls. 

Hence, too, the respiratory movement goes on of it- 
self, and regulates itself; becomes rapid while the body 
runs or strives, decreases when the body rests, continues 
while it sleeps — all independently of sensation ; and, 
indeed, it is good that these movements do not depend 
upon consciousness and attention in us any more than in 
plants ; for they did require our undivided and con- 
stant watchfulness ; we would not have time for any 
thing else, not even for sleep, and a moment of forgetful- 
ness, determent, or sleep, would be fatal to life itself. 

Hence, too, the mastication and swallowing of food, 
though we may be conscious of it, is best accomplished 
without the interference of our will, or even of our at- 
tention. Where is the person who can assert that 
during his meals he watches and manages these move- 
ments intendingly? If anyone does this, we simply 
suggest that he must be a very dull table companion 
to his family and friends, and that if he were to let au- 
tomatic instinct chew for him, the work would be bet- 
ter done, and he would have more time to listen, think, 
and converse. 

Kow, reverting back to the millions of animals of 
the classes below the Yertebrata — to the Crustacese, In- 



VITALITY. 65 

-feecta, Archnseidse, Annulata, Mollusca, Radiata, En- 
tozoa, Acalepha, Polypi, and Infusoria, which have no 
cereorum, we may safely conclude that they (with cer- 
tain fishes and other vertebrata which resemble them 
in this respect) have no power or gift of consciousness. 

There is no escaping this conclusion, for it is as cer- 
tain as death that the cerebrum, and the cerebrum 
alone, is the seat or organ of consciousness. 

And nevertheless let it be noted that, by the aid of 
unconscious sensaticm, they go and come, seek their 
food, avoid their enemies, and make their dwellings. 

They are automatons, and their senses are the levers 
of mechanical movements performed by the body. 

Thus we see that, from the beginning of all organi- 
zation to its end, (through all the consecutive and 
branching series of vegetal and animal forms,) vege- 
tative phenomena exhibit fhemselves witli wonderful 
uniformity of action, and without essential change in the 
living tissues ; so that, in vital properties, the animal is 
like unto the plant. 

To the animal, the nervous systems are added one 
after the other, and become more and more intricate 
only to serve the progressive complexity in the evolu- 
tions of Yitality. 

But Yitality ever retains its distinctive character- 
istics, answering in the plant and in the animal — in all 
organic nature, to this definition : Yitality is vegetative 
activity. 

5 



66 HUMANICS. 

Hence Animality is vegetative activity, with its 
process of nutrition reversed, and a nervous system in- 
serted. 

The distinction between the two is therefore not in 
the phenomena of movement, locomotion, contractility, 
nutrition, respiration, reproduction, and other forms of 
motion ; but it is in a change of the poles of adaptation 
to the external elements. 

What else than this parallelism and agreement, or 
rather this unity in diversity, could we expect, when 
we know : 

That plants and animals both spring from a germ, 
known in physiology as the organic germ cell. 

They are made up, in toto, of these cells, and every 
plant or animal is derived from one organic germ cell, 
which multiples itself to form a complete individual. 
The cells which originate and make up the animal 
differ in no obvious particular from those which germi- 
nate, increase, and propagate the plant. The great 
Oak, or the tiny " Ked-Snow," on the one hand, and 
the locomotive Man, or parasite Spongia on the other, 
are respectively derived from simple germs, identical in 
typical construction and properties. 

In the course of organization these cells undergo a 
sort of partial transformation, whereby one set forms 
bone, another set forms muscle, and other sets form 
nerves, skin, hair, &c. ; but so far as motion is con- 
cerned, all the vital functions and the movements of 



VITALITY. 67 

the body are mostly accomplished by tissues composed 
of cells which have undergone the least alteration from 
the primary type. 

The microcosm of life is the organic germ cell. 

CONCLUSIONS. 

I am perhaps too hasty in presenting any conclu- 
sion at this stage of our argument ; yet I think it al- 
ready sufficiently apparent : 

That, in Zoonomy, 

— the share of Yegetality is Life and Motion. 

— the share of Animality is Sensation and Con- 
sciousness. 

That the propelling forces of an organism come di- 
rectly from the exterior, and impart their energy by 
immediate contact, or through the nerves of special 
sense, or they come indirectly from the exterior, and im- 
part their energy by immediate contact with the viscera, 
or through the sympathetic nerves, to sensibility, &c. 

That motion is not evidence of sensation or of con- 
sciousness in an organism. 

That motion is the property of the fibrous or con- 
tractile tissues of an organism. 

That locomotion is an evolution of vitality — sensa- 
tion being only its Sentinel and Beacon. 

That motion is not a property of the nervous system, 
which is only the vehicle, but not the doer of motion. 



68 HUMANICS. 

That motioD is adapted to the ends of life, even 
without sensation or consciousness. 

That motion in Vitality is the harmonization of 
chemical elements and physical forces, with organic 
arrangement. 

That Life, Vitality, or Vegetality, is the enlarging 
vortex, or concentric motion and distribution, of chemi- 
cal elements and physical forces upon a predetermined 
and re-engendering type. 

Inertion instead of Motion is Death ; and diminu- 
tion instead of enlargement, eccentric instead of con- 
centric motion, dispersion instead of distribution, are 
the ways of Death. 

And I add : 

That since the organic types in so many classes, or- 
ders, species, and varieties are specific, perpetual, and 
predetermined — those types must be due to the Grand 
Archeus of the Universe. 

That since the plants and animals themselves do not 
design or think their vitative movements, that there is 
a Universal Mind that designs and thinks for them. 

And here arises the question yet unanswered, 
whether, when movements of an organism are induced 
through consciousness, they are automatic or optional, 
necessary or free. 

It is my hope that, in the next discourse, this prob- 
lem will be solved : at this stage the answer would be 
premature, and is designedly omitted. 



II. 

SENSATION. 

In philosophy, I hold that all questions are ques- 
tions of fact, all theories are assertions of fact, and all 
science is knowledge of fact. The whole subject-mat- 
ter, premises, evidences, and conclusions of science, 
whether physical, mental, or moral, consists of a series 
of facts made evident directly by, or through the sen- 
sational or the innate mind, or indirectly through de- 
duction or induction. So true is this, that upon ana- 
lyzing any course of reasoning, we will find that every 
alleged demonstration is a good or bad adaptation of 
facts to one another ; and that an argument may be 
defined as the exhibition of a fact in such terms as to 
make it apparent that it agrees or disagrees with, be- 
longs to, or is included in another. 

Take the metaphysical abstractions of Hegel and 
his predecessors, the procrustean skepticism of Compte 
and his predecessors, or the blind mysticism of Jacobi 
and his predecessors, and you will see (upon close ex- 
amination) that they profess to deal only with, facts, 



70 HUMANICS. 

to stand only upon facts, and to arrive only at a knowl- 
edge of facts. When one school contends that science 
is wholly mental, and that there is no objective reality, 
it makes an assertion of fact; when another school 
insists that all things are material, and that there is no 
spiritual reality, it makes an assertion of fact; and 
when a third school teaches that nothing can be proved, 
and that the creation of truth is instinctive faith alone, 
it makes an assertion of fact. All the details of these 
systems, and of those which occupy the ground between 
them, are assumptions or evidences of particular facts 
considered as concluding towards the main fact ad- 
vanced. I fear that mere assertions predominate ; and 
it would be well if the idea of science as containing 
nought but ascertained facts w T ere applied to the study 
of philosophy, and particularly to the rationale of 
Humanics. Suppose that every proposition stated by 
philosophical writers were noted with the interrogation, 
is this a fact f How many of them upon examination 
of the proof would remain ? Might we not then (en- 
deavoring to achieve a practical result) make an inven- 
tory of the general truths, the universal facts, upon 
which they all agree or have left no doubt ? and also 
might we not subjoin an inventory of the most impor- 
tant propositions upon which they disagree, or which 
they have left without clear demonstration ? This in- 
ventory would be of supreme utility ; for, by it we 
would know what were the real conquests of philoso- 
phy, and what work it has to do hereafter. 



SENSATION. 71 

But let not the sense I attach to the word " fact," 
be misapprehended. We are told by logicians, that 
facts are the truths resulting from something done, and 
they distinguish facts from events, from the realities of 
things, from ideas, &c. Thus they say, the action which 
took place at the death of Caesar was an event, while 
the death of Caesar, as having actually taken place, is 
a fact. Thus also they say, a dot, a line, a man, a beast, 
&c, are not facts ; e. g. we cannot say that Caesar was 
a fact. Nor is " an idea " a fact ; for we cannot call 
our thoughts facts. 'Tis well ; let us take all this play 
upon words as valid discrimination, and what does it 
amount to % Nothing ; for, we do not reason things or 
conclude things, but of things, events, ideas. All our 
reasoning involves the affirmation or negation of some 
circumstance, property, or law of matter, mind, action, 
&c. To do this we must use verbs ; and all things are 
nought to intelligence till some assertion is made of 
them. Thus we may define fact to be a true assertion ; 
and say that all true assertions are facts. The event is 
happening or lias haj^pened — God exists — nature is real 
— the spirit liveth — a point is a place in space — the 
idea is well conceived — are all statements of fact. In 
other words, the moment we put a verb and a noun 
together we declare a fact ; and then, not till then, can 
any predicate be formed — then, and not till then, can 
any reasoning take place — then, and not till then, can 
any science exist. This is so plainly true, that no 
argument is needed to establish it, and it suffices to 



72 HUMANICS. 

appeal to the consciousness of every one in order to 
demand immediate adhesion to our averment. 

We cannot say we have a knowledge of any thing, 
whether it he matter or motion, idea or substance, body 
or spirit, till we assert something in relation to it — so 
that, after all, the whole of philosophy is in facts, and 
depends upon their correct ascertainment — the whole 
content of thought is fact, and all correct reasoning 
depends upon the freedom of that content from what 
may be called false facts. 

Therefore, when we read any philosophical author, 
we should through all his verbal distinctions, his inven- 
tion of arbitrary nonentities, his artifices of language, 
his phantoms of imagination, &c, look constantly to 
the question : "What are the facts ? Are they faithfully 
described with no more and no less than what they 
really contain 1 are they properly classed ? are they 
proved or demonstrated ? &c. These and similar ques- 
tions, are the tests of all philosophy ; and with such 
tests no man need be mystified either by the meta- 
physics of nihilism, the cosmogony of atheism, or the 
premature hypothesis of spiritualism. 

But, to say that the contents of human knowledge 
consist of facts, is not a sufficient solution of the ques- 
tion we started to solve ; for we have already found 
ourselves obliged to allude to facts assumed but ulti- 
mately disproved, as distinguishable from facts positive 
and true; so that we have not yet found the stand-place 



SENSATION. 73 

of reliance, the initial point of reason, which is to serve 
as our test between truth and error. 

Philosophers have debated much to decide whether 
our knowledge of things perceived, be mediate or im- 
mediate ; and they have made important consequences, 
one way or the other, depend upon the solution of the 
question. 

Both parties admit the interposition or agency of 
the instruments of sensation, in the act of perception. 

One party contends that this agency of the senses 
does not preclude us from considering that our knowl- 
edge of objects perceived is direct, immediate, or pre- 
sentative. The other holds that the interposition of 
sense makes the knowledge indirect, mediate, or repre- 
sentative. 

From this distinction they start the question, 
whether the things perceived are real or not ; and 
whether we have evidence of the veracity of the senses. 
Hence the contest between idealism and realism. If 
the veracity of the senses can be reasonably denied, 
what proof, it is asked, have we of the reality of any 
thing— or even of our own existence ? 

It does not clearly appear how the distinction be- 
tween representative and presentative knowledge doth 
materially help either side in deciding upon the reality 
or unreality of perception ; for if we cavil with our 
senses, we may plead the general issue in one suit as 
well as the other, and we may impeach the witnesses, 



74 HUMANICS. 

whether they make out the case directly or circumstan- 
tially. 

Suppose that sense apprehends the " things out of 
itself and in their proper space ; " how does it follow, 
from this alone, that the perception is not entirely false ? 
Does not the lunatic who sees a phantom before him, 
see it out of himself, and as in its proper space ? Sup- 
pose, conversely, that what appears as a thing external 
to myself, be merely an image within my mind, can I 
assume, from the fact of its being an image or even an 
innate idea, that it is false ? 

No, neither argument will ever produce a convic- 
tion. No, the certitude of objective reality, is indiffer- 
ent to these distinctions, and is supported by other 
evidence besides that which is brought to sustain the 
theory of immediate cognition. 

As long as the agency of the instruments of sense, 
of the touch, of the nerves, of the brain, &c, must 
stand as an undeniable fact in the debate, the question 
between the presentationists and representationists, so 
far as the verbal distinction is concerned, must remain 
undecided. 

Does my eye throw out filaments of light and push 
them into contact with outer objects, or does it simply 
receive images ? 

If it receive images, how is it that these images can- 
not be realized as existing within us ? How can we shake 
off the consciousness, that it is not an image but the 
thing itself we behold ? Yet how can we dispute the 



SENSATION. 75 

facts demonstrated by Anatomy and Optics, which show 
that the eye is constructed like a camera obscura which 
receives images ? 

If it does not receive images, how can any real 
difference between the hallucination of a spirit seer 
and the normal vision of everybody be accounted for ? 
How could dreams be distinguished from ordinary per- 
ceptions ? How could we recall scenes and events of our 
past experience ? Yet it is perfectly certain that the evi- 
dence of Anatomy and Optics stops short at the retina, 
for beyond this no image was ever found, and nothing in 
the analysis of vision can account for the further trans- 
mission of the image, while nothing in the dissection 
of the brain enables us to follow the picture to any 
point within the nervous or cerebral organism. 

The real question between the presentationists and 
representationists, is whether the data given us in con- 
sciousness, be true or false. 

Hamilton, whose accurate and universal knowledge 
of the writings of philosophers, is perfectly reliable, 
says : " No philosopher has ever formally denied the 
truth or disclaimed the authority of consciousness ; but 
few or none have been content implicitly to accept, and 
consistently follow out its dictates." 

Barring any " inconsistency " they may have been 
guilty of, the philosophers are perfectly right — right in 
not denying the truth or authority of consciousness — 
right in not implicitly accepting its dictates. 



76 HUMANICS. 

This is only an apparent paradox, or contradiction. 

Why? 

Because it is too true that our senses, perceptions 
or consciousness, let the name be either, often deceive 
us, and we are all on our guard against the data fur- 
nished ; yet it is also true that it is by the evidence of 
sense, perception or consciousness, that it is itself cor- 
rected — it is by its own data that it corrects itself. 

Practically, consciousness is a witness who is con- 
stantly contradicting himself, and yet is the sole witness 
on whose testimony we must act. We cannot simply 
dismiss the case, but are compelled, at our peril, to 
give judgment positively one way or the other. 

So that we must admit the authority of the witness, 
though he prevaricates, and differs with himself, and 
our endless task is to find out wherein he belies or mis- 
apprehends himself ; or rather what he really says or 
means. 

The true view of the matter is to consider all the 
data furnished by consciousness as facts / but not to 
take any of these facts as presenting the whole truth. 
If, for instance, I see a ghost standing before me, follow- 
ing me everywhere, as Brutus when he saw the shade 
of Csesar ; must I take this as a fact f Undoubtedly 
I must ; but I should ascertain whether the apparition 
is presented to or from the mind. Behold, I see the 
sun, at dawn in the east, at noon at the zenith, at eve 
in the west. Must I take this as a fact ? Undoubtedly 



SENSATION. 77 

I must ; but I should ascertain which of the two doth 
move, the sun or myself ; and if I decide erroneously, 
I might be tempted to persecute a Galileo as a lunatic, 
a heretic, a wretch who denies both the evidence of his 
senses and the "Word of God. 

Thus, the authority of consciousness standing on its 
true merit, should be fully admitted, not as requiring 
implicit reliance upon any single data it furnishes ; but 
as requiring reliance upon all the data taken together, 
accompanied by a warning, that the omission of any 
part of the existing data, whether known or not known, 
will leave us practically with a deluded consciousness. 

The problem presents itself like a case to be tried 
before a judge and jury upon a mixed issue of law and 
fact. No single item of the evidence may be sufficient to 
determine the issue of fact, no single principle of law may 
be adequate to solve the legal difficulties, but' the whole 
evidence and jurisprudence summed up, may present a 
clear result of premises established, circumstances re- 
conciled, falsehood detected, and logical conclusions 
perfectly apparent. 

We cannot ignore the fact that both perception and 
judgment are imperfect and irregular in their powers 
and action; and are constantly correcting their own 
selves and each other — so that their contents and de- 
cisions are constantly called in question, and undergoing 
revision and change. Where and what, then, is reality f 
I answer it is the what-is-felt at present. Any other 



78 HUMANICS. 

definition is a lie ; for reality is not speculative but 
practical ; and every man acts upon his present feeling 
and conviction as reality, and no man knows any other 
reality ; though every man also knows that his feelings 
and convictions are constantly undergoing transmuta- 
tion and transformation. 

Yet this is not so desperate and alarming as at first 
it would seem. 

This mutability has a basis ; and is, in fact, the 
movement of revision and correction carried on by our 
faculties. It is the march of intellectual humanity 
going on in each man's mind, rallied and encouraged 
by the following aids : 

1°. Artificial helps to natural powers, through in- 
struments, chemical analysis, &c. ; 

2°. Admonitions of sense to sense, whereby our 
senses check and rectify the impressions of each 
other ; 

3°. Kepetition, or the reiterated observations of the 
same fact in different ways or at different times ; 

4°. Human testimony, or concurrent and precedent 
investigations by other men, communicated through 
language, signs, &c. ; 

5°. The laws by which thought or consciousness it- 
self is governed, and which act as a rule and compass 
to all our judgments. 

If we look back upon our own experience and hear 
the testimony of all men past and present, we find that 



SENSATION. 79 

there is a multitude of always-present realities, of which 
the human kind has never been divested, and in which 
it daily gains increasing confidence. Realities of ex- 
istence, of self and not-self, of social intercourse, moral 
sentiment, bodily feeling, scientific order, natural law, 
mode of thought, &c. These being repeated over and 
over again in all time past, as well as in the present, 
and being asserted by all men, assume a character of 
certitude so great that we exnecessitate, feel we have a 
real foothold, and cannot give adhesion to the doctrines 
of idealism or nihilism. 

Besides, as we have said, reality is not speculative 
but practical ; and we find that in practising and act- 
ing upon these reiterated and re-verified realities, which 
vividly shine in consciousness, no mishap befalls us ; 
and thus as we go, we acquire new confidence in the 
harmony of nature, and in the truth of her revelations. 

What do we mean when we say that a thing, a 
quality, &c, is "real"? We simply declare that our 
perceptive powers have been impressed or moved in 
one way or the other. Whether this impression or 
movement is felt as arising within us or out of us, the 
first idea of it is, that it is felt. It must be felt or not 
felt : if not felt, no notion or idea of it could exist in 
our minds, and thus its negation would be determined ; 
but, if felt, it is, and it must be affirmed — at least so 
far as the fact of being felt is considered. Whatever 
opinion, notion, conception, judgment we may form of 



80 HUMANICS. 

the impression or movement, whether as trustworthy 
or deceptive, the idea of reality attaches itself to what 
is felt, as well as to the judgment conceived in relation 
to it. Indeed, the judgment itself is an impression or 
movement felt, by and in the mind or soul. Beyond 
what consciousness declares or testifies, there is for us 
nothing, zero, nought, negation ; and therefore the 
opposite of negation, reality, must be on what this feel- 
ing doth testify and declare. 

It is in consciousness that we feel the high operations 
of reflection and thought, which depend upon our im- 
mortal archeus; for, our rational soul works upon the 
data consciousness has obtained through sensation. 

Every movement to, in, or from the mind, reveals 
itself to the mind itself, and it is this revelation which 
is taken as reality, in presenti. Yet there is a degree 
in the admission. A new phenomenon or idea is re- 
ceived with caution. Other beliefs in the mind may 
contest the genuineness of the new data ; and a period 
of transition and investigation occurs. The new comer 
may be even rejected, in toto, as a deceit ; but this re- 
jection is always based upon the evidence given by the 
then present condition of the mind as to what is felt 
and real. Most frequently old and tried acquaintances 
present themselves ; and are acknowledged in the pro- 
portion of their age and frequency. When their 
visits recur in a known and familiar garb, they are 
instantly accepted without distrust. 



SENSATION. 81 

We thus find, that reality is in the testimony of 
consciousness — that outside of the what-is-felt there is no 
fact — and that truth is therein or nowhere ; while, on 
the other hand, it is also certain we must and do regard 
our sensations, perceptions, &c, with doubt, suspicion, 
&c. So we necessarily oscillate between the admission 
and denial of reality. Indeed, we simultaneously trust 
and distrust therein, and this double feeling or convic- 
tion is founded on the very consciousness which relies 
upon itself to impeach itself. While we judge of it 
we judge by it. It unites the characters of justiciary, 
witness, and party, all three of whom are affected by 
every sentence pronounced. If the tribunal condemns 
the witness, as such, — it condemns and discards itself. 
This it cannot do; for it subsists in spite of itself. 
Thus it may rectify, not annihilate itself ; and it lives 
to act according to its gifts, and to accept at every 
given point of time its own self, its own evidence, and 
its own judgment as valid — as exhibiting reality. 

Let it not be assumed that, in what we have said, 
we have been confounding perception, consciousness, 
and judgment. They are really inseparable, though 
distinguishable. They are all revealed to feeling, in 
feeling, and by feeling. They constitute together the 
what-is-felt ; and it is vain to attribute falsehood to one 
rather than to the other. Judgment rectifies percep- 
tion, and perception rectifies judgment. What is it 
that compares, classifies, generalizes perceptions, and 
6 



82 HUMANICS. 

finally finds their harmony ? Judgment. What is it 
that prevents judgment from making gratuitous as- 
sumptions and accrediting random theories ? Percep- 
tion. Where do we seek for the content of either or 
both? In consciousness, where they are one. Out of 
this circle we cannot go, nor can we confine ourselves 
at any time to any one point of the circle ; for it is the 
circle of the what-is-felt, made up of all the elements 
of certainty and uncertainty, and of interfused judge, 
witness, and party. 

How vain, then, is the dispute between the idealists 
and sensationalists — one party arguing that all knowl- 
edge is received, and the other that it is all produced, 
by the mind. All they know and all they can know is 
the what-is-felt, as it is felt ; and as it exhibits itself 
by, to, and in consciousness, whether as sensation, per- 
ception, memory, reflection, judgment, or as any other 
content of self or phenomenon of not-self. The truth 
or falsehood of these, may be argued upon the premises 
of either doctrine. Either theory may furnish reasons 
to affirm or deny reality, as the realists and nihilists, 
in their respective works, have abundantly shown 
against one another. For myself I am content to take 
the what-is-felt as it is, with its combined certainty and 
uncertainty ; for that is all God has given me, to deal 
with at my own peril. 

Reader, permit me, before proceeding further, and 
merely by way of incidental and unessential remark, 



SENSATION. 83 

to suggest a thought. Its admission or rejection is not 
material to any proposition I desire to insist upon ; yet 
it seems to me worthy of passing notation. 

I have admitted that perception is subject to error ; 
but to error which it is, itself, constantly correcting. 
This, in a certain school of philosophy, would be re- 
garded as contradiction and heresy ; for it qualifies or 
modifies their dogma of the absolute certitude and con- 
sistency of the contents of consciousness ; and leaves 
us, they say, to doubt man's past, present, and future 
ability to attain a correct consciousness of the real. 

T might simply reply by an appeal to the facts 
which attest the imperfection of all things, and there 
stop ; yet, I suggest, that if man were perfect in any 
one quality of intelligence, he would be necessarily 
perfect in them all ; and that as intellectual perfection 
implies infallibility, so man, if mentally perfect, would 
be infallible. But to assert this would be sheer blas- 
phemy and absurd presumption ; for the pretension 
would amount to a vain and proud claim to the pleni- 
tude of God's attribute. 

Am I right in saying that perfection in one mental 
quality would be perfection in all ? Yes ; for there is 
no definite line of demarkation between the several 
properties of mind — they are woven into each other 
and depend upon each other — so that if any one has 
not the assistance of the rest it could not do its full 
duty. Thus as a faculty in its action needs help, it is 
clear that if the help is imperfect the work must also* 



84 HUMANICS. 

be imperfect. Thus the infallibility of any part of 
consciousness requires the infallibility of the whole, to 
which it belongs and in which it rests. Taking one 
from hundreds of analogies which might be adduced 
from the material world, and pointing to a quadruped 
having three defective legs, I ask, "Would not this im- 
perfection impair the powers of the fourth, however 
faultless it might be in itself? 

If we were forced to the alternative of asserting 
either the absolute truth or absolute falsehood of con- 
sciousness — if there be no middle term between the 
perfection of our sentient powers and their non-entity, 
then we are placed In a dilemma between two falla- 
cies : 1°. "We would have on one side the sophism of 
the unconditional realists, who rely upon the data fur- 
nished by consciousness itself to prove its own veracity, 
which is legging the question ; for the very thing de- 
nied cannot be taken as the basis of an argument con- 
cluding to its own truth. How can a witness be heard 
to prove his own credibility ? 2°. On the other hand, 
we would have the fallacy of the nihilists, who argue 
upon the data given by consciousness itself, in order to 
conclude against its very existence, which hfelo de se ; 
for if consciousness has no reality it cannot be the basis 
of any conclusion whatever. Thus we are forced, into 
a middle position, which is simply this : 

1°. That which consciousness declares is the begin- 
ning and basis of all knowledge — the centre from which 



SENSATION. 85 

all we know radiates, so that every attempt to prove or 
disprove it fails for want of a legitimate major premiss ; 
for if this basis, beginning, or centre of all reasoning, 
could be proved or disproved, there would be a major 
premiss or fact still more primary and universal, so 
that consciousness would not be the beginning or cen- 
tre. But as we know of no other ground more univer- 
sal, further removed, or nearer the core, all our 
arguments must admit the deliverances of consciousness 
as fact though unproved and unprovable. These de- 
liverances are like the testimony of a single eye-witness 
to the allegations of an indictment or declaration. It 
would certainly be absurd to ask him to prove what he 
says ; for that would be requiring two witnesses when 
there is really but one in existence. 

2°. But while we must take consciousness as fact 
simply because it is the fact of facts, and contains all 
in all, — because there is no other and it is our very self; 
this implies that we must take it as it is; for we 
cannot take it otherwise, — yet, for the same reason, we 
must admit it and all its imperfections, self-impeach- 
ments, and self- corrections : admit its declaration of 
an objective not-self — admit this not-self as known only 
in the self — admit that self and not-self are frequently 
confounded — admit that what consciousness positively 
avers to day as true, it holds to-morrow as false ; and 
still is just as positive as ever. 

The way to discover the truth in a case like this, is 
to cross-examine the only witness ; so that he may cor- 



86 HUMANICS. 

rect himself if he was mistaken, and he will not hesi- 
tate to do so ; for his honesty, at least, is certain, since 
it is for himself and to himself he gives his testimony. 

Indeed, it is necessary that there should be a start- 
ing point of knowledge, or prima ratio; for if there 
were not one, we would be constantly driven from 
position to position in all reasoning. Thought would 
fall backwards down the abyss of " infinite series" or 
pursue an ever distant ignis fatuus. 

"With all its imperfections consciousness therefore 
subsists as the eriterium Veritas. 

Of these imperfections it behooves us not to com- 
plain : God alone is perfect. For what he has given, 
let us be thankful, since it is life and intelligence ; and 
since it fulfils the requisites of the mortal clay, while it 
connects us with HIS eternal essence. 

The Senses may be considered as one : that is, 
touch. When we perceive an object by touch, we as- 
certain its form, its size, its number, its arrangement, 
its density, its weight, its force, its position, its texture, 
its temperature, its movement, &c, and by a succession 
of touches we might even measure time. All of the 
qualities may with more or less adequacy be perceived 
by sight ; and sight adds color. Hearing, in common 
with touch and sight, perceives time and motion, and 
adds sound. Taste is so closely allied to touch, that 
absolute contact is necessary in using this sense. This 
is also true with regard to smell. Indeed, not only 



SENSATION. 87 

taste and smell must be touched into action, but so also 
must sight and hearing ; for it is by the immediate 
percussion of light and sound that the eye and ear are 
impressed. So that we may consider the four last as 
higher developments, indistinct modes of the sense of 
touch. 

When we perceive an object the first impression is 
concrete. 

Suppose, for instance, an apple : the first notion its 
presence affords is unital — it is the concrete notion of 
an apple. Color, smell, taste, form, &c, are not con- 
sidered abstractedly, but all inhere so intimately that 
no idea is conceived, but of one entire object. 

In mathematics this is concrete numeration. 

In language this is the noun, which certainly came 
before the adjective, and even before the abstract sub- 
stantive. 

The unity of the senses is implied in the fact, that 
though we may conceive the abstract notion of color, 
smell, taste, form, &c, yet the hand, the palate, the 
eye, the ear, the nose, unerringly refer these qualities 
to the same object presented, when, in truth, they are 
united in that object. The senses do not present as 
many severalties as there are qualities. The idea of sev- 
eralty of objects does not arise in consequence of the 
severalty of the senses ; but the senses declare one ob- 
ject with several qualities. In the case of the apple : 



88 HUMANICS. 

the color which the eye beholds, the taste which the 
palate obtains, the odor which the nose scents, the 
sound which the ear admits, the density which the 
hand feels, are all known as being of that apple. The 
apple which touch ascertains as a solid is known to 
touch as being the same apple which sight beholds as 
red, taste relishes as sweet, smell appreciates as fra- 
grant, and sound hears as husky ; and so it is conversely 
from one sense to the other. Even when objects are 
distant, the sound suggests form, smell, color, &c. 
Evidently there is a medium of interchange between 
the senses, or a common basis of feeling. There is 
certainly a communion between the senses, whereby, in 
union, they become aware of the identity of the object 
in which each of them finds a distinct quality. There 
must be an inherent property common to all the senses, 
or a central focus to which external impressions con- 
verge, and in which they all unite. Outwardly this 
would be the touch, which is common to the four other 
senses — inwardly this would be the mental image, so 
often acknowledged by psychologists. ]STo other than 
one or both of these hypotheses would fit the facts. 

Here we should note a class of facts of the greatest 
importance to the philosophy of sensation and of 
thought — it is that crude collection which constitutes 
the science or art of Animal Magnetism, Spiritualism, 
&c. Left in the hands of charlatanism, credulity, and 
superstition, the real facts which these pseudo sciences 



SENSATION. 89 

possess have been so intermixed with errors and false- 
hoods, with so many gratuitous assumptions and imag- 
inings, that the majority of serious and practical minds 
have found it safe to reject the whole. This absolute 
rejection will not, however, bear the test of time and 
experience ; for facts are now and then presented, so 
authentic and yet so entirely dehors the routine of 
classic metaphysics and psychology, that to ignore them 
is to be wilfully blind and deaf. The philosophy which 
omits them must be incomplete, as excluding a class of 
positively ascertained phenomena. It is therefore time 
that men of true science, strict observation, and logical 
intellect should examine these facts, and assign them 
their real value and place. Their positive meaning is 
to be found. 

Among these facts the following is well attested and 
may be verified : Persons have been found who, in 
certain conditions, can read with bandaged eyes, see 
through the thickest substances. I have witnessed this 
phenomenon myself. Here then is a case of seeing 
without eyes — the special organ of vision is dispensed 
with. The same apparently supernatural fact has been 
witnessed in regard to the organs of taste, hearing, and 
smell. Now, how can we explain this physically % I 
find but one answer. It is that there is a central seat 
of homogeneous substance or continuous surface of 
sensation, which, when excited, dispenses with the me- 
dium of the special organs, and performs alone their 
functions. If this be so, here would be another proof 
of the common basis of the senses. 



90 HUMANICS. 

It is nevertheless plain that the abstract fractions 
of the sentient unit are gathered severally. Each sense 
performs at least one distinct function — does what the 
others are totally incapable of doing. Thus the sound 
the apple makes as I bite it, is cognized by the ear and 
not by any other organ ; the savor I find as I masticate 
it is taken by the palate, and not by any other organ ; 
the odor it exhales is caught up by the nose and not 
by any other organ ; the colors it possesses are per- 
ceived by the eye and not by any other organ ; the 
hardness of the substance is disclosed by the feel and 
not by any other sense. Moreover, the non-existence 
of any one of these organs of sense would exclude the 
conception of the quality it is most specially destined 
to distinguish. It would then be to us as if there 
were no such quality in existence. If any one of the 
senses (except touch) were extinguished, the others 
would remain unaffected, and would continue their nor- 
mal operations. 

Thus it appears that the senses have each a separate 
individuality. 

But I have already shown that each sense, while it 
lives, is so closely interwoven with the others, through 
the common bond of touch, that no independent action 
of any one sense ever practically takes place. 

The senses therefore are — many in one. 

" The senses are many in one : " such is the result- 
ant expression of five simple operations : 1st. The pri- 



SENSATION. 91 

mary enumeration of the five senses, as existing and 
distinct integers ; 2d, the addition of the five in one 
sum or term — sensation ; 3d, the subtraction from 
sensation of four of the integers : smell, taste, oyer, 
sight, by which we find that touch remains ; 4th, the 
subtraction from sensation of only one of the integers, 
touch, by which we find that nothing (zero) remains ; 
for the elimination of the feel carries away all sensa- 
tion ; 5th, the consequent equation is : touch— sensa- 
tion. 

Thus, insomuch as they are distinguishable from 
each other, we may treat the senses as severalties. Ac- 
cordingly, we may endeavor to enumerate the direct 
functions of the senses, apart from all that appears to 
be composite, apart from all complexity, and from 
what is consequent upon other powers of the mind. 

Touch, we find spreads its net of nerves to every 
part of the body ; yet the same things or forces pro- 
duce different grades of feeling at different points of 
the body. This is in the ratio of the delicacy and fine- 
ness of the skin. Alcohol or pepper, for instance, will 
burn with more intensity when applied to the eye, than 
when touched by the hand, &c. Yet the feel of any 
given object is always in esse the same : the difference 
is in degree only. At the same time in the touch of 
different things we find a great variety of sensation, 
not only in degree but in quality. Hence we are able 
to give names to various feelings experienced by touch : 
Density, Earity, Texture, Contexture, Pulverulence, 



92 HUMANICS. 

Adhesion, Warmth, Coldness, Shocking, Soothing, &c, 
or hard, soft, firm, fluid, thick, thin, viscid, friable, 
tough, brittle, rigid, flexible, rough, smooth, slippery, 
tenacious, &c. These, with their co-ordinates, are the 
names of the principal sensations of which we become 
conscious directly through touch. They are the units 
of or numerators of touch, and touch itself is the name 
given to their common denominator. 

Taste directly and individually cognizes a great 
variety of sensations. The number is so great that no 
classification of them has ever yet been undertaken, 
nor does language as yet afford the terms necessary for 
their systematic arrangement. Only a few specific 
units of taste are distinguished by words essentially 
their own. Sweet, sour, bitter, pungent, are the only 
abstract names for tastes which occur to me now. The 
other tastes are named after the objects in which they 
are found, such as — sugary, honeyed, salty, spicy, &c, 
&c. 

Sight proclaims color, light, and shade in all their 
combinations. The abstract units of sight are not 
more numerous than those of any other sense ; but it 
is the principal instrument by which we become con- 
scious of concrete units ; for it enables us to perceive 
(at a given point of time, or space) an assemblage of 
parts forming a whole, such as a man, a beast, a vege- 
table, a mineral, &c. It is the organ to which we owe 
" the images " formed in the mind. Yet, as we have 
already shown, the other senses (touch more than the 



SENSATION. 93 

rest) are contributors and rectifiers. Hence we err 
when we attach the ideas of space, motion, number, 
order, place, form, size and the like, exclusively to sight ; 
and a closer analysis forces us to acknowledge that the 
direct function of sight is the perception of color and 
shade. 

Oyer cognizes sound. It furnishes units of great 
precision ; and Music with its seven well-marked notes, 
&c, is its offspring. Some have thought it possible 
to form a gamut for the use of touch, or sight, or taste, 
or smell, with names of degrees, as clearly marked as 
in music. Indeed, Newton and his disciples have al- 
ready done this for color ; and we see no valid reason 
for declaring it impossible in the domain of taste, smell, 
or even touch. Oyer, however, for the present is in 
the advance. Its sensations are measured, numbered, 
weighed, classed, and named with a perfection truly 
admirable. 

Smell is the most isolated of the senses, so that its 
direct functions and feelings cannot be mistaken ; yet, 
whatever may be the cause, nearly all its feelings are, 
like those of taste, named after the experiences of the 
other senses. We have but few words for smells which 
are not the mere transformations of the names of con- 
crete objects. No measured units of smell have, as 
yet, been discovered ; and its ut-re-mi-fa-sol remains to 
be framed. Fragrance, stink, perfume, fetor, are so 
general, they cannot be considered as designating units. 



94 HUMANICS. 

In the preceding paragraph we considered the 
functions-proper which impart severalty to the senses. 
In doing this the functions-common forced themselves 
upon our attention. While we mentioned the distinct 
properties which make the senses many, we could not 
help recognizing the general characteristics which make 
them one. We could not help this, because, while we 
were subtracting from all the properties those which 
were special to a particular sense, we found the com- 
mon phenomena so united, co-existent, and co-operative 
with the more limited, that one class could not be ob- 
served and noted without the other being present in 
the view and in the language describing it. 

After enumerating : 

1. Touch, perceiving substance and its densities ; 

2. Taste, perceiving savor and its phases ; 

3. Sight, perceiving color and its shades ; 

4. Oyer, perceiving sound and its tones ; 

5. Smell, perceiving odor and its varieties 

the fact that touch extended its properties to all the 
senses, and was their common element, became appa- 
rent, and we have noted it. 

But this communion shows itself by other evi- 
dences. 

In all the senses there is a consciousness of inter- 
course with — 

1°. Phenomena, or the Concrete and Ostensible ; 

2°. Force, or Impulse and Motion : 

3°. Law, or Necessity and Equilibrium ; 



SENSATION. 95 

4°. Space, or Extension and Place ; 
5°. Time, or Duration and Moment. 

1. Phenomena, as such, could never be the data of 
thought without being felt in Sensation as the evolu- 
tion or resultant of some Power or Force. 

2. Force and Phenomena would be as chaos, if sen- 
sation were not conscious of the subjection of the exter- 
nal world to absolute and perpetual laws. 

3. Law, Force, and Phenomena would be as dreams, 
if Sensation did not realize Space as containing them. 

4. Space, Law, Force, and Phenomena would be 
one eternal now, if Sensation did not divulge the suc- 
cession of Time. 

5. Time, Space, Law, Force, and Phenomena would 
in their turn be " unthinkable "—that is to say, never 
become any thing more than driving and drawing mo- 
tors of instinct, were it not for the elementary and 
egressive powers of Thought, of which I will treat in 
the next chapter. 

Physiology confirms these views, and enables us to 
define not only the offices of general and special sense, 
but also to find the distinction between Sensation and 
Consciousness in one degree, as well as between In- 
stinct and Thought in the next. 

Physiology shows that the nerves of vision, when 
shocked by a blow, or a current of electricity, emit 
flashes or appearances of light ; that diseases of the 



96 HUMANICS. 

ear-tubes sometimes give a " singing in the ear" or 
other sensation of sound ; that the nerves of vision are 
insensible to sound, and those of hearing insensible to 
light ; and that for the protection of the eye-ball na- 
ture has provided it with nerves of touch distinct from 
the optic or light-perceiving nerves, &c, &c. 

On the other hand, however, Physiology teaches 
us that in the absence of sight and hearing, touch will 
enable us to ascertain Direction and Form, Size and 
Order, Time and Space ; or according to common par- 
lance, which is scientifically correct, the " strength of 
the wanting sense goes into the other," which becomes 
more intense, and fulfils the office of the two, so that 
the blind do find their way and the deaf can learn to 
speak. 

Physiology shows, too, that the trouble of the born- 
blind who acquire vision, is to find the harmony and 
common properties of Touch and Yision. 

When they become conscious of the common cen- 
tre of the two sensations, their tribulations cease, and 
confusion is gradually dispelled. 

Dr. Wardrop gives a very interesting account of the 
circumstances which followed the acquisition of sight 
by a lady, on whose eyes he had performed an opera- 
tion. The details are lengthy, and I must confine my- 
self to citing one or two passages : " On the sixth day 
she seemed indeed bewildered from not being able to 
combine the knowledge acquired by the senses of touch 



SENSATION. 97 

and sight, and felt disappointed in not having the 
power of distinguishing at once by her eye, objects 
which she could so readily distinguish from one another 
by feeling them. On the seventh day the teacups and 
saucers fell under her observation. ' What are they 
like ? ' her brother asked her. ; I don't know,' she re- 
plied ; ' they look very queer to me, but I can tell you 
what they are in a minute if I touch them.' She no- 
ticed an orange on the chimney-piece, but could form 
no notion of what it was till she touched it. On the 
eighth day she seemed to have become more cheerful, 
and entertain greater expectation of comfort from her 
admission to the visible world," &c. 

Physiology also ascertains the homogeneity of the 
substance or matter of the nerves. Hence, though 
Touch, Sight, Smell, Hearing and Taste, Sensibility 
and Motion, have their special nerves, these nerves are 
all endowed with the same primary qualities, chemi- 
cally and organically, and the development of distinct 
functions is evidently due, not to a diversity or contra- 
riety in essence, but to modifications of that essence. 

Instinct, that machinery which drives and adapts 
the actions of animals in the most complex works, does 
not (with the introduction of consciousness) desert the 
Yertebrata. Hence, sometimes when they act from 
pure instinct, their apparent freedom, and the con- 
7 



98 HUMANICS. 

sciousness they exhibit, create an inference of ration- 
ality which does not really exist. 

As man possesses consciousness in a high degree, 
and can comprehend its operations, while he has 
hardly any gift of instinct, and can barely conceive 
what instinct is, he is prone to attribute the instinctive 
acts of animals to the powers with which he is familiar, 
and which are at his service. The acts which some 
beasts and insects perform instinctively, man may 
often perform by the aid of reason, (and without the 
help of instinct, which for many purposes is refused 
him ;) so that he naturally imputes the actions of beasts 
and insects to faculties like those possessed by himself, 
and by which he is enabled to accomplish what he sees 
them do. It is not till beholding them proceed with- 
out education, experience, or reflection, that he clearly 
apprehends the existence of instinct, the operations of 
which he can only understand when he observes his 
own reflex actions in nutrition, sleep, generation, &c. 

It must not be inferred that I underrate the force 
of instinct in man — he is much indebted to this prop- 
erty. 

In the study of Yitality I have alluded to many 
proofs of this. Most every thing he does in the act of 
feeding is instinctive, so in the acts of fighting, of 
walking, of keeping his balance, and of sexual connec- 
tion. But thought constantly intervenes and inter- 
meddles, so that it is difficult to separate the share of 



SENSATION. 99 

intuition from that of deliberation. Philosophy has 
still great labors to perform, in making a careful analy- 
sis of particular acts, so as in each to assign the specific 
shares of vitality, instinct, consciousness, and thought. 
Certain it is they are all four present in almost every 
movement of the human body. 

Now, starting from the facts clearly established in 
our study of Yitality, to wit : 

That the ablation of the cerebrum removes con 
sciousness ; 

That (notwithstanding the removal of consciousness) 
certain acts, necessary to life, are determined by sensa- 
tion, and are duly performed ; 

That the nerves of special sense have a direct action 
upon the nerves of motion ; 

That the Inveetebeata, and many fishes, have no 
cerebrum, and yet perform acts determined by the 
nerves of special sense ; 

I infer — 

That sensations and consciousness should be dis- 
tinguished ; should be as positively discriminated one 
from the other, as any one special sense can be known 
from another — the distinction is as great. 

That consciousness is a modification or special de- 
velopment of sensation — -just as taste or smell is a 
modification of touch ; and that the differences be- 
tween the basis and the mode are as positive in one 
case as in the other. 



100 HUMANICS. 

It may be difficult for us to conceive how, for in- 
stance, Bees can work and act without experiencing 
what is known to us as consciousness — that is to say, 
without the faculty of combining several simultaneous 
sensations into one picture or idea — one co-ordinate 
assemblage or " ensemble " as the French express it. 

Yet it is so ; and must be so ; for, insects have no 
cerebrum. 

But some one may say : "perhaps the nerves and 
ganglia of special sense, in insects, do the office of Con- 
sciousness or of the Cerebrum." To this I reply : your 
"perhaps" is no argument against a plain induction 
from ascertained facts; your "perhaps" contradicts 
the speciality of the several kinds of nerves, and gives 
to each kind two special functions ; your "perhaps " 
is at war with the economy of nature in the plan of 
" division of labor" which she strictly observes, and 
in her other plan of " doing nothing in vain" sl rule 
from which she never departs. Surely nature would 
not have made a new organ (a cerebrum) to evolve 
consciousness, if the special nerves had been capable 
of it, and if it already existed by their evolutions ; for 
in that case the accession of a cerebrum would have 
been wholly unnecessary. 

If we cannot implicitly rely upon the economy and 
constancy of nature, all reasoning must cease. 

Eelating in detail the acts of Bees and other in- 
sects, those who suppose the necessity of consciousness 



SENSATION. 101 

for these acts, exclaim : " How can we understand 
doings so wonderful and complex, unless we admit a 
consciousness in the actor ? How could these acts be 
done without a combined assemblage of phenomena 
in perception ? " 

I answer : 

Though the How and the Why be unknown the 
fact is not the less certain ; and if we cannot form a 
clear conception of the cause and process of action 
without consciousness, neither could we with it ; for, 
as I will presently show, consciousness would explain 
nothing — the mystery, if mystery there is, would be as 
great as ever. 

The insects go directly to their work and do it to 
perfection, from the instant of their birth. 

They erect a complicated castle, and its architec- 
ture conforms to the most abstruse laws of physics and 
mathematics, though they have received no education 
m the art they practise. 

Each does a share, executes a distinct operation of 
the process ; one carries the material, and another 
scoops out the cell ; they are all working at the same 
time, order and system prevail in their manoeuvres ; 
and a beautiful edifice of harmonious parts and adapted 
totality is constructed, yet none of the workmen ever 
did or saw such work before. 

Hence, the argument drawn from the complication 
or design of the work amounts to nothing in favor of 
consciousness ; for if the works are performed without 



102 HUMANICS. 

previous knowledge, instruction", or experience, and 
only by virtue of an innate impulse and direction, as 
they evidently are, of what use would consciousness be 
to the workers ? Of no use, since they do not obey 
consciousness, any more than do the spindles and looms 
of a cotton factory. 

True it is their work exhibits evidences of design, 
but the design is not theirs: it is that of God — the 
Universal Mind — the Grand Archeus of the Universe. 

Is it reiterated that the insects go and come — that 
to find their food they must seek it, that to gather it 
they must know it, when found. I answer again ; sen- 
sation, direct mechanical sensation, under the compul- 
sion of a predestined organism, is the sufficient and only 
solution consistent with all the facts — consistent, for in- 
stance, with the fact that each kind of worker is formed 
peculiarly for a specific species of labor ; and the fact 
that among many tribes of insects the parents die be- 
fore their progeny are born ; and among others the 
eggs of a brood are hatched by the elements ; and yet 
the work of every generation is duly done. Thus, it is 
not a whit more wonderful that they should seek their 
food without being conscious of it, than that they 
should build their palaces without knowing how. 

Certain it is they have not the organ; and, there- 
fore, cannot possess a consciousness. 

Consciousness is the union of various simultaneous 



SENSATION. ] 03 

sensations into one — so as they all together form one 
tableau or idea. 

Consciousness is the combining of many direct sen- 
sations in due accordance with present reality. 

Consciousness, as well as sensation, is revived in 
Memory ; but the Memory of consciousness is concrete. 

Consciousness is therefore the summary of sensa- 
tion. 

The seat of consciousness is the cerebrum, and it 
determines action through the cerebellum ; and the 
Vertebrata are therefore endowed with consciousness. 

It does not give liberty ; for its operations are posi- 
tive or imperative ; but it imparts greater variety and 
complexity of motives / and consequently of action. 

Hence, when we see the Orang-Outang, the Ele- 
phant, the Horse, the Dog, the Fox, the Eat, &c, de- 
ceiving, or decoying foes, practising cunning ruse, se- 
lecting the fit mode within their reach to attain an 
object, when we read the thousand and one anecdotes 
related of their so-called " intelligence," we will not be 
able to find any thing in them beyond the spontaneous 
suggestions of their concrete Memory and Consciousness, 
aided in many instances by the still more wonderful 
incentives of their instinct. We will not fail to ob- 
serve that the motives which appear to their conscious- 
ness, are obeyed without deliberation; and that if 
not checked or deterred by the accidental and inter- 
vening occurrence of another direct perception, the 
animal will unhesitatingly fulfil the dictates of feeling 



104 HUMANICS. 

on the one side, and seize the means of gratification 
presented to consciousness on the other. Impelled by 
hunger, self-preservation, fear, anger, &c, — aided by 
the acuteness of their senses, — while the scene around 
them is lighted up by consciousness, they do all that 
man could do, if he were deprived of his powers of ab- 
straction, meditation, &c. 

When the acts of sub-human animals cannot be 
traced to direct propelling motives they may appear to 
be free and rational, simply because we do not suffi- 
ciently consider the variety of attracting forces which 
consciousness subjects them to, when it reveals the 
whole scope of the horizon to their view and activity. 

But it is not until we come to the study of human 
thought, and have discussed its distinctive traits, that 
the true nature and purview of consciousness can be 
made fully apparent. At present we content our- 
selves with the remark that man seeks, finds, makes 
motives, subjects them to examination and revision, 
accepts or rejects them, but other animals cannot do it. 

Since consciousness unites all the sensations of feel, 
sight, sound, taste, and odor — blends them together — the 
faculty of suggestion necessarily arises'; for fusion and 
conjunction of several sensations implies an interchange, 
and therefore suggestion. Each sense brings its mes- 
sage to the common centre, and an entire picture is 
formed. Each with its special impression of quality, 
brings its indication of time, place, force, and motion. 



SENSATION. 105 

Of these four last mentioned, and perhaps in others, 
they have a common susceptibility, and are therefore 
able to correspond with, and react upon one another. 

Association of impressions takes place ; and hence 
the " scalded cat dreads cold water." 

But what is the definite purview of Consciousness f 

If we could bring our mind, notwithstanding the 
constant interference of thought, to conceive its state 
when first perceiving a novelty, and before turning 
over the perception in reflexion, we would have a clear 
idea of the purview of consciousness. The image of the 
objects would be distinctly within the sensorium, with 
form, color, space, time, motion, totality, and such like, 
before being analyzed, classified, referred either in 
whole or in part to an essential type, and before being 
numbered and measured, according to any standard. 

The image thus given might occasion pain or 
pleasure, revive the memory of some other previous 
impression, start some reaction of motor nerve ; but no 
reasoned conception would exist. 

£Tow suppose we were incapable of subjecting the 
image to any revision, that we were not conscious of 
any laws of nature, or grounds of deduction and induc- 
tion, and the image would work upon our sensorium 
uncontrolled by ourselves, and should provoke a deter- 
mination of action without deliberation on our part : if 
we could realize to ourselves a condition like this, we 
would then have a correct conception of the sensational 
consciousness of fishes, reptiles, birds, and beasts. 



106 HUMANICS. 

There are degrees of consciousness. 

In Fishes the cerebrum is in a rudimentary state ; 
in Reptiles it begins to assume a somewhat more dis- 
tinct but still undeveloped form; in Birds it presents 
a notable improvement, but there is yet no separation 
of the hemispheres; in Mammalia it unfolds all its 
principal parts, and in man its formation is completed. 

But it is not only from class to class that this pro- 
gression takes place, but it is also observable through 
the orders of each class — till the cerebrum of man is 
attained. 

The first appearance of the cerebrum in fishes, is 
that of a small bulb of nervous substance without ven- 
tricles, convolutions, &c. ; but, as the seriation ad- 
vances, the softer portions are deposited on the ex- 
terior and the more solid matter in the centre ; the 
gray matter makes its appearance ; the radiating fibres, 
the commissural fibres ; the corpus callosum ; the ven- 
tricles ; the convolutions, &c. ; while each particular 
part after first showing itself as a simple germ in one 
class, becomes embryonic in the next, takes a distinct 
shape in the next, and finally developes itself with 
granules, threads, converging and diverging radii, stri- 
ata, &c, in man. 

But as between man and the higher Mammalia 
there are no new jparts yet discovered by comparative 
anatomy, nothing to indicate a new organ. There is 
greater elaboration, more distinctness, more details — 
the threads cross each other with greater complexity ; 
but there is nothing to divulge any new function. 



SENSATION. 107 

Consciousness alone is perfected. 

Hence, in conformity with what we know of the 
grades of consciousness as displayed in the actions of 
animals, we see a seriated development of the organ ; 
and find that the bodily formation and active display 
proceed in parity. 

Hence the powers of consciousness in man, are and 
must be more intense and complex than in any other 
creature. 

Beyond sensational consciousness, the sub-human 
animals do not go. Mere perception of direct or imme- 
diate phenomena, in concrete aggregation, is sufficient 
to explain all the wonderful stories told of their so- 
called " intelligence." 

Hence it is I am led to believe that phrenologists, 
in naming several organs of the cerebrum, have hu- 
manized them too much. The rational element of 
humanity is so constantly involving itself with all our 
acts, vital, instinctive, or conscious, so modifies and 
commands memory or suggestion, that we can hardly 
separate the ingredients even in nomenclature; and 
consequently phrenology has in some instances imputed 
a rational essence to some organs of consensual percep- 
tion. Revising the names of this portion of the organs, 
I would regard their functions to be, — 

Individuality , but not Combination ; 

Eventuality, but not Operation ; 

Locality, but not Circumscription ; 



108 HUMANICS. 

Form, but not Symmetry or Proportion ; 

Extension, but not Size or Dimension ; 

Force, but not Weight, or Eesolution of Forces ; 

Color, but not Catoptrics ; 

Interjacence, but not Order / 

Severality, but not Number or Computation ; 

Time, but not Chronometry ; 

Tune, but not Khythm ; 

Language, but not Grammar. 

In one word : 
Quality, but not Quantity. 
Imagery, but not Measure. 

And I now add to this list of Sensations even those 
two mighty faculties miscalled intellectual or reasoning 
faculties. 

Compaeison, which is simply the perception of iden- 
tity and variety. 

Causality, which is simply the perception of con- 
nection and disconnection. 

What! exclaims the reader, are these two grand 
faculties to be reduced to the category of mere sensa- 
tions ? these reasoning faculties which belong to man. 
alone — these rational organs which invest us with our 
superiority over the brutes, are they to be given up to 
our animality, at the expense of our humanality ? 

Indeed, it must be so, for observation commands 
this classification ; and when I come to the study of 



SENSATION. 109 

Thought, I hope to be justified ; but, in the mean time, 
I beg attention to the remark — that if we doubt a dog's 
faculty of compaeison, we must deny his ability of dis- 
tinguishing his master from another person at sight ; or 
if we doubt his causality, we may try whether when 
we pick up a stone and offer to throw it at a dog, he 
will run or not. 

Then, what is there left for man alone ? Much — 
much more than he has, so far, fully appreciated as his 
exclusive property : an atom of the divinity — a spirit — 
an Archeus — not only superior, but different from any 
material or physiological endowments. What is it? 
I will attempt an answer, but before doing so, I must 
dispose of the emotions. 



III. 

EMOTION. 

"What are those vibrations, agitations, calms, thrills, 
tremors, shocks, quietudes, ardors, apathies, quicken- 
ings, reactions, and even indifferences we feel within 
ourselves, and which cannot be identified with either 
Vitality, Sensation, Thought, or Action ? 

They are what we call Emotions, of which there is 
a great multitude, and of this multitude, each unit has 
a known character and name ; the principal ones being, 
according to Phrenology, Amativeness, Parental Love, 
Adhesiveness, Inhabitiveness, Constancy, Vitativeness, 
Combativeness, Destructiveness, Alimentiveness, Ac- 
quisitiveness, Secretiveness, Cautiousness, Approbative- 
ness, Self-Esteem, Firmness, Conscientiousness, Hope, 
Faith, or Spirituality, Veneration, Charity, or Benevo- 
lence, Constructiveness, Ideality, or Beauty, Sublimity, 
Imitation, Mirthfulness, and Human Nature. 

They cannot be confounded with Sensation, Con- 



EMOTION. Ill 

sciousness, or Thought, but may be influenced or aroused 
by either. 

They are not Sensation, for Sensation sometimes 
causes them, and to identify them with Sensation, would 
be to confound effects with causes. 

They are not Consciousness, for Consciousness is a 
mirror, and to identify them with Consciousness, would 
be to confound the reflector with the rays it radiates. 

They are not Thought, for Thought is their judge 
and mentor, and to identify them with Thought, would 
be to confound force with law ; the steam with the 
engine. 

Yet we feel the Emotions, we are conscious of them, 
we can think them ; but, in doing so, we become more 
fully aware that they are the vibrations of our organism 
when played upon by Sensation, Consciousness, and 
Thought; as distinctly so as are the vibrations of a 
harp string from the hand that strikes them. 

Besides, the Emotions are sometimes awakened by 
Sensations alone, sometimes by Consciousness alone, 
sometimes by Thought alone, and sometimes by all three 
together — thus showing that neither of these three can be 
Emotion itself, as it exists sometimes without sensation, 
sometimes without consciousness, and sometimes with- 
out thought, and therefore is not a property of either. 

Without Sensation % Yes ; for the loves of the plants ; 
the special warmth and excitation evinced by their or- 
gans of generation at the time of conjugation ; the recoil 
of the Mimosa when touched ; the combat of the Diona?a 



112 HUMANICS. 

with every insect that touches it ; the tendency of all 
plants to seek for heat, light, electricity, and food ; the 
loves and acts of those insects which have no nerves, 
no organs of sense, and which are only distinguishable 
from plants by their mode of nutrition and growth ; and 
even the loves of the turtle-dove, which attaches itself 
to its mate, not by virtue of any disclosure of sense, but 
by virtue of a predetermined instinct which nothing 
can revoke ; the gregarious feeling of many animals, 
such as ants, bees, sheep, and men, which gregarious- 
ness being in these species and not in others, no opera- 
tions of sensation suffices to explain — all these facts, 
and many others too numerous to mention, clearly show 
that emotion may exist without sensation. 

Without Consciousness ? A fortiori, if emotion 
may exist without sensation, it may without conscious- 
ness, which is only the summary of sensation ; and, 
moreover, we know that the Bee, the Wasp, &c, who 
evince anger, combativeness, fear, and other emotions, 
have no cerebrum, and therefore no consciousness. 
They have sensation only, and through it their emo- 
tional properties may be excited ; but the fact that 
emotion existed before sensation, having forced us to 
conclude that emotion was identical with it, we must 
conclude that it only opens a new avenue to sensibility ; 
and that consciousness is only another avenue which 
may, or may not, exist. But it is in man that the non- 
essentiality of consciousness to emotion is the most ap- 
parent ; for man is combative, secretive, destructive, 



EMOTION. 113 

cautious, acquisitive, &c, by innate instincts, which, 
far from originating with consciousness, control it, sway 
it, and subject it to their tendencies and uses. 

"Without Thought? None will contest the non- 
identity of emotion and thought ; and many would be 
ready to assert a repulsion to exist between the two. 
In fact, the frequent clashings between judgment and 
inclination, will and desire, is sufficient, at least, to 
prove that they are distinct. Happy is the man who, 
in accordance with the designs of the Grand Archeus, 
succeeds in harmonizing these two elements of self, and 
sets them to act in unison with each other and with the 
laws of nature. 

Attempts have been made to confine the idea of 
Emotion to the mere pain or pleasure we feel on be- 
coming conscious of certain sensations ; but this defini- 
tion, for several reasons, will be found inadequate to 
convey a correct understanding of what Emotion is. 

It is not enough to say that Emotion is pain or 
pleasure, for it is evident that to feel either of these, 
the organism or medium must be gifted with properties 
or energies, which render it susceptible or prone. A 
stone cannot feel emotion. Why ? Simply because it 
possesses no property of excitability within itself, it has 
no innate energies resolvable -into emotion. 

Pain and pleasure are only two of the most general 
effects of emotion. They are not emotion itself, for to 
describe the emotions, we are compelled to use other 
terms than " Pain " and " Pleasure." We must say : 



114 HUMANICS. 

affection, content, regret, cheerfulness, dejection, joy, 
sorrow, beauty, hope, despair, fear, diffidence, courage, 
wonder, pride, vanity, humility, modesty, friendship, 
enmity, sociability, melancholy, love, hate, benevo- 
lence, pity, gratitude, respect, veneration, contempt, 
piety, and a thousand other terms which may or may 
not imply any suffering or enjoyment; sometimes 
neither, and often either, according to circumstances. 

It would be impossible to include all the emotions 
in a classification comprising only the two heads of 
pain and pleasure. Many would come under neither ; 
and even those which might be ranged on one side or 
the other, might, 'by a rising or sinking of intensity, ex- 
hibit the opposite condition. Thus, Benevolence may 
become Pity or Sorrow ; Shame may be softened into 
Modesty or Bashfulness. 

It has, doubtless, already been remarked that in 
separating Emotion — in distinguishing it from every 
thing else, I have not excluded vitality; and the infer- 
ence to be drawn is, that I can find no essential differ- 
ence between Vitality and Emotion. 

Is there any ? 

If there is, it must be deduced from the following 
definition, which I believe to be true : 

Emotion is the manifestation, within the organism 
of the motive properties of Vitality. 

This manifestation may be determined in different 
modes : 



EMOTION. 115 

1. It may spring up in Vitality by virtue of the vi- 
tal force itself. 

2. It may be quickened by Sensation. 

3. It may be illuminated by Consciousness. 

4. It may harmonize, in sympathy, with Thought ; 
or, 

5. It may be developed by two or more of these 
forces acting in different proportions and under dif- 
ferent conditions. 

Hence according to this theory, if Emotion be dis- 
tinguishable at ail from Yitality, it is not otherwise 
than as Form from Matter, Color from Light. 

And this is indeed an important and strongly mark- 
ed difference ; for there are few minds that cannot 
realize it as a valid distinction. 

-None who feel themselves will deny that emotion 
is vital — that all we know of it is in the modifications 
of our vital feelings ; but every one admits a positive 
discrimination between properties and the phenomena 
they evolve. How many, for instance, are the modes 
in which gravitation appears, the falling apple, re- 
volving worlds, flowing waters, &c, yet we all concede 
the necessity of not confounding weight and motion. 
So it is with fuel, heat, and light ; and thus, among 
many other comparisons, we might give this one : Yi- 
tality is a flame radiating its own heat and light, or 
emotions, stirred by the poker of sensation, reflected in 
the mirror of consciousness, conducted by the flues of 
thought, burning its own elements, and dying if the 
fuel is not renewed. 



116 HUMANICS. 

Whatever excites emotion in one person, may not 
affect another in the least, or may induce a very differ- 
ent feeling. 

Thus, noise may irritate and anger the nervous or 
studious man, but does not disturb the phlegmatic, and 
would please a child. The corrupt smile at vice, but 
the pure behold it with indignation. Merriment en- 
livens the happy, but shocks the miserable man. 

Since the causes of Emotion are so multiple ; since 
our mere vital condition, state of health, <fcc, has 
so much to do with them ; since every shade and kind 
of Sensation may move them ; since every aspect and 
phase of Consciousness may evoke them ; since every 
evolution of thought may influence them ; and since all 
these determining powers cross and intermingle in so 
many ways and proportions, the number of complex 
emotions actually felt must be very large ; they must 
be as numerous as could be the permutations of many 
numerical digits arrayed in twos, threes, fours, &c, and 
this would be millions. 

At the same time as it is only through the what-is- 
felt — only in the concrete feeling just as it presents it- 
self, that we know of emotions ; so by this feeling do 
we name them. Hence we have in our dictionaries a 
multitude of terms to express and designate various 
complex feelings ; and but very few (I ought rather to 
say none) for any unmixed and strictly abstract emo- 
tion. 



EMOTION. 117 

'Nov do the complex terms, at our command, suffice, 
for we are constantly obliged to resort to whole phrases 
and sentences to express the conditions and movements 
of the Soul. 

But, confining our attention to the words singly, we 
find that language (having been formed apart from any 
view to abstract analysis or exhaustive classifications, 
but under the pressure of direct and compound neces- 
sities) gives us terms only for the what-is-felt, as it is 
felt ; and hence the Dictionary, beginning at " Abash " 
or " Abashment," and ending with u Zealousness," con- 
tains, at least, two thousand words expressive of states 
or disturbances of feeling ; while also every one of these 
words conveys a composite meaning. 

There is, for instance, in " Plate," as well as in 
" Contempt," a sentiment of antipathy or repulsion ; 
but, in one case, it is mingled with an idea of the harm- 
fulness of the object, and in the other of its impotency. 
In one the basis of feeling may be the hostility of Yice 
to Yirtue, or of Justice to Wrong, while, in the other, 
it is often the opposition of Gravity to Futility, or the 
like. Nor are these terms even so simple as to require 
us to stop the analysis at this point. Hate has, for in- 
stance, its degrees : it may be only aversion, grudge, 
spite, resentment, or it may be disgust, malice, detesta- 
tion, abhorrence, abomination, implacability, &c. In 
Hate, too, if it be caused by an act of injustice, and 
not by mere instinctive repulsion, the intellectual powers 
may be concerned ; for, in this case, hate depends upon 



118 HUMANICS. 

the judgment of right and wrong, and may cease through 
any detection of error in premises or conclusion. 

Hence, it would be a difficult task, indeed, to form 
a satisfactory list or catalogue, or classification of pri- 
mary uncompounded emotions. We have in Physics 
the primitive colors, in Chemistry we have the " ele- 
mentary bodies ; " but, in Psychology, the radical emo- 
tions have not been completely ascertained. Language, 
in its present state, almost precludes a systematic clas- 
sification ; for the terms at the disposal of the philoso- 
pher, are not only complex in themselves, but run into 
one another, and any one word will imply some condi- 
tion or meaning belonging to many others having with 
it apparently no connection. 

Phrenology has attempted the desired classification 
of Emotion ; and even were we to discard its Anatom- 
ical and Physiological pretensions, Phrenology would 
still hold a high rank among Psychological systems. 

The phrenological theory is, that — 

All the functions and faculties of man are the source 
and seat of emotion. Knowledge supplies motives, and 
feeling induces thought and action. The motor nerves 
have direct or indirect intercourse with the whole man. 
His vital, animal, and rational nature, separately or to- 
gether, vibrate in emotion, so that it may be said every 
feeling or thought is emotion ; and thus we would 
have 



EMOTION. 119 

1°. Love of Being, represented by the vital in- 
stincts. 

2°. Love of Having, represented by the Propensi- 
ties. 

3°. Love of Doing, represented by the Sentiments. 

4°. Love of Knowing, represented by the Percep- 
tive and Intellectual organs. 

5°. Love of Speaking, represented by the organ of 
Language, moved by the rest. 

But they are all concerned with each other, and it 
is difficult to group them. 

Taking the emotions, as represented by the Phreno- 
logical synopsis, it will be found that they will admit 
of the following division : 

1°. The love of Life or Egotism, represented by the 
Selfish and Domestic Propensities, or as I would pre- 
fer to call and class them Subjective and Objective Self- 
ishness. The subjective or wholly selfish are Self-esteem, 
Approbativeness (?) Cautiousness, Combativeness, Se- 
cretiveness, Acquisitiveness, Distinctiveness, and Ali- 
mentiveness, which descend from the stem of Selfishness. 
The Objective or Selfishness, in objects of affection or 
propensity, are Amativeness, which is a selfish desire 
to gratify the genital functions ; Philo-pkogenitiveness, 
the attachment to one's own progeny ; Inhabitiveness, 
which is selfishness, applied to locality ; Adhesiveness, 
which is selfish pleasure in gregariousness, or in chosen 
objects of companionship ; and Concentkativeness (?) 



120 HUMANICS. 

or rather Constancy, which produces continuity of af- 
fection towards the objects chosen. Constructiveness, 
which is the selfish instinct whereby birds and insects 
are enabled to build their nests, or beasts and fishes 
their lair, as the bee its hive, the beaver its lodge, &c. 
The language of these organs is : My Wife, My Chil- 
dren, My home, My friends ; may I never be parted 
from them. 

2°. The love of Knowledge or Curiosity by the 
Perceptive Faculties, of which we have already treated 
in the study of sensation. 

3°. The love of Truth or Hope represented by a 
group composed of Conscientiousness, Firmness (?), and 
Hope. 

4°. The love of Beauty or Faith, represented by a 
group composed of Veneration, Marvellousness, Sub- 
limity (?), and Ideality. 

5°. The love of Morality or Charity, represented by 
a group composed of Benevolence, Imitation (?), Mirth- 
fulness, and Language. Some would add Human Sym- 
pathy and Suavity. 

I have marked some of these names with a point 
of interrogation, in order to suggest, that — 

1°. Approbativeness is a perfectly selfish faculty : it 
seeks to please only for the sake of self-glory or van- 
ity ; it fears the ill-will of others ; it delights in their 
praise, but it does not love them, or care for them, oth- 
erwise than for the flattery they may offer. 



EMOTION. 121 

/ 

2°. Concentrativeness is a misnomer. It ought to 
have occurred to Combe that nature in her consistent 
symmetry would not have located an intellectual organ 
among the propensities ; but that the continuity evinced 
by those whose heads served him to mark this organ 
was the continuity (and therefore the concentration) of 
affection. Indeed, Spurzheim did not concur in Combe's 
opinion, declared that his experience was in contradic- 
tion with them, and Combe himself only gives the 
name as conjectural / and the mistakes made by prac- 
tical phrenologists, who have received the conjecture 
as demonstration, might serve to discredit their art, if 
in other respects it not redeem itself. Continuity of 
affection, instead of continuity of thought, is probably 
much nearer the truth. 

3°. Imitation is evidently sympathy, sl sort of iden- 
tification of self with others and their feelings. I have 
therefore placed it among the social emotions. It is by 
this chord that the Actor, the Orator, and the Poet are 
able to set an assembly or community to a unison of 
feeling and of action. 

4°. Firmness is the organ to which concentration of 
mind, or of continuous trains of thought, really belongs. 
Firmness implies fixedness of intent, or of design, so 
that he who has this feeling will, if his intellect is once 
attracted by any question, pursue it to the end. 

5°. Sublimity was I believe discovered by Fowler 
& Wells. I have placed it among the Artistic Organs, 
as it seems closely allied to the unawed advance towards 



122 HUMANICS. 

unlimited perfection, evinced by the inventors and 
progressive men of the age. It is of higher rank than 
the mere constructive instinct, which works upon a 
predestined model ; for it is free to receive its impulse 
from intellect and ideality, which delight in adaptation 
and beauty. 

But in all these definitions of emotions, there is al- 
ways some term or phrase implying some element of 
thought or option, which does not and cannot belong 
to them. The emotions cannot be considered as intel- 
ligent, nor should their definition convey a compound 
notion, for if they were either capable of rational judg- 
ments, or of multiple components, they would not be 
emotions, but modes of reflection and judgment. 

The stamp of reason they acquire in man, is due 
not to any quality of their own, but to man's intellec- 
tual nature, which not only modifies and enlightens 
them, but soars above them, above their animality, and 
descends from the Spirit of God to inspire them. 

The ideas man forms of his emotions, and the names 
he gives them in consequence of these ideas, involve 
sensational impressions and intellectual operations, 
which constantly accompany the passional involutions. 
Man's Firmness, for instance, is interwoven with the 
judgment, whether correctly or incorrectly formed, of 
what is to be done ; his Conscientiousness contains the 
idea of what ought to be done ; his Hope exists with 



EMOTION. 123 

an appreciation of probability or possibility, as well as 
with some desire ; his Sublimity is moved in common 
with the presence or recollection of great force, and 
the simultaneous recollection that this great force is 
adapted to some mighty design of God or man ; his 
Constructiveness is associated with a capacity for the 
processes of thought the architect requires, viz., the 
computation of measure, proportion, fitness, &c. Thus 
were it not for the peculiar impulse or thrill of each 
of these emotions, and for the fact that we know sev- 
eral of them to exist independently of consciousness, 
we would be apt to regard them as purely phenomena 
of the intellectual or rational power in the agent. 

It is in man that this admixture of the rational ele- 
ment with emotion is peculiarly felt ; and therefore if 
we were to confine our attention to man alone, we could 
not hope to unravel the apparent confusion thus creat- 
ed ; but the instincts of the lower animals, those in- 
stincts which are clearly and positively automatic, ow- 
ing nothing to education or thought, have furnished us 
with appreciable distinctions. Hence in vain have phi- 
losophers shown the sensational and intellectual charac- 
teristics of the human emotions, and have argued, with 
Condillac, that sense necessarily produces conscious- 
ness, and that consciousness necessarily produces thought 
and emotion ; the Phrenologist turns and points to 
senseless vitality, or to preordained instinct as his wit- 
ness. 



124 HUMANICS. 

Still the difficulties of elementary nomenclature, and 
abstract definition remain, preventing any clear demar- 
cation ; and it would seem that man might with this or 
that faculty perform the acts for which another organ 
has been given, or appears to be destined. Hence, for 
instance, what need of Constructiveness if we have Or- 
der, Comparison, Causality, Ideality, &c. But the con- 
fusion is merely verbal, turning more upon the mean- 
ing of the name than upon the essence of the emotion 
itself. 

But, notwithstanding this nominal indistinctness 
and verbal admixture as between one emotion and the 
other psychological elements, there is one clear and 
well-marked distinction to be drawn. It is between 
the selfish and the social feeling. One set of emotions 
tend evidently to self or egotism ; they are concentric ; 
but another set tend to society and man in general ; 
they are expansive and disinterested. On the one side 
we may place all those sentiments having communion 
with Humanity and God, while on the other, we may 
range the propensities peculiarly animal and vital. 

This gives us at once the grand distinction which 
pervades the philosophy of Jesus, and which constitutes 
the ethics of the New Testament. 

Thus is our attention called to the 



EMOTION. 125 



in relation to which I will now proceed to give my 
views. 

Many, before reading this Study, would like to know 
what sect the author belongs to ; but neither this pre- 
face nor the book itself will gratify their curiosity in 
this respect. The disclosure is refrained from simply 
because it would be an idle thing in a work which does 
not propose to consider the character and teachings of 
Jesus- in a religious or theological point of view. It 
is only of the man and his philosophy that the follow- 
ing pages are written. 

•Of Jesus, the Christ, there are apostles who have 
promulgated the revelation, martyrs who have perished 
in the name, priests who have preached the dogmas, 
worshippers who have professed the faith, and theo- 
logians who, in thousands of volumes, have expounded 
the word ; but of Jesus, the man as distinguishable from 
God, few have separately treated. 

And may we not without irreverence consider him 
in this view ? Is it not taught that he was both man 
and God — that he had a true human body — that he ate, 
drank, walked, worked, and grew weary — that he 
groaned, bled, and died on the cross — that he assumed 
our whole nature, soul as well as body — that he was 
capable of human feelings, such as amazement, grief, 



126 HUMANICS. 

joy, &c. — that his human nature must not be con- 
founded with his divine — that though there is a union 
of natures in Christ, there is not a mixture or confusion 
of them or of their properties — that his humanity is not 
changed into his deity, nor his deity into his humanity ; 
but that the two natures are distinct in one person ? 

If, on the one hand, the Unitarians have been con- 
demned for doubting the divinity of Jesus, on the other 
Marcion, Apelles, Yalentinius and many others were 
declared heretics for denying his humanity. 

It is therefore without the fear of incurring the 
blame of any Christian that, eliminating every theo- 
logical view, and considering the ethics promulgated 
by Jesus and his apostles in a purely rational aspect, I 
shall endeavor to expound and commend his law as a 
systematic philosophy. I hope to show that, even 
without the sanction of divine authority, and when 
measured by right reason alone, this system is logically 
and practically the true one, and the only one suited 
to the nature of man as a social creature. 

In doing so, I shall not, I believe, find it necessary 
(as do the most approved authors, who nevertheless 
are considered as good Christians) to tamper with, pal- 
liate, or evade any of the moral precepts of Jesus, so 
as to pander to the exigencies of selfishness or vanity, or 
to any of those punitive feelings which influence the 
prevailing ideas of Justice and Right. Unfortunately 
this is the fashionable course ; and in the most popular 
works on ethics we still find Brotherly-Love hewn 



EMOTION. 127 

square with the " four cardinal virtues " of the Greek 
and Eoman moralists. These I think should be dis- 
carded as insufficient and as leading man astray. I 
accept the n&vo law in its broad and absolute meaning ; 
and it is in this uncompromising sense that I shall 
maintain it to be the true and perfect standard of hu- 
man action. 

From a perusal of the works of scientific thinkers 
of modern times, it would appear as if the majority of 
them had taken it for granted that Jesus has not dis- 
closed the innate moral criterion, but has left it to them 
to find and proclaim the natural stand-point of morals, 
law, and politics. 

In this, I think, they have been mistaken. By the 
rules of action prescribed and exemplified in the New 
Testament, by the enunciation of the principle or basis 
of these rules, and by the reasons given to fortify them, 
we are furnished with a complete system far better than 
any ever formed by the philosophers of ancient times, 
— a system containing within itself psychologically, the 
essence, and logically ', the rationale of the moral law; 
while the whole is practically illustrated by the sublime 
and beautiful acts of the author and his apostles. 

But the scientific moralists were far from perceiving 
this. They have continued to explore the world of 
mind and action to find some new theory, some hither- 
to unknown resting-place for the olive-bearing bird of 
true virtue. They all, no doubt, desired the moral 



128 HUMANICS. 

perfection of man, but the wish for the glory of discov- 
ering the test principle and focal point of ethics, and 
social economy, had certainly much force in deter- 
mining the course of many of them, and prevented 
them from seeing — 1°, that the precious jewel had been 
found — 2°, that they were not the finders. 

I regard many of the works of these philosophers as 
serving to exhibit the miserable aberrations and in- 
genious shifts of which the human mind is capable 
when seeking to reconcile the animal and selfish de- 
velopment of the passions with the dictates of reason 
and the true instincts of nature. On the other hand, 
the efforts of many writers to disclose a pure criterion 
is of itself sufficient to show the existence of an inherent 
impulse in man which prepares him for love and as- 
pires to truth ; but they have failed, in a greater or a 
less degree, to attain the goal of these impulses and 
aspirations. 

The ancients in their failure, being ignorant of the 
Jesuic doctrine are entitled to our indulgence ; but the 
moderns, though often displaying laudable motives and 
aims, are less excusable ; for they had the benefit of the 
Jesuic record, and yet disregarded it to follow the 
Greek and Roman models. Thus, in lands professedly 
Christian, where the Jesuic record is held as divine and 
as containing the revelations of God in theology and 
morals, we see men profoundly learned, who (though, 
seeking for the pivotal truth) have hardly noticed the 
hook which was before them, and which contained the 



EMOTION. 129 

truth they desired, written in blazing characters. They 
ransacked the mazes of metaphysics, and racked their 
brains with cunning and abstruse speculations to solve 
the problem which had been worked out, centuries be- 
fore, by him whom they were wont to call their God. 
Strange to say, this book and revelation, which they 
all had in their hands, remained, with respect to the 
fundamental principle it contains, sealed to their in- 
tellectual eye ; and though they read it over and over 
again, they found but little in it besides texts for theo- 
logical controversy. Having eyes they did not see, 
having ears they did not hear. True, they have pro- 
fessed a profound respect for the book, and ostensibly 
bowed to its authority ; but it was only to betray or 
forget it with impunity ; and they passed it over with 
scarcely a thought (not dreaming it contained the treas- 
ure they were seeking) to follow after their own theories 
or those of Socrates, Plato, Aristotle, Zeno, Epictetus, 
&c. 

It must, however, be admitted, that approaches have 
been made towards the true criterion ; and that of late 
years the philosophers are beginning to see that the 
New Testament is the way to true ethical knowledge, 
" subjectively " as well as " objectively" At present, 
they are not far from converting their favorite terms 
of "Suggestion," "Sympathy," "Conscience," and 
"Moral Sense," into the more primary and definable 
ones of— 1°, " Love to God," and 2°, Social Feeling, or 
" Love of Man." All that is now necessary is, to show 



130 HUMANICS. 

them that these two are the plain and positive innate 
attributes of man. The time is fast approaching when 
no ethical works will be esteemed except periphrases, 
commentaries, amplifications, illustrations, and demon- 
strations of the Law of Love, as stated by Jesus, and as 
exemplified by him eighteen centuries ago. 

Indeed, we are already arrived at the point when 
we are able to perceive with clearness, not only how 
the nominalists and realists, the sensationalists and 
idealists, divisionists and communists, the protectionists 
and freetraders, have demolished one another; but 
also how it is that nothing of their several systems re- 
mains standing, except the few pillars they had bor- 
rowed from the intellectual and moral temple of true 
Christianity. It is curious, in looking through the 
works of the great thinkers of these schools, to see, 
apart from their verbal peculiarities, varied nomencla- 
tures, and singularities of logical process, how they in 
substance agree together, how they all tend in their 
material points of agreement to establish the Jesuic 
doctrine, and how the omission or denial of some one 
of the ingredients of the Jesuic philosophy, or an iso- 
lated development of only one of its principles, has been 
the cause of all the errors of which they have convicted 
one another. 

This has been perceived by most of the master minds 
of the present century, and many of them have already 
pointed out and contributed to the growing tendency 
towards Jesuism. This book is a humble tribute to 
that tendency. 



EMOTION. 131 

Let it not be imagined that I confound religion 
with ethics. Yet, though not confounded, they should 
never be separated. Ethics without religion is a body 
without life. But, I insist upon it, a complete and 
perfect system of ethics, properly so called, is publish- 
ed and expounded in the New Testament. 

Nor let it be thought that what I call a system of 
ethics, is merely a series of precepts inculcating certain 
duties, without reference to any primary and general 
principle. No. My aim is to show that the New 
Testament contains not only the precepts of true virtue, 
law, and social organization ; but also the repeated 
enunciations of the original cause, intellectual essence, 
prime motive or logical beginning from which all the 
rules it contains are derived, upon which they depend, 
and by which they are proved, in such a manner that 
the existence of the first great truth being once made 
evident, all the commandments follow as strictly 
rational deductions. Even an atheist who might ob- 
stinately choose to separate the ethical principles and 
ordinances contained in the New Testament, from the 
religious dogmas with which they are interwoven, 
would find more to satisfy his best feelings and his 
reason than in all the essays of the sages of antiquity. 
Indeed, the peculiar beauties and advantages (as well 
as the progress) of modern philosophy are due to the 
direct or indirect influence of the lessons of Jesus. 
This is the light which enabled Butler and his succes- 
sors to see more clearly through the difficulties of their 



132 HUMANICS. 

subject, and to discover moral analogies which had 
been hidden for ages. As we progress, the surpassing 
excellences of the Jesuic system will, at every step, 
become more and more evident, until their final tri- 
umph in theory and practice be achieved. 

If I can forward this object in the slightest degree 
I shall rejoice. 

The ethical system of Jesus may be set forth in 
consecutive order, as follows : 

That God is our common father. 

That, as children of one father in heaven, we are 
brethren. 

That God loves us all as his children. 

That God, by his impartial bounties, gives us the 
example of universal love. 

That, as the children of God, we should love him. 

That, as brethren, we should love one another. 

That, by this parentage and brotherhood, we are 
equal before God and each other. 

That God has implanted the social feeling within 
our nature. 

That, by his will, we are not only children of our 
father, but also members of society. 

That, as members of society, we are members of 
one another. 

That, as members of the social body, we are identi- 
fied in interest and feeling. 

That, by this identity, whatever affects one affects 
all, and whatever affects all affects each. 



EMOTION. 133 

That, as we cannot sever this union of one and all, 
the love of others should be equal to the love of self. 

That, as each of us is but a fraction of society, mere 
members of the social body, there exists a general hu- 
man solidarity. 

That, as our weal depends upon the common weal, 
so therefore the welfare of society is the paramount 
law. 

That we each possess an immortal soul. 

That, by our immortal souls an eternal connection 
exists between us and God. 

That, by this connection, death is powerless to sever 
us from the heavenly family. 

That, by the assurance of an eternal life and broth- 
erhood, all fear is banished. 

That, by banishing fear, all self-denial, self-sacrifice, 
and even martyrdom, may be cheerfully incurred, to 
serve the people. 

That, by the equality of self-love and social feeling, 
we are free agents. 

That, by free agency and immortality, we are re- 
sponsible beings. 

And that, finally, by the power of these great 
truths of Faith, Hope, and Love, the kingdom of God 
will be established on earth as it is in heaven. 

This hope is the sanction, the cement, the vital force 
of the whole Jesuic system ; for, without it, who would 
die for the people, who would not consider his own inter- 
est as distinct and supreme? Without hope in heaven, 



134 HUMANICS. 

the individualizing and dissolving influence of egotism 
might, in spite of the social feeling, prevail, and ever 
torture the bowels of society with every disorder. 
Mankind would forever live like wild beasts chained 
to each other., antagonistic, yet linked together by the 
social bond, and each would try by every mode of force 
and stratagem, to save himself from the general fate. 

This is a faint outline of a few of the main features 
of the Divine philosophy of Jesus, which is summed 
up in three words : Faith, Hope, and Charity, these 
three, but the greatest of these is Charity ; for all the 
law is fulfilled in one word : thou shalt love thy neigh- 
bor as thyself. The beginning and the end of this sys- 
tem are expressed in one line : He who loveth God 
loveth his neighbor also. 

Jesus was the author, the first promulgator, the 
founder of this synthesis of ideas, this arch of princi- 
ples, this harmony of ethical truths, and he gave it to 
the world as a religion, so that when I claim it for re- 
ligion, I merely assert a fact and an undeniable copy- 
right, an unquestionable title. 

But many have not been in the habit of associating 
these ideas of Equality, Socialization, Solidarity, and 
Liberty with the religion of Jesus. 

I know that the moral and social ideas of Jesus 
have been most commonly forgotten in sectarian creeds 
and theological contests — that substance has been made 
to yield to form ; but take the book and read it for the 
lessons of divine and social love it contains^ and you 



EMOTION. 135 

will find that the New Testament confirms on every 
page every word I say, and nowhere contradicts me. 

If in the voluminous writings of Confucius, of 
Plato, or of any other sage, one or two passages may 
be found, which resemble some of the words of Jesus, 
be assured that they are disconnected and loose, form- 
ing no part of the structure which they accidentally 
adorn. In the New Testament, on the contrary, these 
principles are there as the foundation of the entire edi- 
fice, as an integral part of the whole, as the key of 
many exemplifications, as the spirit of the general con- 
text. Jesus was the first to point out the supreme val- 
ue, the all-pervading truth, the infinite power, and the 
intellectual connection of these principles. It may 
well be said of the main precept of the Jesuic system, 
that the stone which the builders rejected has become 
the head of the corner. 

Jesus did not profess to give existence to the truths 
he disclosed, no more than Newton professed to create 
gravitation. Yet no man who might have previously 
written or said that an apple had fallen from a tree 
to the ground, could claim to be the discoverer of at- 
traction. With no more reason could any one who 
may have said — " do unto others as you would that 
others should do unto you," be set up as a rival of him 
who developed the source, reason, consequences, and 
connection of this precept, and who gave it a place in 
a plan where it shines harmonious with the rest — a 
jewel bright — but not by far the brightest among many 



136 HUMANICS. 

others, forming with it a symmetrical diadem of glo- 
rious truth. Jesus came not to disturb the eternal 
laws of heaven ; but he appeared in the moral world, 
as Newton did afterwards in the physical, to make 
known the mystery which had been hidden from the 
foundation of the world. 

The ancient sages spoke here and there a detached 
phrase of the divine law ; but they uttered it, as it 
were, casually and unconsciously, for we see nowhere 
a persistence in the train of thought. On the contrary, 
they depart from it instantly, to expound ideas of puni- 
tive Justice, interested Prudence, selfish Temperance, 
and angry Fortitude. In some places they merely 
crossed the path of truth — they did not follow it. They 
said just enough to prove that the Jesuic system is not 
an artificial one, but grows out of the true nature of 
man, as endowed from the beginning by the Creator. 
If all the scattered Christian sayings of the ancient 
philosophers were gathered together, and attributed to 
a single sage, he would remain but a pigmy alongside 
of the giant Jesus. 

1. The Criterion Proposed.— The majority of mor- 
alists whose wisdom has enlightened the world, in 
ancient and modern times, have made researches, to 
ascertain the prime mover or single fundamental rule 
of human conduct ; and each has fondly cherished a 
belief in his own success. Most of them have respec- 
tively designated some feeling of the soul, some instinct 



EMOTION. 137 

of nature, or some universal maxim, as the main insti- 
gator or true guide of action. The primary sentiment, 
or synthetic precept thus found, is given in their va- 
rious theories, as the touchstone or criterion by which 
the acts of men are to be tested. Thus Egotism, Sym- 
pathy, Conscience, Interest, Utility, Experience, Honor, 
Vanity, Ambition, Reason, Justice, Pleasure and Pain, 
Use and Abuse of faculties, have in turn been made 
the supreme law of man. 

The unanimity with which philosophers of note 
have sought for a great pivotal truth, or some general 
principle of right and wrong, shows of what impor- 
tance the discovery of such a truth or principle would 
be. 

Such a criterion once established, all the difficulties 
of the science of ethics would at once disappear ; for 
then we would have a common standard, by which 
every action might be immediately weighed and meas- 
ured, an axiom from which all minor precepts would 
clearly and logically flow. 

Indeed, a just conception of the infinite wisdom and 
mercy of God, should, of itself, give the assurance that 
he has not left us without an inward capacity in har- 
mony with his eternal justice. 

If such a master-law or capacity really exists, it is 
to be presumed that Jesus, the Christ God, must have 
revealed it, or that Jesus, the man and philosopher, 
must have sought to discover it. 

Yiewing him in his human aspect, that of a virtu- 



138 HUMANICS. 

cms and profound philosopher, whose love of mankind 
knew no bounds, we must remain satisfied, from the 
fact of that boundless love itself. 

That he must have endeavored to do what others 
have striven to accomplish : to unveil the mysteries of 
the human heart, and to find within the mind a genial 
soil in which the tree of life might grow. 

That he sought to base his ethics upon the nature 
of man, as organized by the Creator. 

That he did not, wilfully, when God had given us 
irradicable impulses to go in one direction, instruct us 
to proceed in another. 

That he did not, wilfully, subject us to a rule which, 
from its being contrary to the laws of our mental and 
physical organism, is impossible. 

This prompts us at once to inquire whether the 
philosophy of Jesus, as found in the New Testament, 
does not disclose some all-pervading element, inherent 
in man, and designed by the Deity to govern the moral 
and social world ? 

2. The Flesh and the Spikit. — We find, in review- 
ing the sayings of Jesus and his apostles, a clear line 
of demarcation drawn between — the Flesh and the 
Spirit — the lusts of the flesh, and the triumph of the 
Spirit — things carnal, and things spiritual — the old man, 
and the new man — the works and fruits of the flesh, 
and the works and fruits of the Spirit — fleshly wis- 
dom, and the grace of God — uncleanliness and purity 



EMOTION. 139 

— things of God, and things of Men — the natural man, 
and. the spiritual man — the works of the Devil, of Sa- 
tan, of the world, of the body, on the one hand, and 
the works of the Holy Spirit, of Grace, and of the 
kingdom of God on the other. 

This distinction is so often repeated, and so earnestly 
insisted, on in hundreds of texts, that it is impossible 
to regard it otherwise than as a main and leading idea 
of the Jesuic philosophy. 

In the very outset of the gospels John the Bap- 
tist, the precursor of Jesus, announces him as one who 
will baptize with the Holy Ghost ; and immediately 
afterwards, Jesus, led by the Spirit (Mat. iv. 1) and 
ministered to by the angels, (Mark i. 14,) and being full 
of the Holy Ghost, (Luke iv. 1) is tempted of Satan, 
and triumphs over him. 

In many parts of the four gospels we find the idea 
clearly conveyed, that Jesus, throughout his whole ca- 
reer, from the event of his baptism through John, down 
to his crucifixion and death, continued to be filled with 
this Holy Spirit, and to resist the Devil and his lusts. 

On one side he places the soul and on the other the 
body, and counsels his disciples to mutilate the mem- 
bers rather than to permit their lusts to overcome the 
spirit. (Mat. v. 30, xviii. 9 ; Mark ix. 23.) 

In the same discourse he places God and Mammon 
in juxtaposition, and warns us that they are irrecon- 
cilable, and that we cannot serve them both. (Mat. 
vi. 24.) 



140 HUMANICS. 

And then when on his way to meet his death he 
again, in his rebuke to Peter, gives an emphatic sanc- 
tion to this distinction : He turned, and said unto 
Peter, Get thee behind me, Satan ; thou art an offence 
unto me ; for thou savorest not of the things that 
be of God, but of those that be of Men." (Mat. xvi. 
23; Mark viii. 33.) Jesus here clearly designed to 
distinguish between the spiritual and sensual feeling ; 
for we shortly afterwards find him enjoining Peter 
thus : Watch and pray, that ye enter not into tempta- 
tion, for the spirit indeed is willing, but the flesh is 
weak. (Mat. xxiv. 41 ; Mark xiv. 38.) 

The exordium of the Gospel of St. John contains a 
plain enunciation of this' division. He describes the 
sons of God as those who believe in the name of Jesus, 
as those who u were born not of blood, nor of the will 
of the fleshy nor of the will of man, but of God." 
(John i. 13.) A little further he says, (John iii. 6 :) 
That which is born of the flesh is flesh, and that 
which is born of the Spirit is spirit. These are 
recorded as the words of Jesus himself, in his dialogue 
with Mcodemus, about the necessity of being born 
again ; and he repeats on another occasion : It is the 
spirit that quickeneth— the flesh profiteth nothing. 
(John vi. 63.) 

The importance of this distinction, as taught by 
Jesus, was strongly felt by his apostles ; for we find 
them constantly urging it in all their epistles, and in a 
variety of forms. If it were necessary, a multitude of 



EMOTION. 141 

texts could be quoted in confirmation of this statement ; 
but there is no reader of the Bible who has not learned 
to distinguish the flesh, its lusts and its works, as the 
source of sin, from the spirit, its holiness and fruits, as 
the light of the kingdom of God. Yet, I cannot refrain 
from referring to a few passages forcibly conveying the 
idea I seek to inculcate, so material do I consider it to 
be for arriving at a clear understanding of the philos- 
ophy we are studying ; and so necessary for obtaining 
a knowledge of the criterion that philosophy adopts as 
its pivot. 

Eom vii. 18 : I know that in me (that is in my 
flesh) dwelleth no good thing — 22, for I delight 
in the law of God, after the inward man. 25, So 
then with the mind (spirit) I myself serve the law 
of God, but with the flesh the law of sin. 

Eom. viii. 1 : There is therefore no condemnation 
to them which are in Jesus Christ, who walk not 
after the flesh, but after the /Spirit. 6, For to be car- 
nally minded is death, but to be spiritually minded is 
life and peace. 13, For if ye live after the flesh ye shall 
die ; but if ye through the Spirit do mortify the deeds 
of the body ye shall live. 

Eom. viii. 6 : To be carnally minded is death ; but 
to be spiritually minded is life and peace. 

Eom. viii. 9 : But ye are not in the flesh but in 
the Spirit. 

Gal. vi. 7, 8 : Be not deceived ; God is not mock- 
ed ; for whatsoever a man soweth, that shall he also 



142 HUMANICS. 

reap. For lie that soweth to \\i& flesh, shall of the flesh 
reap corruption ; but he that soweth to the Spirit, shall 
of the Spirit reap life everlasting. 

Gal. v. 16 : This I say then, Walk in the Spirit 
and ye shall not fulfil the lusts of the flesh. 17, For 
the flesh lusteth against the Spirit, and the Spirit 
against the flesh ; and these are contrary one to the 
other. 

Eph. iv. 22, 23 : That ye put off the old man 
which is corrupt according to the deceitful lusts ; and 
be renewed in the spirit of your mind. 

Philippians iii. 3 : For we are the circumcision 
which worship God in the Spirit, and rejoice in Christ 
Jesus, and have no confidence in the flesh. 

Col. iii. 9, 10 : Seeing you have put off the old 
man, and his deeds ; and have put on the new man. 

1 Pet. ii. 1 : Dearly beloved, I beseech yon, as 
strangers and pilgrims, abstain from fleshly lusts 
which war against the soul. 

1 Pet. iv. 6 : For this cause was the gospel 
preached also unto them that are dead that they might 
be judged according to men in the flesh, but live ac- 
cording to God, in the Spirit. 

2 Pet. i. 4 : Whereby are given unto us exceed- 
ing great promises ; that by these you might be par- 
takers of the divine nature, having escaped the corrup- 
tion that is in the world through lust. 

1 John ii. 16 : For whatsoever is born of God 
overcometh the world. 



EMOTION. 143 

Jude 19 : These be they who separate them- 
selves, sensual, having not the Spirit. 

In selecting these texts, I have taken only a few of 
those in which the flesh and the spirit are put in oppo- 
sition to each other, in the same passage, as they an- 
swer my present purpose with more directness ; but, 
throughout the New Testament, THE FLESH, its 
works, its fruits, now under its name of the flesh, but 
then as frequently under the name of the old man, the 
natural man, the body, the world, things sensual, things 
carnal, Satan, the devil, lust, filth, or impurity — is rep- 
resented as the great enemy against which Jesus and 
his apostles contended ; and of which they sought to 
free mankind ; and in place of which they offered the 
Spirit — the Holy Spirit — the Holy Ghost, and through 
it Grace and Eaith with all their fruits. (Titus iii. 5 ; 
1 Cor. xii. 3.) 

What I have thus set forth is no doubt familiar to 
all theologians, and is, I believe, admitted by every 
one of them ; yet I find in these premises the neglected 
corner-stone of the only true system of temporal ethics, 
and an infallible and all-embracing rule of human ac- 
tion. 

Flesh and Spirit ! "What definite idea, in a natural 
sense, should we attach to these words ? 

Jesus gives us a plain, certain, and beautiful rule 
by which the meaning of these two terms can be prac- 
tically ascertained : 

Ye shall know them by their fruits. Do men 



144 HUMANICS. 

gather grapes of thorns, or figs of thistles? Even so 
every good tree bringeth forth good fruit ; but a cor- 
rupt tree bringeth forth evil fruit. A good tree cannot 
bring forth evil fruit, neither can a corrupt tree bring 
forth good fruit. (Mat. vii. 16, IT, 18 ; Luke vi. 43, 
44 ; et als.) 

Applying this rule to the subject before us we find, 
on the one side, that — 

The fruit of the Spirit is Love, Joy, Peace, Long- 
Sufl'ering, Gentleness, Faith, Meekness, Temperance. 
(Gal. v. 22.) 

And on the other side, that — 

The works of the flesh are manifest : which, are 
these : adultery, fornication, uncleanliness, lascivious- 
ness, idolatry, witchcraft, hatred, variance, emulations, 
wrath, strife, sedition, heresies, envyings, murder, 
drunkenness, re veilings, and such like. (Gal. v. 19.) 

Is it not evident, then, that these two are the source 
of moral good and evil, the opposite generators of vir- 
tue and of vice ? 

Kor is this distinction arbitrary. Jesus did not tell 
us to control the flesh and follow the spirit without any 
reference to the instincts of our nature. He had, as I 
will endeavor to demonstrate, a deeper and wider per- 
ception of the constitution of man than any other 
teacher of morals, ancient or modern ; and he has 
given us the only law truly adapted to that constitu- 
tion. 

An investigation of the subject will satisfy every im- 



EMOTION. 145 

partial mind, that Jesus regarded man as capable of 
two feelings : one the selfish feeling, which corresponds 
with the flesh ; the other the social feeling, which is 
congenial to the spirit, and includes the love of God. 
(2 John v. 2.) 

The selfish feeling is that which confines " love " to 
the individual ; and concedes nought to fellow-crea- 
tures but what is necessary to obtain a requital, ser- 
viceable to interest or pleasure. 

The social feeling is that which extends " love " to 
all mankind ; and concedes nought to the individual 
but what men enjoy as " members one of another." 
(Kom. xii. 5 ; Eph. iv. 25.) 

These are the extremes : there are many grades of 
approach between the two ; many mixtures, in differ- 
ent proportions of both. 

Hereafter we will see to what extent Jesus admits 
any of these grades or admixtures. 

Certain it is, however, that his moral criterion is all 
in this distinction between flesh and spirit ; and that 
his rule of moral perfection, in a temporal sense, pre- 
scribes the full development of the social feeling with 
all its consequences. 

He has taught us the proper method of developing 
and cultivating it : 1st, by clearly defining the two op- 
posites, so that the line of demarcation cannot be mis- 
taken ; 2d, by teaching wherein the works of the flesh 
or selfish feeling are to be avoided ; and 3d, by show- 
ing us how to act according to the spirit, and how 
10 



146 HUMANICS. 

to reap the sweet fruits the social feeling doth pro- 
duce. 

3. The Selfish Feeling. — In the Jesuic philosophy 
the Selfish Feeling or the Flesh is personified by Satan 
or the Devil. All the terms which might be applied 
to one glorying in all the sins that flesh is heir to are 
applied to him by Jesus and the sacred writers. Every 
crime or vice which the most unbridled egotism might 
suggest is imputed to him. All the offences committed 
by mankind are attributed to his influence. He is 
called a murderer and liar, John viii. 44 ; the God of 
the world, 2 Cor. iv. 4 ; the ruler of darkness, Eph. vi. 
12 ; the adversary, 1 Pet. v. 8 ; the accuser of the 
brethren, 1 Pet. ix. 10 ; a sower of tares, Mat. xiii. 
25, 28 ; a wolf, John x. 12 ; a roaring lion, 1 Pet. v. 
8 ; the tempter, 1 Thes. iii. 5, &c, &c. He is de- 
scribed as being presumptuous, Mat. iv. 5, 6 ; proud, 
1 Tim. iii. 6 ; wicked, 1 John ii. 13 ; subtile, 2 Cor. 
xi. 3 ; deceitful, 2 Cor. xi. 14, Eph. vi. 11 ; fierce 
and cruel, Luke viii. 29, Luke ix. 39, 42, 1 Pet. 
v. 8 ; and cowardly, Jas. iv. 7. We are told that he 
was the author of the fall, 2 Cor. xi. 3 ; that he tempt- 
ed Jesus, Mat. iv. 3-10 ; that he opposes God's works, 
1 Thes. ii. 18 ; that he hinders the gospel, 2 Cor. iv. 
4 ; that the wicked are his children, Mat. xiii. 38, 
Acts xiii. 10, 1 John iii. 10; that they turn aside 
after him, 1 Tim. v. 15 ; that they do his lusts, John 
viii. 44; and that he blinds, deceives, and ensnares 



EMOTION. 147 

them, 2 Cor. iv. 4, Eev. xx. 7, 8, 1 Tim. iii. 7, 2 Tim. 
ii. 26. The warnings against his power and cunning 
are so numerous, and the necessity of resisting him, of 
being armed against him, and of being watchful to 
avoid his temptations and snares, is so often enjoined, 
that we can hardly open the book without finding a 
text on the subject. 

All these epithets are applied, all these accusations 
are brought, all these warnings are uttered, all these 
sins are denounced against the flesh in texts so similar, 
and forms so concordant with those relating to the 
devil, that no doubt can remain that the unsubdued flesh 
may be regarded as the embodiment of Satan. Rom. 
vii. 28 ; Jas. iii. 15 ; Eph. ii. 2, 3 ; Rom. i. 21-32 ; 
Gal. v. 19-21 ; Eph. iv. 27 ; 2 Pet. ii. 4, 10 ; 2 Tim. 
iii. 2 ; 1 John iii. 8, 9 ; John viii. 44 ; Heb. ii. 14 ; 
1 John iv. 1, 3. 

Indeed, the Jesuic philosophy under this head not 
only comprises Satan, but, secondly, the animal body 
with its lusts ; and thirdly, the mental spirit of rebel- 
lion and depravity which is opposed to love. 

That the animal body is viewed in the New Testa- 
ment as opposed to the Spirit of God, is evident from 
the texts which declare : that the law of sin is in our 
members, Rom. vii. 23 ; that it is necessary to subdue 
and mortify the tody, 1 Cor. ix. 27, Col. iii. 5 ; that 
the God of the wicked is their own belly, Rom. xvi. 
17 ; that the good have crucified the flesh and its lusts, 
Gal. v. 24 ; that the works of the flesh are fornication, 



148 HUMANICS. 

lasciviousness, and other such exclusively physical 
deeds, Gal. v. 19 ; that the sinful are as natural hrute 
leasts, 2 Pet. ii. 12 ; and that the natural man receiv- 
eth not the things of the Spirit of God, 2 Cor. ii. 14. 

That the selfish feeling (considered as mind) also be- 
longs to this category, appears from the denunciation of 
the carnal mind, Rom. viii. 7 ; from the internal works 
of the flesh, such as envy, malice, anger, pride, hatred 
of God, &c, Rom. i. 21 ; from the necessity of cleans- 
ing the mind of filthiness, 2 Cor. vii. 1 ; from the ex- 
istence of a spirit of disobedience, Eph. ii. 2, 3 ; and 
from the declaration that there are spirits which are 
not of God, 1 John iv. 3 ; minds subject to the flesh. 

Thus, a sort of infernal trinity is disclosed : 1, Sa- 
tan, the God of the world ; 2, the sensual spirit ; and 
3, the earthly body; and it is of this trinity St. 
James seems to speak, when condemning the wisdom 
of the vicious, he says, iii. 15 : This wisdom descend- 
eth not from above, but is (1) earthly, (2) sensual, (3) 
devilish. 

Hence, as if no part of the comparison should be 
omitted, we are taught that there is a natural body and 
a spiritual body, 1 Cor. xv. 44, one which is earthly and 
corrupt, and cannot inherit the kingdom of heaven, but 
the other which is changed, redeemed, and is heavenly, 
(ibid. 35 to 53 ; Rom. viii. 23.) Of those how hold 
the one, and live after the flesh, Satan is the father: 
and of those who inherit the other, God is the father. 

In this the children of God are manifest, and the 



EMOTION. 149 

children of the Devil. 1 John iii. 10. That is, They 
which are the children of the flesh, these are not the 
children of God. Rom. ix. 8. 

4. The Social Feeling. — No man — and in calling 
Jesus a man, I follow the example of St. John, xi. 50, 
and of St. Paul, 1 Cor. xv. 21 ; Rom. vi. 15 ; Heb. x. 
12 — no man ever displayed a love for his fellow- crea- 
tures equal to that which Jesus has shown. During 
his life all his thoughts, and words, and acts, were for 
their happiness. Though " he was rich," he stripped 
himself of every thing for their sakes, (2 Cor. viii. 9 ;)' 
though he could have enjoyed luxury and power, he 
rejected them, and became a houseless wanderer, in 
order to scatter the seed of his word throughout the 
land ; though he was learned, he humbled himself with 
the ignorant, that he might impart his wisdom ; though 
he was pure, he mingled with the corrupt, for the pur- 
pose of reforming them ; though his fellow-men re- 
jected and wronged him, he clung to them with una- 
bated affection, and with untiring zeal he continued to 
travel from place to place, relieving physical infirmi- 
ties, and curing moral ills — having incessantly before 
him the single great object of his mission, which em- 
braced the good of all men : no self-denial, no danger, 
no labor was too great to check his courage and devot- 
edness ; and finally, persecution and malice having 
brought him to the cross, " he died for the people," 
was a voluntary martyr; and, with his last breath, 



150 HUMANICS. 

(still tenacious in his love even of his murderers,) he 
uttered the sublime summary of all he felt for us : 
" Father, forgive them, for they know not what they 
do." 

To prove that in these acts of love and devotedness, 
Jesus offered himself as an example to be imitated, and 
that he expects of every man the same intense love of 
humanity, and the same unmeasured acts of charity, 
would be to quote the New Testament from beginning 
to end. But perhaps the best evidence on this point is 
the declaration that Jesus took upon himself the nature 
of ilesh and blood, " with the feeling of our infirmities, 
and was tempted like as we are," (Heb. iv. 15 ;) thus it is 
shown that he evidently intended practically to demon- 
strate it to be possible for men in general to feel and 
act as he did. 

Indeed, the ethics of Jesus are not only practically 
possible, but they are conformable to out nature^ and 
are written thereon by the Creator. So thought St. 
Paul, for he tells us the Lord saith : " I will put my 
laws into their hearts, and in their minds will I write 
them," Heb. x. 16. But this is more pointedly shown 
in the parable of the Sower, and the example of the 
Gentiles, who do hy nature the things contained in the 
law. 

The parable of the Sower, Mat. xiii. 3-18, Luke 
viii. 5-11, represents Jesus as casting the seeds of the 
word. Some fall by the wayside, some in stony places 
and among thorns, and some into good ground. The 



EMOTION. 151 

religious feeling and the social feeling inherent in 
man, are the good ground, which, receiving the seed, 
enables it to take root, and bear forth fruit. It is the 
Spirit which quickeneth these congenial constituents, 
with a holy heat and fervency. He who hath not 
" root in himself," and in whose heart the seed cannot 
grow to maturity, is the man who has become hardened 
in prejudice and egotism. The expressions " good 
ground," and " root in himself," clearly indicate a nat- 
ural state of the soul, antecedent to the hearing of the 
word, and to the infusion of the Spirit. Of this state 
we have an example in those Gentiles, who having not 
the law, " do by nature the things contained in the 
law," and " show the work of the law written in their 
hearts" Rom. ii. 14, 15. 

Now, what is this natural feeling which produces 
the works of the law ? 

The example of Jesus answers ; every line of the 
E"ew Testament answers ; but there is one line which 
sums up the response, with a brevity and pointedness 
which no Spartan could equal. That line contains not 
a stroke of wit, not a short ejaculation of contempt, 
defiance, pride, or stoicism : no, it compasses more 
than all the volumes philosophers have written on 
ethics ; and, in one word, it teaches the wisdom of ages. 

St. Paul says, Gal. v. 14 : 

" All the law is fulfilled in one word : thou shalt 
love thy neighbor as thyself." 

Here, then, we have the love of man, or in other 



152 HUMANICS. 

words, the social feeling proclaimed as being the piv- 
otal sentiment from which all human virtue doth ra- 
diate. 

Upon the existence of this sentiment depends all 
the arts, all sciences, all laws, and all governments, for, 
without the social attraction, all these things would be 
useless and vain. 

Without this sentiment as a ground-hold, what a 
mockery would it be to pronounce, as an all-embracing 
commandment : love thy neighbor (that is to say every 
man) as thyself. 

If philosophers had considered the full force and 
purview of the social feeling, they would have acknowl- 
edged not only its paramount importance, but also that 
it lies much deeper in the soul of man, than the other 
motives they have taken as their stand-point. 

Egotism, though the very opposite of the social 
feeling, is in fact necessarily subservient to it ; for it 
can only be gratified in and through society. This 
secondary rank, for the same reason, must be assigned 
to Yanity, Ambition, and Pleasure. The so-called 
moralists, who have taken these words as their pointers, 
are forced to reconcile them with the social feeling, by 
showing that Interest and Egotism are well served, 
Ambition and Yanity are properly gratified, Pleasure 
and Pain are wisely apportioned, only when they are 
controlled by a due regard for Society, and only so far 
as they can be reconciled to the love of Man. 

As to Conscience, the Moral Sense, and Honor, they 



EMOTION. 153 

imply the existence of an index or prompter, which 
guides or quickens them, and as the inward voice is 
never else than the echo of a just regard for our fellow 
beings and society, I conclude that the social feeling is 
the real monitor. 

Sympathy is but a form or mode of the social feel- 
ing, viewed in a restricted sense, and as attracting in- 
dividual to individual. The same remark applies to 
Benevolence. 

Experience, Utility, Reason, Use, and Abuse of fac- 
ulties, are nothing but the watchwords of empirical 
systems devoid of any cementing or governing princi- 
ple. 

Justice, Equity, and Equality require the discovery 
of a standard of moral weights and measures ; and as 
Justice, &c, are but the proper application of that 
standard, it is the standard itself we ought to recognize 
as our principle ; but it is in our associated intercourse 
alone, that any such principle can have any force. Is 
it not, therefore, the principle of association itself, 
which governs all social morality? 

Thus we find that the Social feeling is after all the 
source and summary of every virtue and law ; for with- 
out society virtue and law had never been born, nor 
could they ever have had even a name. The social 
feeling is therefore of the Spirit, and not of the Flesh. 

In accounting for the existence of society, some 
philosophers have resorted to imaginary accidents and 
events, by which mankind are supposed, through the 



154 HUMANICS. 

necessity of self-protection, and mutual safety, to have 
been brought together in families, clans, tribes, and 
nations. Man is supposed to have been at first not only 
wild but isolated : individual — having no permanent 
connection with his fellows, male or female. The 
attacks of wild beasts and of enemies, as well as other 
circumstances, dependent not upon the internal nature 
of humanity, but upon a gradual discovery of the 
interests of the individual, are given by philosophers 
and jurists in beautiful narratives, as the causes by 
which man has been, as it were, driven from the solitary 
to the social state. This theory assumes that man is 
by temperament or instinct inclined to the solitary state, 
and that he was, despite natural feeling, compelled, by 
the force of external causes, to associate with other men. 

The evidence of history, geography, and zoology, 
contradict this opinion : historians have always found 
men formed, at the origin, into societies ; geographers 
have always seen them living together, even in the 
wildest lands ; and naturalists, who take the liberty of 
establishing analogies between man and other living 
creatures, divide the animal kingdom into two portions, 
the gregarious and non-gregarious, and class man as 
belonging, by instinct, to the first. 

If man were destined by nature for the solitary state, 
how happens it that he is naturally so weak, so defence- 
less, and so naked ? We find everywhere the natural 
order of things so arranged, that every animal is formed 
to harmonize, in all respects, with the condition in 



EMOTION. 155 

which he is to exist. Volumes have been written to 
show the beautiful adaptation of all things, and crea- 
tures in the universe, as illustrative of the wisdom, fore- 
sight, and benevolence of the Creator, and, in fact, as 
proving the existence of God himself. Is man an 
exception to this rule of general accord, so admirable 
and perfect in its aggregate and details ? 

Could the solitary man provide against his physical 
deficiencies ? "No : he is left weak, defenceless, and 
naked, because socialization, for which he feels an in- 
nate propensity, meets all the exigencies of this natural 
helplessness ; and moreover, because he is endowed 
with faculties for which motives of action must be fur- 
nished. 

These faculties are vast, varied, and mighty. They 
invest man with the dominion of the globe. Can they 
have been so lavishly cast upon a creature inclined to 
a solitary life ? To answer affirmatively, is to impugn, 
without a reason, the supreme wisdom and love, so 
infallible and constant in all other respects. 

If man were solitary, the greatest number of the 
manifold and extensive powers of the mind (though 
capable of bringing all things into subjection, and 
though having the appetite to do it) would be impris- 
oned in the narrowest circle, would find but few and 
limited objects and occasions for their action, would be 
deprived of sufficient aliment and exercise, and would 
be debarred the full and healthy display or expansion 
of their natural forces. 



156 HUMANICS. 

All our faculties are social in this : that they have 
capabilities of development and refinement which 
naught but society can gratify. 

The analytical, synthetical, logical, imitative, ideal- 
izing, ordinating, mathematical, and constructive powers 
of the mind, all require the great field of social inter- 
course, to satisfy their impulses, and unfold their ener- 
gies. 

Deprived of the natural locomotive, aggressive, and 
defensive members and instruments given to other ani- 
mals, stripped of all natural physical protection against 
the elements, and his enemies, man, on the other hand, 
is endowed with senses, susceptible of and eager for the 
most luxurious enjoyments. His sense of feeling is so 
tender that he must have a bed to sleep on, the softest 
fabrics to clothe himself with, the smoothest implements 
and furniture to handle. His sense of taste is so critical, 
and his stomach is so weak, that cookery with its heat 
and its condiments, must pre-digest and ensavor his 
food. His sense of smell is so accomplished, that the 
sweetest and gentlest odors are those which impart 
him pleasure. His hearing is so nice that it evokes 
music, with her infinite harmonies and melodies. His 
sight is so fastidious, that it delights only in lines of 
beauty and scenes of sublimity. 

True it is, some animals have senses more acute than 
those of man, for some uses ; but those uses are of the 
simplest kind and are single and specific in their ends, 
while the senses of man are of a complex character, 



EMOTION. 157 

are capable of graduated impressions, of perceiving 
seriated degrees, of appreciating combined accords and 
discordances, and demand a supply of subtle enjoy- 
ments, which, naught but the arts and commerce of 
society can afford. 

To nourish this weak and unagile body, and to grat- 
ify those senses, (so delicate and so unfit, by their nature, 
to dwell among the wild beasts of the forest, or under 
the inclemencies of the desert,) the man, fulfilling the 
true inclination of his mind, lives among and with his 
like, and finds the full aliment and use of his active 
intellectual powers. His imitative ingenuity creates 
agriculture; his mechanical faculty invents all the. 
wonders of manufactures and machinery ; his construc- 
tive propensity produces the comforts and splendors 
of architecture and viatecture ; his analytical powers 
discover chemistry and botany; his varied appetites 
generate commerce with its multifarious exchanges 
and relations ; his mathematical genius measures the 
size, distance, and pathway of the stars, and expounds 
the laws which control revolving worlds ; his musical 
tastes induce him to frame the gamut and contrive 
cunning instruments of sound; his logical capacities 
enable him to trace the intricacies and explore the 
depths of his own mind ; and, finally, his idealizing 
aspirations procure him elegant and splendid adorn- 
ments for all his works, and start painting, poetry, 
and sculpture into life. No pure necessity of self-pres- 
ervation can account for the formation of the society 



158 HUMANICS. 

which evolves these things; but, it is indubitable that 
all the senses, instincts, feelings, sentiments, and in- 
tellectual faculties of man (of themselves and by their 
own attraction) draw him into association with his fel- 
lows. In one word, man is endowed by nature and by 
nature's God, with a gregarious instinct, the innate de- 
sire of society, the social feeling. 

But what irrefragably proves that man is, by the 
natural law, a social animal, is the fact that he is cre- 
ated with the gift of language. This gift could be of no 
possible use to a solitary being ; but it is the last and 
most perfect endowment which God has blessed us with 
to lit us for our destiny. Yain would it be for me to 
attempt to enumerate all the consequences which flow 
from this divine boon. The interchange, the transmis- 
sion of ideas, the preservation of acquired knowledge, 
the progress of the sciences and arts, the establishment 
of commerce, the forum, the pulpit, and the press — all 
these, wmich are social phenomena, nay, society itself, 
could not have existed for a moment without language, 
nor could language itself exist without society ; and 
thus, by the mutual dependence of the two, does it be- 
come evident that man is by nature made for speech 
and for society. 

If, then, man is instinctively and organically grega- 
rious and social, if the divinity has formed and endowed 
him for social life, if he finds the only true pleasurable 
outlet of all his feelings and faculties in a life of com- 
munion with his fellows, if it is only in society and 



EMOTION. 159 

through society that he can be happy, does it not fol- 
low that the social feeling is the main, the aggregate 
passion of human nature, the point at which centres 
every precept of virtue, and the pivot or criterion on 
which all good morals and all good laws must turn ? 

In analyzing the moral sentiments of man, we do 
not hesitate to class as natural and instinctive feelings, 
Pity, Cupidity, Anger, Love, &c, — all the passions are 
assigned a seat in the soul, or (to speak the language 
of positive philosophy) a location in the cerebral or- 
ganization of the natural man. In forming the list of 
our passions, we should not overlook the gregarious or 
social feeling. In my opinion, for the reasons I have 
given, it should be assigned the first and most con- 
spicuous place. Sympathy and pity are not sufficient 
to explain the phenomenon of society. We may, 
through egotism, or from some other cause, feel sympa- 
thy or pity for a dog, a horse, a bird, &c, but there is 
a gap between such a feeling and that which commands, 
as an imperious want, the social condition. A man, 
shipwrecked upon the most beauteous, fruitful, and 
genial of the uninhabited isles of the ocean, would pine 
in anguish for the companionship of his like ; and if, 
after a time, his deadliest enemy were cast upon the 
lonely Eden, the solitary would greet the new-comer 
with tenderness and joy. Both would fly with exhila- 
ration from their rich and shady groves, to the bosom 
of society, be its hardships ever so great, or their fate 
ever so uncertain. The history of hundreds of ship- 



160 HUMANICS. 

wrecks might serve to illustrate this ; and the romance 
of Kobinson Crusoe is only a truthful summary of the 
observations of travellers upon this trait of human na- 
ture. 

It is now established, by authentic investigations, 
that the greatest moral torture which can be inflicted, 
is solitary imprisonment ; and the current of opinion 
has turned against it as a nugatory means of reforma- 
tion and as a cruel punishment. Why is this so ? 
Simply because in the same manner as we recoil with 
horror from the cutting and scarring of the physical 
man, we also revolt against the mutilation of the spir- 
itual man, and must therefore condemn the act which 
prevents the gratification of the most imperious of our 
natural passions — the desire for society. 

Solitary imprisonment excludes all the intellectual 
and moral effects society is wont to work upon the in- 
dividual ; and consigns him to the complete ossification 
of all the best impulses of his nature. Like a corpse 
thrown into the deep grottos of Antiparos, the soul of 
the solitary prisoner becomes petrified and void of all 
human sensibility. 

An irresistible attraction, far more powerful than 
self-interest, draws us into social intercourse. Next to 
life, and the food which sustains life, we require society. 
Sever us from society, and we feel as if divided from 
ourselves, a branch cut from the tree of humanity, 
thrown aside to wither and to die. 

5. The Holy Spirit. — But the Jesuic Philosophy 



EMOTION. 161 

does not stop here. With the natural social feeling it 
connects two other facts of equal importance. I mean 
the existence of God, and the immortality of the Soul. 
A knowledge of these two facts, whether arising from 
natural instinct, or reason, or from revelation alone, at 
once elevates and spiritualizes the social feeling. This 
knowledge furnishes the social feeling with its highest 
sanction, and final justification. That sanction is God's 
economy, and that justification is the eternal brother- 
hood in the heavens. 

" And now abideth Faith, Hope, and Charity : these 
three ; but the greatest of these is Charity." (1 Cor 
xiii. 13.) 

The union of these three in the breast of man, 
through the grace of God, constitutes in the Jesuic 
philosophy the gift of the Holy Spirit ; and consecrates 
our body as the temple of that Spirit. 

That the gift of the Holy Spirit includes the love 
of God, the love of man, and the hope of immortal- 
ity, is clearly taught by the New Testament. " The 
love of God," saith St. Paul, " is shed abroad in our 
hearts by the Holy Ghost, which is given to us." (Rom. 
v. 5.) " Beloved, let us love one another, for love is of 
God, for every one that loveth is lorn of God, and 
knoweth God." 1 John iv. 7. " For the fruit of the 
Spirit is all goodness," &c. (Eph. v. 9 ; Gal. v. 22 ; 1 
John ii. 9, 10 ; 1 John iii. 14, 15.) " Now the God of 
hope fill you with all joy and peace in believing, that 
ye may abound in hope, through the power of the 
11 



162 HUMANICS. 

Holy Ghost." (Rom. xv. 13.) " He that soweth to the 
Spirit, shall of the Spirit reap life everlasting." (Gal 
vi. 8.) 

These texts, without seeking for numerous others, 
corresponding to them, are sufficient, in a religious 
point of view, to show what are the main characteris- 
tics of the operation of the Holy Spirit upon us ; but 
it is the connection of the three, which forms one of 
the most beautiful features of the Jesuic system. 

To our ideas of God, which produce feelings of rev 
erence and awe, the Jesuic philosophy adds views, 
awakening tender and grateful sentiments. Not only 
is God eternal, infinite, single, all-wise, all-powerful, 
all-present, incorruptible, immutable, just, true, holy, 
and glorious, but he is good and merciful. Nor is this 
goodness and mercy confined, by the Jesuic doctrine, 
within a limited sphere ; it is rich, manifold, and abun- 
dant ; it is as infinite and everlasting as the Divinity him- 
self. 

God loves man with infinite and eternal love. 

He is the common father of all mankind. 

Man partakes of God's divine nature, being made 
in his image, and being vivified by his breath. 

Through God, man has the promise of spiritual im- 
mortality and celestial happiness. 

These are the doctrines with respect to God, which 
Jesus insisted upon the most, and with which all com- 
mandments are connected ; and which quicken the 
physical instinct for society, by the spiritual flame of 
divine love. 



EMOTION. 163 

If God's love for man be so great, once conscious 
of it, we naturally, and as far as within us lies, requite, 
obey, and serve. 

If God is the common father of all mankind, it fol- 
lows that all men are brothers, and should love one 
another. 

If we are partakers of God's nature, it follows that 
all his moral attributes are ours : love, truth, patience, 
purity, &c. 

If through God we are assured of eternal life, we 
are immediately prompted to prepare our souls for 
heaven ; and this preparation imports the performance 
of every sanctifying duty, and the practice of every 
regenerating virtue. 

Nor is this process of argument, which connects all 
rules of right conduct between man and man with a 
belief in God, a mere commentary upon the teachings 
of Jesus. He makes the argument himself, and teaches 
these opinions in express and direct terms. 

St. John gives as a reason for loving God, the fact 
that " he first loved us." (1 John iv. 19.) In many 
places of the New Testament Jesus tenders God's love 
to us, and asks for a return by obedience to his laws, 
while he makes tempting promises of reward for this 
return and obedience. (Jno. xiv. 15, 21, 23 ; 1 Cor. ii. 
9 ; Eph. ii. 4 ; Eom. viii. 37 ; John iii. 16 ; 1 John iv. 
9-11 ; 1 John iii. 1, 16, &c.) 

After prescribing love to God as the first and great 
commandment, he says, the second, inculcating the 



164 HUMANICS. 

love of man, "is like unto the first," (Matt. xxii. 39,) 
thus clearly showing the intimate connection he con- 
ceived to exist between the feelings of humanity and 
love to God, and the immediate bearing of these two 
commandments one upon the other. Indeed he regards 
them as being almost identical. (Mark xii. 31.) 

He points to the love of God for man in general — of 
God who sendeth rain to the just and unjust without 
distinction, as a model of human love for humanity. 
(Mat. v. 44, 45 ; Luke vi. 36.) 

Love your enemies, says he, " that ye may be the 
children of your Father which is in heaven : " establish- 
ing the use of the endearing name of Father, as appli- 
cable to the divinity, and establishing also the tender 
relation of father and child between God and Man, as 
foundations for an appeal to us as children to imitate 
heaven by loving even the wicked. 

To enforce this relationship, he says : " All ye are 
brethren ; and call no man your father upon the earth ; 
for one is your Father which is in heaven." Mat. xxiii. 
8, 9. Those who love God and obey him, he declares 
to be " sons of God," John i. 12 ; Rom. viii. 14 ; and 
to those who are obdurate in sin, he assigns another 
father, the devil. (John viii. 44.) 

From such premises, viz., that God is our father, 
and we (as long as we do not obtain Satan) are his chil- 
dren, it naturally follows that we are "partakers of the 
divine nature." So indeed is it expressly declared, 
2 Pet, i. 4 ; Heb. xii. 10. 






EMOTION. 165 

By love to God, by the Spirit of Truth, and by 
deeds of willing mercy, self-denial, and civic heroism, 
we are taught that Man, Jesus and God may be as one, 
in each other. (John xiv. 20 ; xvii. 21, 26 ; Acts xvii. 
28 ; Eph. iv. 6 ; 1 John iv. 6, &c.) 

Our body itself is the temple of God, and the Spirit 
of God dwelleth in us, 1 Cor. iii. 16 ; vi. 19 ; our 
members are his, vi. 15 ; our spirit is his own, vi. 20. 

Such being the case, does it not logically follow, as 
argued by the gospel itself, that we should love and 
glorify God in the body and in the spirit, by preserv- 
ing their purity, and by avoiding sin ; for if we defile 
the body, saith St. Paul, we destroy the temple of God. 
(1 Cor. iii. 17.) 

In one word : " He who loveth God, loveth his 
brother also ; " and " if a man say, I love God, and 
hateth his brother, he is a liar." (1 John iv. 20, 21.) 
Can language convey, in more forcible terms, the 
affinity between the love of God and man ? 

And as if this were not sufficient to persuade us, 
the Jesuic philosophy shows, that to God's love we are 
indebted for the assurance of immortality ; and never 
abandoning the connection between our duty to God, 
to ourselves, and to our fellow-men, this immortality is 
made to depend upon the sincere accomplishment of 
these duties, in spirit and in deeds. (Mat. xxv. 34 ; 
Jam. i. 12 ; &c.) It would be a superfluous work to 
collect texts showing the necessity of preparing our- 
selves, so as at all times to be worthy of participating 



166 HUMANICS. 

in the joys of the supernal kingdom. Every reader is 
familiar with this point of the doctrines of Jesus ; and 
every one must at once of himself perceive the reasons 
which enforce it. 

No system of ethics is perfect, or even tolerable, 
unless it teaches the existence and love of God, the im- 
mortality of the soul, and, as a consequence, the uni- 
versal brotherhood, arising from a common spiritual 
origin and destiny. All systems devoid of this ingre- 
dient, St. Paul properly describes as " oppositions of 
science, falsely so called ; " and of them warns us lest 
they spoil us " through philosophy and vain deceit, af- 
ter the rudiments of the world, after the tradition of 
men, and not after Christ." 

The first great commandment elevates man above 
the beast, links him with the Divinity, and gives a 
sanction to virtue. Its absence in philosophical trea- 
tises on morals is the cause of the multiplicity and con- 
tradictions of systems, of the difficulty of fixing upon a 
criterion or primary motive, of all the uncertainty in 
fixing upon the fundamental rule of the natural law. 
The love of God is just as natural a feeling, and is as 
wide in its compassing, as any of the sentiments which 
have been the basis of learned schemes of morality. 
Phrenology sustains this opinion, by placing reverence 
and hope high in the order of moral sentiments. The 
love of God might therefore be easily made the basis 
of a professedly " natural" theory of ethics, which 
would be at least as respectable as those having Ego- 
tism, Conscience, Utility, &c, for their foundation. 



EMOTION. 167 

But the Jesuic philosophy teaches that love to God 
is inseparably bound up with the love of man, and 
that they cannot be parted without injury to both. 
"Keep yourselves therefore in the love of God." 
(Jude 21.) 

Thus it is evident that we might, according to Jesus, 
define ethics or morals as — 

1°. The science of the Will of God ; or as 

2°. The science of the Salvation of the Soul ; or as 

3°. The science of the love of man. 

But as the three are so closely connected, we should 
at once say : 

Ethics or Moral Philosophy is the science of the 
moral will of God, and teaches us our duties and the 
reasons of our duties to God, to ourselves, and to others, 
by Faith in him, through Hope of immortality, and in 
Charity or Love for all men. 

Theology teaches us what to believe : Ethics, what we 
should do ; and, the two together, constitute Religion. 

A definition of morals which does not include the 
divine will (whether revealed by prophets, or discov- 
ered by induction) as a main component, would not 
accord with the Jesuic Philosophy. In fact, this philos- 
ophy claims the Divinity as its source — it never ceases 
to speak in the name of God, and it proclaims the 
perfect performance of all our moral duties as the ful- 
filment of his will. (Mat. vi. 10 ; vii. 21 ; Luke xi. 2 ; 1 
Cor. ii. 6-16 ; Philip, ii. IT ; ill. 14, 15 ; Heb. x. 
36; 1 Pet. iv. 2; 1 John ii. IT.) 



168 HUMANICS. 

Indeed, all definitions of Moral Philosophy should 
comprise this element. Is it not by the Divine will 
that " we live and move and have our being " ? and 
has not the Divinity given us this existence for a great 
and eternal purpose ? In this great design and pur- 
pose he manifested his will ; and if we seek to act in 
harmony with it, should we not, at once, define the 
science which teaches us to do so, as the science- of the 
moral will of God ? 

Certain it is, at all events, that this is the true defi- 
nition according to Jesus — of Jesus, whose mission as 
summed up by himself, was the doing and the 
teaching of the Will of God. (Luke viii. 21 ; xi. 28 ; 
John iv. 34 ; v. 30 ; vi. 38-40 ; viii. 28, 29.) 

But if the definition stopped here it would be in- 
complete, for the mind remains unsettled if left at so 
great a height to contemplate the boundless space of the 
heavenly ordinances. A well-marked purview, and 
brief precision, are necessary in every definition. This 
brief precision is attained at once by including in the 
definition itself an index to the triple basis of the whole 
moral law. Its source : Faith in the eternal reign. Its 
medium : Hope in the infinite goodness. Its ground- 
work : Charity to the whole brotherhood of the Al- 
mighty Father. 

And thus is the social feeling lifted above mere in- 
stinct, purified, intellectualized by an identification with 
Love to God, a reliance in his love of us, and a con 
sciousness of the common origin of the human family.. 



EMOTION. 169 

And thus will the Holy Spirit be made manifest ; 
and " at that day," saith Jesus, " ye shall know that I 
am in my Father, and you in me, and I in you" — " that 
all may be one." 

Whenever any one of the three characteristics of the 
Holy Spirit is expressly or tacitly omitted in any defini- 
tion of morals, or is misunderstood, or is made to pre- 
dominate, many errors are the consequence ; and from 
the wrong beginning systems are deduced, of which 
Superstition, or Atheism, or Asceticism, or Sensualism, 
or Egotism, or Communism, is the ruling feature. 

Thus we have : — 

Superstition : the affrighted visionary, who beholds 
hideous phantoms in every rising truth — who fears, but 
loves not God, resolves all merit into the formulas of 
belief and rituals of worship ; and sends forth her at- 
tendants, Ignorance, the eyeless ; Fanaticism, the foam- 
ing epileptic ; Intolerance, the inquisitor ; and Perse- 
cution, the iron-hearted, to anathematize science, torture 
dissenters, drown witches, burn heretics, and massacre 
whole populations of reformers. 

Or we have — ■ 

Atheism : the Satanic scoffer, mocking heaven and 
inspiration, and coupling man with the brute ; he 
stands before the world with his companions, Panthe- 
ism the idolater, and Skepticism the blind astronomer, 
all reeking with the blood of their fellow-creatures, 
slain in the name of Liberty and Truth. 

Or we have — 



170 HUMANICS. 

Asceticism : the moving corpse without a grave, 
who severs himself from the human family, avoids 
brotherly intercourse and love, walks through life 
wrapped in the winding-sheet of the dead, and hails 
the Sepulchre as a portal of escape from a land of un- 
congenial strangers. 

Or we have — 

Sensualism : the abject satyr, reeling with wine, gorg- 
ing at feasts, and grovelling in lust — Sensualism, whose 
God is the belly, and whose law is pleasure. 

Or we have — 

Egotism : the machiavelic Proteus,the masked bravo, 
tendering the cup of deception brimful of blood and 
poison, or kneeling in adoration before his mirrored 
self, beyond whom he knows nothing and loves nothing ; 
reducing all morals to the casuistry of experience or 
utility, appealing to vanity under the name of honor, 
knowing conscience only as the fear of pains and pen- 
alties, admitting honesty only as the best policy, teach- 
ing hypocrisy and flattery as social virtues, advocating 
justice but discarding mercy, praising charity but 
practising it onty through penurious alms, and know- 
ing no law but interest, no agent of good but the fet- 
ters of despotism or the lash of tyrants. 

Or we have — 

Communism: the philanthropic Procrustes, who 
fain like egotism (for extremes meet) would, under 
pretence of equality and universal justice, compel all 
men, by fire and sword, to be disinterested and hum- 



EMOTION. 171 

ble , and, in the name of humanity, destroy all liberty 
and moral responsibility. 

It would carry me far beyond the plan of this work 
to take up each particular Selfish affection, and show 
in detail the views of Jesus upon it separately. Hun- 
dreds of texts might be quoted to show that Jesus, 
though he did not condemn the innate feelings neces- 
sary to self-preservation and generation, made them all 
subordinate to the love of Humanity and the happiness 
of Society. He raised the marriage institution to that 
inviolability which gave it a social instead of a private 
character ; for he made the promise of mutual fidelity 
to depend upon the welfare of the community, and 
yielded little or nothing to the interests, passions, health, 
or incompatibility of the husband and wife. He treated 
the relations of child and parent, of friends and com- 
panions, of home and property, as entirely secondary ; 
and required his disciples to leave all, when it was 
necessary to do so, to follow him — that is to say, to 
save the people. Self-sacrifice and Civic Heroism are 
taught in every discourse, and illustrated by every act 
of Jesus, as being paramount law, by virtue of which 
the animal instincts and affections find a common centre 
around which they may all cluster in peace, and a 
common measure to which they may all conform with- 
out interference and collision. 

It is therefore unnecessary to enter into further de- 
tails. It is only necessary to read the "New Testament 



172 HUMANICS. 

by this single light and according to this spirit, and 
the whole philosophy thereof, in its unity and in every 
application and precept, will become apparent to every 
intelligent and unprejudiced inquirer. 

If Justice can exist at all, it is in the fulfilment by 
Society of its obligation towards each of its members 
viewed as a limb of its body, so as to secure the good 
of each through the happiness of all, and thus establish 
the equilibrium of Individual and Municipal Eights. 



IV. 

THOUGHT. 

Johnson says : " Thought is the operation of the 
mind ; the act of thinking." " It is," says he in another 
place, " the action of man's intelligent substance — the 
first fundamental faculty of man." 

"Webster says : "It is the act or operation of the 
mind, when attending to a particular subject or thing ; 
or it is the idea consequent upon that operation." 

Locke says : " Thinking is the action of the soul, 
not its essence ; " and in another place he says : " When 
the mind turns its view inwards, and contemplates 
its own actions, thinking is the first that occurs." 

Descartes held that " To feel and will, is to think." 

Condillac, conversely, held that " To think and will, 
is to feel." In another place he says . " The word 
thought in its acception comprises all the faculties of 
the understanding, and all those of the will." Also : 
" Every thought has its proportions and its ornaments." 

Laromiguere defines Thought to be " the aggregate 
of our sensitive, moral, and intellectual faculties." 



174 HUMANICS. 

Bacon concurs with Aristotle, in the apt and elegant 
remark : " That the hand is the instrument of instru- 
ments, and the mind the form of forms." 

"The Dictionary of Philosophical Science," publish- 
ed by Hachette, Paris, 1844, says: "Thought (cogitate*) 
is the internal movement of the intellect : the evolution 
which the mind performs upon itself, apart from, but 
influenced by its properties." 

With these definitions before us, we may say, 
thought involves three things : 1°. An object, 2°. A 
Motor, 3°. A movement ; or, in other words, 1°. Contents 
of mind, whether they be considered as real or ideal, 
me or not me ; for, in either view, they are the objects 
of thought ; 2°. Properties of mind ; and 3°. Process of 
Mind. 

1°. Instead of Contents we may say : — Facts, Sub- 
ject, Object, Reality, Matter, Phenomena, Substance, 
Time, Place, Duration, Space, Number, Order, Recol- 
lections, Images, Suppositions, Opinions, Resolutions, 
&c, i. <?., every thing of which we are conscious as a 
data or matter of thought, whether we conceive it to 
be self or not self, subjective or objective, mediate or 
immediate, presentative or representative. 

2°. Instead of Properties we might say : — Sensation, 
Faculties, Powers, Affections, Propensities, Passions, 
Feelings, Sentiments, Laws, Instincts, Appetites, Mem- 
ory, Imagination, Intellect, Motive, the power of 
Judgment, of Reason, of Comparison, of Association, 
if Abstraction, of Generalization, &c, i. e., every thing 



THOUGHT. 175 

of which we are conscious, as internal foeces or pow- 
ers inducing any mental action whatever. 

3°. Instead of Process we might say : — Logic, Com- 
puting, Measuring, Analyzing, Synthetizing, General- 
izing, Inducting, Deducting, Comparing, Classifying, 
&c, i. e., the acts themselves and their laws, as exhibited 
in the movement of the thinking mind, while perform- 
ing its rational function. 

Let it be noted that in making this summary, I take 
the definitions of thought given by philosophers, as 1 
find them, and do not here assume a theory of my own ; 
and even in those definitions, I take as true only such 
facts or points as are agreed upon by all the professors 
of every school. 

Thus our beginning is upon conceded ground ; and, 
secure in undisputed premises, I start to find new foot- 
holds of progress. 

Wherever the professors of philosophy have differed, 
I will investigate for myself ; and invite the reader to 
join me. 

At this stage we may, at least, say : 

Thought is the movement (Process) of the mind 
upon itself (Contents) as influenced by its own capabil- 
ities (Properties). 

Thought must have a beginning, or what in figur- 
ative language is called a basis, a foundation, a pivot, 
a fulcrum, a stand-point, a centre, &c. If it had not 
this it never could be positive, never be fixed, never 



176 HUMANICS. 

act with certainty ; for the very idea of certitude im- 
plies an initial fact behind which thought cannot go, a 
primary truth which the mind cannot contest, and out 
of which all argument must proceed — and which like 
the star-needle to the mariner must command our 
faith. 

This initiatory act is (we deferentially suggest) 
Numeration, or Enumeration. It is the beginning of 
thought ; for it furnishes all the materials of reasoning 
in all science and art, and it contains within itself the 
primal law of intelligence. 

This act of enumeration is performed by sensation 
and emotion, in conjunction with an inherent power of 
the mind, which enables it to take, to form, to assume, 
to evolve a unit. 

In mathematics this fact is indisputable. In every 
other science it will be found, upon scrutiny, to be 
equally undeniable. 

A little attention to facts will enable us to know 
that the mind in receiving or gathering its sensations, 
does nothing but enumerate. 

Indeed, if sensation were to stop short of embody- 
ing integers, or concrete units, where would our knowl- 
edge of any thing be ? What would that knowledge 
consist of without units of matter, motion, time, space, 
substance, force, quality, quantity, body, spirit, or 
definition, whether expressed by a name or a number ? 
Without a numeral unit, no fraction, no addition, no sum, 
no mathematics could be* conceived. So without an 



THOUGHT. 177 

abstract or concrete integer described or defined with 
certainty, no analysis could be made, no synthesis could 
be known or found, no induction or deduction could be 
carried out, and logic could not exist. True it is, units 
which might be treated in arithmetical numbers do not 
abound in philosophy, morals, law, religion, and the like ; 
but at the same time, it is equally true that these sciences 
are strictly to be considered as sciences only so far as 
their contents can be named and defined, which is 
equivalent to enumerating them. As we progress in 
finding clear limits to the entities named, or as the 
name given approaches to a distinct unit, so does the 
science improve. As the parts of which its synthetical 
unit is composed, also acquire this clearness of limit, so 
does a science approach perfection. Outside of exact 
integers there is no science worthy of the name, and 
hence we are induced to assume the laws of number 
and measure as the laws of all reasoning in legislation, 
ethics, politics, &c. 

I do not mean by this that these sciences can be 
treated in arithmetical numbers or geometrical figures ; 
but that as numbers and figures are the data of abstract 
mathematics, so names, definitions, and stated facts, are 
the algebraical signs of every concrete science, wheth- 
er it can be reduced to numbers or not ; and that the 
same laws of thought govern in reasoning with these 
names, &c, as in reasoning with arithmetical numerals 
or geometrical figures. 

Hence, my general proposition is : 
12 



178 HUMANICS. 

1°. That — the initial act, germ point, or focal cen- 
tre of all thought is THE IDEATION OF THE 
UNIT ; and, therefore, 

2°. That — from the ideation of the unit all evolu- 
tions of thought proceed, and to it all compositions and 
decompositions of thought recur. 



In showing this I begin with — 



LOGICAL ENUMERATION. 

We have already seen that the subject matter and 
end of all thought is fact. Seasoning is a procedure 
from fact to fact. 

We have also seen that there are certain data given 
by consciousness which are by necessity the initial 
premises or prima ratio in all reasoning, and behind 
which we cannot find a stand or starting point. The 
facts thus exhibited to thought by consciousness are its 
materials. 

But what is a fact ? 

A fact is any single state or act which can be de- 
clared by a simple sentence. Examples : 1. "I am ; " 
2. " The Jews cruelly crucified the divine Jesus." 

In these two examples we have simple sentences — 
there being only one verb in each example. 

But the first example cannot be multiplied into a 
greater number, while the second example might serve 
to form several simpler sentences ; thus : 



THOUGHT. 179 

The Jews crucified Jesus ; 
The Jews were cruel ; 
Jesus was divine, &c. 

So it appears that a single fact may be either simple 
or complex. 

1. A simple fact, is that which may be declared by 
a simple sentence, that is to say, a sentence which can- 
not be multiplied or divided into several without adding 
to the sense. 

2. A complex fact, is that which is declared by a 
complex sentence. A compound sentence (which is 
defined as one which can be resolved into clauses) al- 
ways declares two or more simple or complex facts; 
as : " Plato and Aristotle were men of great wisdom ; 
but their philosophy was inferior to that of Jesus." 

Besides being simple or complex, facts are either 
direct or indirect. 

1. A direct fact, is that which is perceived by con- 
sciousness without the aid of any process of addition, 
subtraction, multiplication, division, reduction or ratio. 
It is the pure enumeration or remembrance of what is 
felt, as it is felt. It may be either the present sensation 
and feeling, or an image supplied by memory, or a defi- 
nition and conviction heretofore sanctioned and now re- 
lied on as an axiom. Its essential characteristics are : 
1°, immediate recognition by the mind as truth, with- 
out discussion or doubt / and 2°, completeness or total- 
ity — that is to say, not requiring before recognition 
the conjunction or elimination of any other fact or idea. 



180 HUMANICS. 

2. An indirect fact, is one which (whether simple 
or complex) is joined to, taken from, or measured with 
others to form, leave, or find a previously unknown or 
unperceived entire truth. 

Now for the Unit. 

In mathematics the idea of the unit involves the 
possibility of repetition, one, two, three, &c, numbers 
of times ; but this is not the positive and true idea of 
the unit. A thing may be a unit though there be only 
one of its nature in the universe. The fact that it is one 
is enough to constitute it a unit, though it cannot in 
fact be repeated. It is one, whether there be another 
one or not. When it can be repeated, what do we say ? 
We say, that there are many units of the same denom- 
ination. Each is of itself a unit ; and as such it does 
not depend upon the existence of any other thing like 
or unlike it. God is one ; yet the true idea of God 
precludes the possibility of repetition. The sun is one, 
the moon is one ; and they are units in themselves 
whether there be other suns and moons or not. In the 
science of numbers, what is meant by two, three, &c. ? 
Two simply means one and one ; three means one, one 
and one : the same can be repeated as to four, &c. 
The figures 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, merely serve as a short- 
hand to express the repetition of units of the same kind ; 
but if units of different kinds are taken together this 
form of short-hand is no longer applicable, and we are 
obliged in lieu of numbers to call each thing by its sub- 






THOUGHT. 181 

stantive name. Thus several objects are before me — 
they are : Apple, Horse, Diamond ; I do not count 
them; but by the giving of these names an act of 
enumeration is performed. Indeed, even in the science 
of numbers, things of different kinds are reduced to a 
common denominator, to render their computation in 
arithmetical characters possible. Thus we say: two 
three, four, &c, " things," though these things thus 
numerically designated may be totally dissimilar in 
themselves. 

A unit is any single entirety. It is any single and 
entire thing, person or fact, being, act or quality. 

Upon considering the facts embodied in this defi- 
nition, we find : 

1°. The puke or abstract unit, which is the idea of 
one independent of any auxiliary object; or the mere 
elementary number or measure of its like without re- 
gard to any interposed standard of substance or force. 
The pure unit regards only itself. The semibreve is the 
pure unit of musical sounds. Thus the mere sign of 
unity — the figure 1 — may be regarded as constituting 
a unit in itself, and from thence all the operations of 
pure arithmetic may be demonstrated, without ever 
thinking of any application or relation beyond that oi 
the signs among themselves, as mere conventional as- 
sumptions. 

If a mathematician deals habitually with puke arith- 
metical numbers, algebraical tokens, and geometrical 
figures, apart from any direct applications, his aggre- 



182 HUMANICS. 

gate intellectual fjrce will diminish, while if he con- 
stantly applies his rules and processes, as a form of rea- 
soning, to all practical questions, the acuteness, strength, 
and clearness of his mind will increase. 

2°. The standard or common unit, which is the ap- 
plied standard of weight, force, value, time, distance, 
capacity, &c. It involves the idea of a positive rela- 
tion between two (or more) real things — one of which 
serves as the measure. It differs from the pure unit in 
this, that it is juxtaposited with another something. 
Ex. : a Cent; a Man; an Animal, &c. 

3°. The concrete or proper unit, which is any defi- 
nitely limited and single thing, or person, including sev- 
eral qualities or circumstances as parts or attributes of 
its unity. Ex. : the Man ; that Horse ; Adam, &c. 

4°. The collective or multiple unit, which is any 
single term, or name, including many individuals. 
Ex. : Men ; Synod ; Committee, &c. All plural nouns 
and plural integers are collective units. 

5°. The complex or verbal unit, which is any sin- 
gle fact or declaration including a subject or a predi- 
cate considered together. Ex. : What I feel ; my Love ; 
&c. ; Thinking; Dreaming, &c. 

Euclid says : 

" Unity is that according to which each of existing 
things is called one." 

" Any thing may be unity for other things of its 
own kind." 



THOUGHT. 



183 



Two other distinctions of great importance remain 
to be noted. 

Units are either 

I. Constant or Variable. 

II. [Numeral or Ab -numeral. 

I. 

1. Constant units are those that retain the same 
value in the same expression. 

2. Variable units are those which admit of an in- 
definite number of values, in the same expression. 

II. 

1. Numeral units are those which are computed by 
means of numbers. 

2. Ab-numeral units are those which are computed 
without the use of numbers. 

Davies, in his Logic of Mathematics, says : 
" Algebraic symbols may stand for all numbers, or 
for all quantities which numbers represent, or even for 
quantities which cannot be exactly expressed numeri- 
cally" 

" In Geometry, each geometrical figure stands for a 
class ; and when we have demonstrated a property of 
a figure, that property is considered proved for every 
figure of the class." 

The whole process of reasoning by numeral units, 



184 HUMANICS. 

is explained in Arithmetic ; and it is not our object to 
treat this branch of onr subject further than to show 
the identity of its principles with the process of rea- 
soning upon instances of ab-numeral units. 

The numeration of Arithmetic, and the enumera- 
tion of general logic, differ only in appearance — not in 
essence. 

The arithmetician does not find it necessary to give 
a distinct name to every quantity which enters into his 
process. 

The standards of the quantities with which he deals, 
their commeasurability, enables him to use the short- 
hand of digits. 

The general logician, on the contrary, encounters 
the necessity of distinct names for the several quanti- 
ties he operates upon ; and he finds it almost always 
impossible to apply numbers to these quantities. 

Yet he always regards them as quantities, and 
though he does not enumerate them by digits, he names 
every item of his computations, and is able to measure 
them, at least so far as to declare that this or that term 
is — " more or less than," " increased or diminished fty" 
" added to," " taken from," " the equal of," &c. 

The algebraist keeps his quantities distinctly appa- 
rent throughout his process, by means of signs : a, ~b, 
c, x, y, 2, &c. ; the general logician uses names, defini- 
tions, phrases, in fact every form and artifice of lan- 
guage ; generally keeping the terms of his computation 
distinct under their respective marks, as in algebra. 



THOUGHT. 185 

The logician is, however, frequently enabled to 
merge the manifold terms of a ratiocination into new 
and comprehensive titles, and like the arithmetician, 
he often sums up or solves with a precision not to be 
surpassed in numeral logic. 

But we are anticipating. 

It is sufficient at the present stage to note this : 
that when the materials of an argument cannot be 
counted, when numerals cannot be used to compute 
them, they are only inventoried. A list is made of all 
the items, by titles, phrases, and names ; and this is 
logical Numeration or Enumeration. 

The principles which ought to govern such an enu- 
meration, w r ill be better understood after an exposition 
of the operations of addition and multiplication, sub- 
traction and division, reduction and ratio, which may 
take place apart from any digital numeration ; and 
only by names and grammatical signs. 

In the mean time I remind the reader : 

1°. As to identity of names with number : that when 
Pythagoras was asked which being he thought was 
wisest ? he answered : " JVumder." Which the next 
wisest ? he answered : " That which has given names 
to things." 

2°. As to the initial act of thought : that in Gene- 
sis ii. 19, it is written : " Out of the ground the Lord 
God formed every beast of the field, and every fowl 
of the air, and brought them unto Adam, to see what 
he would call them" 



186 HUMANICS. 

ADDITION. 

How are we to add together terms not commeasur- 
able, terms of different, of mixed, of irregular values, 
denominations, qualities, orders, and natures ? 

Algebra, which deals only in such quantities as can 
finally be reduced to exact numbers, nevertheless sug- 
gests an answer to our question ; for it marks the quan- 
tities by artificial names : a, b, c, x, y, z, &c, and 
treats these artificial names as positive entities, till a 
convenient period in the operation presents itself for 
making the reduction. 

Logical addition proceeds in a similar manner ; and 
differs only in the form of the reduction. 

Instead of merging the items into a sum total of 
exact numbers, it finds a total name, or phrase, which 
sums up all the terms of the problem. 

For example : 

Add together the following terms : 





A thing, 




A price, 

A receiver, 

A deliverer, 

A consent to receive, 

A consent to deliver. 


The sum total is : 


A contract of " Sale." 



The sum total of this addition, instead of being ex- 
pressed in figures, is set down in the word " Sale," 



THOUGHT. 187 

which is just as clear and exact as any aggregate ex- 
pressed in digits could be. 

An indefinite number of parallel examples might 
be given here ; but the intelligent reader needs no 
others. 

MULTIPLICATION. 

This form of reasoning is identical in principle with 
addition. It is simply a short mode of finding the ag- 
gregate produced by a certain number of repetitions of 
any given quantity. 

The distinctive trait of multiplication is that both its 
factors must be plural. If both or only one is singular 
we can have no change or increase. Ex. : 1 x 1=1 or 
30x1=30. 

One of the terms represents a force, mark, quality 
or " power." If it be only a single unit it is the mark 
of " one time " or equality ; but when both the factors 
are plural the full force, mark, quality or power of the 
one is communicated to the other, so that all the units 
of the one enter into each of the units of the other ; so 
that an increase takes place in each integer of the mul- 
tiplicand equal to the full value of the multiplier. 

Thus if I multiply ten pounds by three, each of 
the pounds becomes three pounds, and I have thirty 
pounds. 

In logical multiplication the force, quality, or power 
though not numerated, is imparted in precisely the 
same manner. It must not only be a force, quality, 



188 HUMANICS. 

mark or power as in arithmetic, but both factors must 
be plural as in arithmetic, and the one must be dis- 
tributed to all the integers of the other — also as in 
arithmetic. 

With this rule we can never have any difficulty in 
distinguishing a logical addition from a logical multi- 
plication. 

Man + Man = Men . 

Accordant Wills x Mutual Promises = Contract. 

Some factors appear to be in the singular number, 
but are really plural and capable of distribution. 
These are the nouns of multitude and many " abso- 
lute " or abstract names. When they are used in logi- 
cal multiplication, though one or both of the factors 
seem to be in the singular, we should not overlook the 
plurality of their true meaning, the distribution intend- 
ed by the expression. 

Ex. : Animal +Keason— Man, 
Animal x Reasons Man. 

In the first of these two examples, we mean to con- 
sider a single individual endowed with reason ; but in 
the second example, we consider a whole class or mul- 
titude of animals, among whom, and to each of whom, 
reason is distributed. The sum in one case is a single 
person ; the product in the other is all mankind. 

In our mental presence, this principle should ever 
be kept : 



THOUGHT. 189 

Terms can be multiplied by each other only when 
they have a common measure, phenomena, property, or 
law. 

In arithmetic this rule is constantly kej3t in view, 
so that in adding we must place units under units, tens 
under tens ; and in multiplying we cannot use integers 
of one denomination or standard as factors of those of 
another. Thus it is throughout the other stages. 

A multiplier is, however, frequently given without 
any appellation to mark it as being of any denomination 
or standard, though one is always really implied. Take 
this example : John had 4 sacks of corn, but Tom had 

3 times as many — how many had Tom? Answer: 

4 sacks x 3 times =12 sacks. It is evident that three 
times really means, three-times-sacks / for the product 
is, sacks ; and if the number of times had been any 
thing else, we would not have known what name to 
give to the product. Hence, the question would have 
been absurd had it been : John had 4 sacks, but Tom 
walked 3 times as far — what distance did Tom walk ? 
Even pure arithmetic is possible for no other reason 
than that certain pre-determined laws of change are 
imputed as common to numbers. If the laws of change 
are varied by a new convention, the new and the old 
cannot be computed together, unless by applying some 
process of transmutation. Thus a duodecimal cannot 
be multiplied by a decimal without reduction. 

Ex. : 4 dimes x 3 reals, how many cents or reals ? 
Now, in ab-numeral mathematics or logic the rule, 



190 HUMANICS. 

though exactly the same, is of more extensive applica- 
tion. It is always requisite that two things be either, 
1°, commergable into one term, or 2°, inter distributable, 
in order that they may be added or multiplied to- 
gether ; but in general logic the thinker who deals not 
with a question of precise numbers dispenses with 
arithmetical notation, without however departing from 
those primal laws of thought according to which num- 
bers themselves have been framed. 

I. Mergable into one term, is essential for addition. 

II. Distributable into each other, is essential for 
multiplication. 

III. But in multiplication, whether numeral or not, 
this interdistribution is never possible unless the factors 
contain some exchangeable force or property, common 
necessity or law. 

Hence : 

I. By addition. Ex. : Sheet of paper -f- written 
words + continued sense + personality addressed -fper- 
sonality addressings a letter. 

II. By multiplication : Book x repeated printing 
—Edition. 

III. But if we have miscellaneous books though we* 
might add them together to make a library, they would 
not be factors of each other. 

Thus : when the terms are not interdistributable we 
cannot proceed by multiplication. 



THOUGHT. 191 

SUBTRACTION. 

Eow suppose that from a " Sale," I subtract the 
price. 

The operation and result will be as follows : 
Sale. 
— Price. 
= Donation. 
A donation or gift contains all the elements of a 
sale, minus the price. A gift is without price. 

Logical authors seem to agree, that reasoning may 
be considered as the putting of two ideas together ; and 
comparing them to find their relation to a third. This 
is only another way of stating, that the difference or 
equality of two things may be ascertained by means of 
a common standard or measure, or, in other words, by 
Subtraction. 

In deduction, the Syllogism is clearly a comparison 
of two things stated, so as to show that they are both 
identical with a third, or that both include the same 
lesser term or attribute. 

In induction, the laws of Elimination are mere 
modes of comparing several phenomena, so as to iso- 
late or discover their common and residual elements. 

In Grammar, the prefixes e, ex, extra, ir, il, ne, 
un, ab &c, import the exclusion of some element from 
a name. 



192 HUMANICS. 

The above and many others which might be men- 
tioned, are assuredly examples of Subtraction. 



DIVISION. 

Francoeur, a mathematical writer, says : " In the 
same manner that multiplication is only the continued 
addition of the same number, we may consider division 
as a repeated subtraction, the quotient marking how 
often we can take the divisor from the dividend." 

This is strictly true, but at the same time he should 
have added : " the quotient marks also the value of one 
of the parts subtracted, while the divisor marks how 
many of those part sare required to make up the divi- 
dend." 

In numeral division and multiplication, it is essen- 
tial that the multiplicand in one, and the quotient in 
the other, should represent equal parts of a sum total ; 
and it is implied that each part being repeated a certain 
number of times indicated by the multiplier or divisor, 
the sum total will be produced. 

The idea conveyed by the numeral quotient is not 
that it is alone, nor all that has been found, but is one 
of several ; and that each of the several are exactly 
equal to the one written. 

If I divide 12 dollars among 3 men, or 12 by 3, the 
quotient will be 4 ; but when I write the figure 4, 1 do 
not mean it as the whole answer. It is implied that I 
have found three sums of four dollars each, one of the 



THOUGHT. ] 93 

sums for each man. The operation and quotient are 
really this : 

Divisor 3) 12 Dividend. 
1st Man 4 j 
2d Man 4 V Quotient. 
3d Man 4 j 

12 

Now, in the division of numbers by numbers, we 
take advantage of the real or supposed equality in 
amounts and of the identity in names, to abbreviate our 
answer by stating the quotient a single time. 

This assumed equality is, however, very often, con- 
trary to the real fact. If, for instance, instead of twelve 
dollars the division had been of twelve horses, the 
shares of three horses each might have been very un- 
equal and grossly unjust. 

In the division of ah-numeral facts — facts not re- 
solvable into numbers — the theory is the same ; but we 
find the abbreviation impracticable. We find the sev- 
eral quantities of the quotient to be variables bearing 
different names, so that we must write the result in 
detail. Nevertheless, each of the terms of the quo- 
tient must bear the impress of both the divisor and 
dividend. 

Thus if we divide the " Ownership of Property " 
by " Modes of Acquisition " the quotient will be : 



13 



194 HUMANICS. 

MODES OF ACQUISITION) OWNERSHIP OF PROPERTY. 

Mode 1, by Prescription. 
" 2, by Accession. 
" 3, by Gift. 
" 4, by Legacy. 
" 5, by Inheritance. 

6, by Wages. 

7, by Usufructuary production. 

8, by Manufacture. 
8, by Interest. 

10, by Damage recovered. 

11, by Wager won. 

12, by Sale. 

13, by Exchange. 
" 14, by Kents. 

" 15, by Treasure trove. 

" 16, by Preoccupancy. 

" 17, by Capture. 

" 18, by Salvage. 

It is now time to remark that Division differs from 
Subtraction in this : 

1. Division must be exhaustive, it must exhibit all 
the elements of the matter divided ; but subtraction, 
after extracting a fact, or term, looks at the remainder. 
Whether this remainder, when found, be a simple 
unital fact, or term, or a complex and divisible one, 
may appear at once, or become the subject of further 
computation. Yet whatever it consists of, or whatever 
is done with it, still it represents only a portion of the 
subject first stated, and does not, like the quotient, con- 
tain or imply all the original matter. 

2. Division also differs from subtraction in this : 



THOUGHT. 195 

subtraction may proceed to eliminate arbitrarily any dis- 
tinct or separable portion or element, without regard 
to the question, whether the remainder has or has not 
any measure in common with the portion deducted — 
while, on the other hand, in division 1°, the parts given 
by the quotient must all bear the mark of the divisor, 
as being their common modus, function, or law ; and 
hence 2°, the divisor cannot be arbitrarily selected, 
but must be phenomena, property, or law of the whole 
dividend. 

All classifications which do not conform to these 
laws of division, are necessarily wrongly computed, or 
mere enumerations of direct facts. They may be ar- 
ranged with more or less skill in grouping, but are 
wanting in the essentials of a true and fruitful ordina- 
tion. 

Thus, for instance, in the French and Louisiana 
codes, 1°, the contracts of Mandate, Deposit, and 
Suretyship, are set down as modes of acquiring 
property ; 2°, several well-known modes are omitted ; 
and 3°, acquisition by accession is placed under another 
title. 



REDUCTION. 

In addition and multiplication, in subtraction and 
division, our aim is, either to compute the sum total of 
several facts, or to separate those sums into their ele 
ments ; but when we deal with several sum totals, if 



* 



196 HUMANICS. 

we try to add them together we may find them, in their 
present form, not to be homogeneous, and thus to resist 
our addition or multiplication — while subtraction or 
division would only give us a greater multiplicity of 
separate and incommeasurable terms. 

Keduction, or generalization, which enables us to 
obtain a common denominator or term, within which 
our distinct sum totals may be comprised, is the mental 
process which overcomes this confusion. 

The reduction of compound numbers, of vulgar and 
decimal fractions, &c, are in numeral mathematics the 
types of this mental process. 

Such a reduction was performed by Franklin, 
agreeably to this type applied to ab-numeral facts, when 
he found the common properties of the flying clouds 
and Ley den jar. 

By a like process the framers of the Civil Code, after 
resolving Sale, Exchange, Loan, Hiring, Wager, De- 
posit, &c, into their elements, found them all to contain 
two essentials : viz., Accordant "Wills and Mutual 
Promises, and to be thereby reducible to the same 
denominator: Contract. Hence the book of Conven- 
tional Obligations was deduced to set forth, under a 
general head, a vast number of principles common to 
all contracts. 

Reduction consists in finding, by enumeration, and 
the other processes, already described, what phenomena, 
force, law, &c, separate facts have in common. 

The term which attaches to all the facts taken in 



THOUGHT. 197 

connection is the common denominator, or the reduc- 
tion. 

All things in nature are interfused or interlinked. 
If it be otherwise, then each thing is isolated from 
every thing else ; but we know by experience that such 
isolation is not the fact. If no connections nor inter- 
weaving existed there could be no such thing as reason ; 
for reason is conversant only with the agreement or disa- 
greement of things compared to each other, or with the 
production of one thing by another. Without points of 
communion with that which is not itself, mind itself 
would remain consigned to absolute solitude, igno- 
rance, and silence. Hence, since there are conformities 
and contrasts inter-distributed among all things, and 
since something in common is implied by this accord 
and interpenetration, it is this common something, 
whether Phenomena, Forces or Laws, which forms the 
ground-work of all reductions ; and thus the elements of 
a possible reduction to some common measure is con- 
tained in the things themselves. 

It remains to be seen how these elements are to be 
detected. 

In pure mathematics, these elements are given be- 
forehand by definition. The definition and consequent 
axioms are the facts and laws of the case. Definitions = 
facts. Axioms = laws. Every term in pure mathemat- 
ics has a precise sense and value positively fixed at the 
beginning, so that nothing remains but to reason upon 
the given, precise, and certain data ; and by combining 



198 HUMANICS. 

them, to develop the successive phases through which, 
agreeably to the original definitions, they may be car- 
ried. 

In concrete mathematics the initial step is not so 
easy. Real quantities must be first found as direct 
facts. It is only when immediate sensation or enu- 
meration has furnished two or more of these facts, as 
stated terms, that a process of computation may begin 
and progress. Yet we operate with the real quantities 
in the same way as with the assumed and abstract. 
The type is in our mental nature itself; there is an in- 
nate rule, and we must conform to it, even after we have 
left the ideal and nominal for the real and denominate. 

Thus no sooner was the decimal scale arbitrarily as- 
sumed, than it became subjected to the typical forms 
of addition, subtraction, multiplication, division, reduc- 
tion, and ratio pre-existing in the mind ; and thus, too, 
when no real concrete units exist they are created by 
virtue of the same innate laws : Space is cut up into 
leagues, miles, &c, and Time is severed into hours, 
minutes ; and thus, too, so absolute and immutable 
are the laws of thought, that when the necessary ele- 
ments of an argument are not apparent in the object 
thought of, they are artificially collocated with it, and 
standards purely conventional are made to serve the 
purposes of the thinker ; but they serve that purpose 
because, at the same time, they are themselves mould- 
ed into the sole matrix of thought nature has herself 
deposited within the mind of man. 



THOUGHT. 199 

Hence, it is not to be imagined that these laws of 
numbers do not also prevail in ab-numeral mathe- 
matics or general logic. 

To make a generalization or reduction the operation 
is always the same, whether we deal with numerals or 
with non-numerated terms, facts, or symbols. 

First, the facts must be furnished by direct enu- 
meration, aided by subtraction and division ; and 
secondly, search must be made throughout these facts 
for their common divisor. 

The process of finding this common divisor begins, 
even in arithmetic by experiment, guided by our knowl- 
edge of certain pre-ascertained properties of numbers. 
Each of the several items are separately tried by every 
prime number which may divide them without a re- 
mainder, and then the different sets of prime quotients 
are compared to see if there is any common to all the 
sets. 

In the reduction or generalization of non-numerated 
facts and names, the process is the same. 

1°. The facts or names are enumerated or stated. 

2°. They are tried or tested by separate divisions to 
make them disclose their common divisor. 

3°. When all the members of a set of terms are 
found to be divisible, each by one-same term, a ee- 
duction is accomplished. 

Eeferring to what has been said under the head of 
multiplication on the subject of inter-distribution of 



200 HUMANICS. 

factors, I proceed in addition to call attention to the 
fact of correspondence between multiplication and di- 
vision. This correspondence is well known to be this : 

Dividend with Product. 

Divisor with Multiplier. 

Quotient with Multiplicand. 
So that, since the divisor and multiplier are similar 
in principle, and may exchange functions — since one 
of the main objects of ab-numeral reduction is to find 
common forces and generic laws — and since two terms 
cannot be factors of each other unless they have prop- 
erties in common, or unless there exist between them 
some law of mutual adaptation — it is evident, that mul- 
tiplication may be as good a trier as division ; and that 
should we find a single factor with this common adapta- 
tion, &c, to each and all of a set of several terms, it 
will disclose either. 

1. A common divisor ; or 

2. The general law which governs all the terms. 
This last result is by far the most desirable ; for a 

general law is a light to the eye of thought, and 
enables the mind from a single glance or point of view? 
to understand a multiplicity of Phenomena. 

It is by means of the process of reduction that many 
laws, once scattered, when found all bearing the char- 
acteristic of prohibition against the violation of right 
through fraud or force, were placed under the head of 
Criminal Laws. It is by the same process, repeated 



THOUGHT. 201 

upon all the laws, that we have found common denomi- 
nators for a till-then-confused mass of other laws. Thus 
the whole law is now classified as follows : 

Constitutional. 

International. 

Administrative. 

Civil. 

Commercial. 

Maritime. 

Martial. 

Ecclesiastical. 

Local. 

Private. 

Penal. 

Justicial, (or Procedure.) 

Each category of facts possesses within itself the 
properties of its reductibility. 

All common nouns are examples of reduction. 

KATIO. 

We have now reached the last step in the process 
of thought — the point of progress from whence philoso- 
phy is evolved. 

Philosophy seeks universal truths — truths which 
pervade all other truths — which enter into the others 
as attraction enters and controls every material thing. 
This movement and aim of philosophy is dictated and 
moved by the intellectual faculty of knowing and com- 
puting Ratio. 

Ratio is the property of the intellect which is con- 
scious of proportion. Patio is the mental act which 



202 HUMANICS. 

computes the laws of gradation, beginning at the 
mathematical point, and spreading in wave-circles of 
regular progression till lost in the infinite. 

Addition and Subtraction detects mere sums and 
differences ; but Ratio detects resemblances between dif- 
ferences whether of sums or remainders. 

Multiplication, Division, and Reduction find single 
results of combination, partition, and adaptation ; but 
Ratio finds a series. 

Ratio compares Products with Products, Quotients 
with Quotients, to find a fourth term, or a scale of har- 
monies and differences ; and thence through accords of 
common denominators, progresses to exhaust the finite 
and frame an index to the infinite. 

In numerical science Ratio gives us the laws of 
arithmetical and geometrical progression, roots, pow- 
ers, rule of three, proportion, &c. 

In physical science perfect models of Ratio are 
afforded by the works of Newton and Dalton. 

" A proportion is a comparison between two equal 
ratios." 

" Every ratio is divided into two terms : the first 
is called the antecedent, and the second the consequent, 
and the two, taken together, are called a couplet. The 
antecedent is regarded as the standard." 

" Every proportion is composed of two equal ratios ; 
and the 1st and 4th terms of a proportion are called the 
extremes : the 2d and 3d terms of the proportion are 
called the means." 



THOUGHT. 203 

A PROPORTION". 



Ratio or Couplet Ratio or Couplet 



1st term 2d term 3d term 4th term 

antecedent consequent antecedent consequent 

means 



Individuals 



Families : : Neighborhoods 



Village 



extremes 



" In every proportion the product of the extremes 
is equal to the product of the means." And in every 
proportion, the 4th term is equal to the product of the 
2d and 3d terms, divided by the 1st. Example : 

Individuals : Families : : Neighborhoods : x 

Families 
multiplied by Neighborhoods 



=Many Families of Neighborhoods 

Divided into unities or individuals, thus : 

Individuals \ Many Families of Neighborhoods 
= Tillage or Villages 

viz. : a unit, a Sum, single collection or assemblage 
of Families, of Neighborhoods ; or, several units, or 
sums of Families of Neighborhoods. 

It remains to be decided whether the 4th term found 
is singular or plural. 



204 HUMANICS. 

This can be determined by the laws which regulate 
proportion or ratio, viz. : the Ratios must he equal ; and 
in every proportion the two couplets must increase or 
decrease, directly or inversely, alike — -so that when the 
proportion is direct, their ratio is always the same, and 
when inverse, their product is always the same. 

Now in the above example the consequent of the 
first couplets or ratio increases directly : plurally to a 
plural antecedent or standard ; and so (according to the 
rule) the consequent of the other ratio must be plural 
also. Hence — • 

Individuals : Families : : Neighborhoods : Villages. 

If the first consequent had been singular, it is plain 
the second would have been of the same grammatical 
number. 

Individuals : Family : : Neighborhoods : Village. 

Referring to the elementary text-books on arithmetic 
for the laws of Arithmetical and Geometrical Progres- 
sion. I have only to add that these laws are in force 
among ab-numerals, as well as numerals. In every 
science things or facts are found to exist in series (wheth- 
er of equidifferences or ratios) of progression. A little 
investigation will be apparent to every one ; and there- 
fore I content myself with a couple of instances. 



THOUGHT. 



205 



1°. Example : Arithmetical Progression. 
HOMICIDE. 



Peepeteatoe acting 



Cruelly 
Corruptly- 



IP g 2 £ 2 

Si's - 2 - 

+= n b m ^ 5 ^ 



Maliciously ^ F 



Surreptitiously — co ^ © m® 1 " 1 
Prepensively 



Voluntarily 

Involuntarily 



kS "« 3 

. W 



Fortuitously r 

Defensively 

Compulsively- 






Victim was 



Vanquished 

Eight-enjoying 

Confiding 

Innocent 

Peaceful 

Combative 

Keekless 

Imprudent 

Homicidal 

Criminal 



2°. Example : Geometrical Progression. 
Let us take the series familiar to political economy: 

Labor x Labor— Production 
Production x Production = Exchange 
Exchange x Exchange = Commerce 
Commerce x Commerce = Distribution 
Distribution x Distributions Consumption 
Consumption x Consumption = Demand 
Demand x Demand = Labor. 



The result is a circulating series of ab-numerals, in 
which the same terms return ad infinitum ; but dispens- 
ing with the difficulties which might be suggested by 
this illustration, here is another of plainer construction : 



206 HUMANICS. 

Individuals : 
: Families : 

: Associations : 

: Villages or Communes : 
: Cities or Townships : 
: Shires : 

: Provinces : 
Nations. 

The progression of these things in multiplying or 
geometrical ratio is positively certain, yet it is also 
impossible to apply any numeration to the terms, or to 
frame for them a table of determinate values. 

We have now noted the primary acts sufficiently to 
be prepared to turn our attention to the operation of 
the properties, and process of thought upon its contents : 
viz., upon 

PHENOMENA. 

"Were the human mind limited to simple conscious- 
ness of sensation and emotion — were it left unaided by 
numeration, it would, I contend, (and hope to show,) 
have contented itself with objective nature in its direct 
and unanalyzed aspect and power. But our mind does 
not stop at the immediate deliverings and memories 
due to direct sensation. Our mind is capable of sub- 
jective deliverings and memories, which react as it 
were upon consciousness, and cast its contents into a 
measured or formal matrix and fashioner. 

Apart from number and its postulate measure, sup- 



THOUGHT. 207 

pose we were to consider nature as presenting phenom- 
ena only — phenomena which conld be, as proposed by 
the idealists, considered "in themselves," or "absolute- 
ly." They would then remain, for us, as indeterminate 
and irrational qualities and powers, as mere changes of 
chaos, tossing us about, upon its accidental and conflict- 
ing movements. 

But the human mind must do itself violence, to 
place itself, even for an instant, in a condition to con- 
sider nature in this aspect — an aspect familiar to the 
brutes, who have no concern with nature but to feel and 
obey its direct action upon their organism. 

"While the brutes are conscious of nature only as a 
moving panorama, of irreducible and absolute attrac- 
tions and repulsions, pleasing and displeasing influ- 
ences, we at the same time ideate nature, and all its 
qualities and powers, as simultaneously and continuously 
answering those quantitative notions known as time and 
space, force and law. 

The world of pure quality and impression, or as the 
metaphysicians express it, the world of the absolute and 
unconditioned, is the world abstracted from all our 
ideas of thinkable quantity, all concept of numeration 
and mensuration ; and is therefore the world of the 
brute. 

In their efforts to imagine nature from this point of 
view, the idealists have deluded themselves into a be- 
lief of success ; but they have unconsciously allowed, 
for it was impossible to prevent it, the concept of the 



208 HUMANICS. 

unit to impose itself upon their meditations ; and made 
them produce extensive entities, which they denned 
and named as vaguely as possible. 

If by an effort of thought we consider quality " in 
itself," apart from all relative ideas — if we take each 
quality as wholly disconnected and isolated, we may 
fairly admit the existence of Substance, Gravitation, 
Heat, Light, Electricity, the existence of Colors, Sounds, 
Tastes, Odors, and Feels, severally — the existence of 
Hunger, Thirst, Excretive-habitude, Genital-desire, and 
Motor- vitality — as facts. That they are, is all that 
consciousness, unaided by the conception of quantity, 
can feel ; but consciousness without quantity could not 
even (as I have just done) pronounce or articulate the 
fact of this existence ; for they must be conceived as 
distinct units before language can name them ; every 
noun being a unit or sum. Hence the brutes having 
only the " pure," the " absolute," the " unconditioned " 
idea of fact, and being incapable of ideating the unit, 
have no language but that of interjections ; and express 
the state of their consciousness by simple emotional 
cries and notions, only. "Without the mechanism of 
instinct to move them, they would be lost in the midst 
of nature, as in chaos. 

Thus all we can say of Phenomena in themselves, is 
that they constitute the world of existent and unrational- 
ize&fact. 

Phenomenon m itself is exratiots ate fact. 



THOUGHT. 209 

But human language does not afford terms and 
phrases to discourse intelligibly of the absolute or supra 
quantitative. Let us therefore hasten to take up the 
subject of time and space, force and law. 



TIME AND SPACE. 

For the human mind there is no sucli thing as 
ab-quantitative phenomena. The archeus or primary 
principle of thought, works with constant diligence 
throughout human consciousness, in disclosing the quan- 
titative elements of the cosmos. Hence we may set it 
down as a direct and immediate fact, that we are con- 
scious of nothing, otherwise than as being contained 
in time and in space ; or, in other words, as having 
limit or measure. Every definition of a word, thing, 
or idea, is the statement of its components or parts, and 
therefore of limits and extension, affirmatively or neg- 
atively. Even the idea of God becomes pantheistic, 
that is to say null, unless we separate it from phenome- 
na, limit it by excluding all materiality, and thus 
distinguish God himself from those manifestations of 
his own creative omnipotence we behold in the uni- 
verse. 

Infinite time and space are no doubt existent, but to 
imagine them we must begin by a unit of one or the 
other ; and after convincing ourselves that there is no 
end, no boundary to arithmetical or geometrical pro- 
gression, we stop at last, with the certainty that there 
14 



210 HUMANICS. 

could not have been a time when there was no time, 
nor can there be a space where there is no space. 

Most of the philosophers who have sought for the 
primary ideas of the human mind, begin with Space and 
Time ; and think in doing so that they start from the 
deepest core of thought. Number is treated as a mere 
auxiliary ; and yet in spite of all attempts to assume 
ideas of time and space, as the beginning and basis of 
thought, number constantly obtrudes itself and takes 
her precedence, though the philosopher may be uncon- 
scious that such is the case. This is apparent in the 
works of Kant and Whewell, who begin with Space 
and Time, and do not perceive that number stands 
first ; that space and time are undefinable, are nothing, 
without the precedent idea of number to give value 
and proportion to time, quantity, and dimension to 
space. Space or time, placed before the primary idea 
of the unit, are utterly null and unthinkable. Hence 
the obscurity and contradictions of Kant, all due to his 
impossible germ-point : space, independent of number, 
and without an idea of units of measure. Yet it is 
strange to see how often he steps over the true ground, 
without being conscious of standing upon the pivot 
around which all thought revolves, and from which all 
thought proceeds. 

The process of mind which thus adduces all phenom- 
ena as limited units, and as contained in time and in 



THOUGHT. 211 



space, displays itself in the act of forming ration el 
images of the contents of consciousness ; and we may 
call it — 



IDEATION. 



Regarded as a faculty, in its undefined sense, it is 
known as " ideality," and its work as that of " imagina- 
tion; " but its functions are much more important and 
precise than the meaning of these names would imply. 
It is the arena on which all the battles of the idealists 
and presentationists have been fought ; battles in which 
at every moment the combatants seem to forget that 
they have any organs of sense, but those of sight. 
Ideation not only produces the flowers of romance and 
poesy, but it is the field wherein doth grow those 
sciences which are concerned with time and space; 
and particularly it is the field of Geology and Geome- 
try. 

Indeed, the functions of our faculty of Ideation are 
used in every science ; for no science can dispense with 
considerations of time and space; and no appliance 
of science to art, can take place without its aid. 

Do we not all, when any statement or thought which 
may be figured or located, immediately draw a mental 
sketch ? Do we not give each thing or fact its proper 
room and shape in an ideal picture? Do we not trace 
in this picture the course and scope of every law, force, 
and motion ; and assign a time and place for every 
quality or property ? Few will deny the fact. How- 



212 HUMANICS. 

ever vague the lines, however undetermined their 
length and course ; yet they assuredly make up an im- 
age, fixed or changeable, definite or obscure, of spaces, 
places, forms, limits, &c. The lawyer who discusses 
circumstantial evidence, the sociologist who studies the 
evolution of human progress, the chemist who seeks 
the elements of matter, the philosopher who analyzes 
the movement of mind, all naturally give their thoughts 
a frame- work and body -form in space. 

Every syllabus, synopsis, table of contents, &c, 
having the least pretence to logical arrangement, placed 
at the head or end of any work, is nothing but a local- 
ization and arrangement in space and time of the writ- 
er's thoughts : an outline of the image formed, a map 
of distribution. Blackstone gives an admirable exam- 
ple of one of these at the beginning of each of his vol- 
umes. The best system of mnemonics known in our 
clay, yet as old as Cicero, is the system of localization, 
in the shape of appropriate symbols. 

When we think of any event or thing, or even draw 
inferences from one state of facts to another, do we not 
put successive images before the mind's eye, thus as it 
were to see whether the visions the mind evokes are 
geometrically adapted or concurrent, and do not ob- 
struct or exclude one another. Even the course of time 
is subjected to this delineation in space ; and historians 
depict on paper, as rivers, the parallel and commingling 
vicissitudes of empires. 

Errors in the process of ideation, whether in Philoso- 



THOUGHT. 213 

phy or Ethics, physical science or concrete art, — errors 
such as mismeasurement of distances, misdirection of 
lines, misplacement of contents, misdrawing of figures, 
nondetection of discrepancies, will mar the truth and 
deceive the judgment. In fact, the judgment we form 
is itself an image — fictitious, imperfect, or faithful. 

For instance, suppose we behold a dead body, with 
a death-wound upon it : thought at once conjures up a 
terrible scene of mishap or of murder. As the circum- 
stances become known, now one then another, new 
tableaux arise, with increasing distinctness, till one 
plain and certain drama appears to the mind. Till this 
is done we waver in doubt and fix no opinion. 

The scene beheld by the physical eye is the dis- 
closure of perception — it is direct fact ; but this imme- 
diate image is only one of a series of other tableaux 
which present themselves to the mental eye. We know 
that as there is a present reality, so there must be pre- 
cedent and subsequent realities, at times, in places, 
and ly forces. Thus the known evinces the unknown. 
The body, the wound, the knife, lying now here and 
thus, are not limitable to this moment, this spot, or to 
this condition ; but (as subject to many forces and laws, 
in successive times and different places) have been and 
will be figures in other events and phenomena. Cer- 
tain marks in the present state of things are recognized 
as the traces of antecedent or the omens of future forces, 
places, and times ; and thus suggest the previous and 
posterior phenomena. 



214 HUMANICS. 

The assassin plunging his weapon into the victim's 
side — the struggle which preceded the blow — the at- 
tack which preceded the struggle — the resolve which 
preceded the attack — the motive which preceded the 
resolve, &c. Or subsequently, we foresee and imag- 
ine the assassin's arrest, his trial, execution, &c. 

If we consider this course of thought merely as a 
series of inductions and deductions, our conception of 
what has taken place is imperfect ; for the terms induc- 
tion, deduction, inference, are inadequate to the enun- 
ciation of the whole fact. Something would remain 
unexpressed, and that is the formation of the images — 
images evoked in phases — images mentally seen — im- 
ages distinct in space, time, and movement, as a drama 
with its scenery, impassioned actors, and successive 
events. 

In the same way when we behold any object, though 
we see only one of its sides, we mentally image the 
others ; and in fact we cannot have any satisfactory 
idea of the object .(whether it be a building, a tree, an 
animal, or any thing else) till we have formed a complete 
image (however true or false the mental picture may 
be) of the unseen parts. 

Thus it may be safely said, that thought is the intel- 
lectual formation of images of the unknown and unper- 
cewed. 

Mensuration more or less determinate — 
Enumeration, numeral or ab-numeral — 



THOUGHT. 215 

are acts of thought, primarily necessary in the forma- 
tion images of the unseen, . . . past, present, or future. 

1. That this necessity of mensuration exists, is appar- 
ent from the fact that these images involve form, place, 
order, adaptation, &c. ; and that to compose a picture 
due regard must be had to size, distance, perspective, 
proportion, &c, in all the figures and scenery. Hence, 
ideation is innate geometey. 

2. That this necessity of enumeration exists, is ap- 
parent from the fact that mensuration or geometry is 
impossible without number and its modes : id est, units, 
addition, subtraction, reduction, ratio. Measure relies 
upon number. Hence, the distributer and framer of 
" image " is Arithmetic. 

So, it is doubtless already perceived, that the laws 
and methods of number and measure, operate in idea- 
tion as in every other process of the mind. Were it 
otherwise the images would be all disorder — they would 
be even more confused and incongruous than our wild- 
est dreams / for in our most absurd dreams, there are 
some traces of connection, and adaptation of times, 
places, forces, &c. Without the processes of number 
and measure, all would be chaos ; but by means of 
number and measure, a due succession and fitness arises. 
Indeed, the test of the rationality of each image, is its 
being possible to place it and all its parts, without dis- 
turbing the other pictures of the series, to time it with- 
out anachronism in the succession of events, to evoke 



216 HUMANICS. 

it as the effect or resultant of sufficient forces and laws. 
The existence of these possibilities we ascertain by 
number and measure. We count the hours, &c, we 
measure the distances, &c, we compute powers, physi- 
cal and moral, which act and react; and compose the 
image, placing its personages and movements in con- 
formity with the requirements of applied mathematics. 
When the measures are found proportionate or coinci- 
dent, when the forces are ascertained to be adequate, 
and when the numbers of the measures and the forces 
are found harmonious and orderly among themselves 
and the surrounding facts, the image is a true one. 

For example, a man is accused of murder. The 
time and place of the homicide are made certain. On 
the other hand, the presence of the accused in another 
place, hut at another time, is made equally certain. 
Now, the measurement or counting of distance, time, 
and motion, enables us to find w T hether it was possible 
for the man, with his strength, &c, to pass over the 
intervening space in the intervening time, so as to have 
been present at the homicide. If the computation gives 
minus, an alibi is proved ; and no image showing the 
accused in the scene of murder, can be framed without 
disturbing the truthful image of his presence elsewhere ; 
but, if the computation gives plus ( id est, time, space, 
and force to spare) the two images may co-exist with- 
out interference or anachronism. 

In the preceding example it is self-evident that 



THOUGHT. 217 

Arithmetic furnishes the mode of reasoning on the 
question of the guilt or innocence of the person ac- 
cused ; but there are cases where the arithmetical pro- 
cess is not so apparent, though equally active. For 
example : take the homicide of * * *. He was killed 
by a gunshot. Near his body was found a piece of 
paper — the fragment of a letter — which had served as 
the wadding of a gun. Afterwards the remnant of a 
torn letter was found on the person of the man sus- 
pected of the murder. The two pieces of paper were 
placed together, and not only the tearing, but the writ- 
ing of the two pieces were found correspondent and 
adapted. 

The question in this case being one of form, is 
therefore of Geometry. The adaptation of the two 
pieces to each other, shown when juxtaposited, is the 
demonstration " by application." It is here direct and 
practical ; but the principle is the same as that used to 
prove " by application" that the diameter divides a 
circle into two equal parts. [Prof. I. Davies' Legen- 
dre.] The two pieces would not answer the definition 
of one letter, if they could not be co-adapted. 

Let it not, however, be assumed that arithmetical 
ideas and processes can be excluded in the rationale of 
this case. The total absence of numbers might create 
this impression ; but a moment's consideration will 
show that in this instance (as in every act of reason- 
ing) Arithmetic furnishes the rule of ratiocination. 
The operation of putting the two pieces together was 



218 HUMANICS. 

a practical or tangible addition of fractions of the 
same denominator. The two " pieces " were ab-nu- 
meral ; but nevertheless they were the numerators of 
fractions, of which " a letter" was the common denom- 
inator, and as really so as if they (the numerators) had 
been expressed in numbers. If it had been found im- 
practicable to unite (add) them together, the conclusion 
would have been (according to arithmetical rules) that 
they were not of the same denominator. 

The subject of Time and Space, necessarily calls our 
attention to the science of measurement. 



GEOMETEY. 

The idea of Measure imposes itself in all our no- 
tions of Space, Time, Law, Force, and Phenomena. 
These cannot be conceived apart from measure. " Ab- 
solute Space and Time" are often spoken of, but I 
doubt the ability of any man to form a clear concep- 
tion of the reality sought to be represented by the 
words. As Hamilton has it, absolute space and time 
are " unthinkable." We might as well try to think of 
a rainbow without colors, as of time and space without 
measure. As to " infinite " space, time, or force, it is 
only thinkable as the boundless, or endless, or everlast- 
ing repetition of measures of extension, duration, or 
motion. To convey our ideas of infinity, eternity, or 
omnipotence, we are obliged firstly to state units of 



THOUGHT. 219 

space, time, or force, and secondly to imagine an un- 
limited repetition, proceeding from u the where" at 
which we are placed in all directions, or from u the 
when" into the past, without finding a beginning, and 
into the future, without reaching an end, or from " the 
why" " the how" and " the what" into the power, 
wisdom, and will of God. 

Hence the first concern of Geometry is to give, by 
means of definitions, certain units of form and exten- 
sion, square, triangle, circle, cube, cone, sphere ; and 
to fix the relative values of these units, and of their 
several elements. The units once fixed, are used in 
computing the abstract sums, differences, and ratios of 
one element of a figure with regard to another ele- 
ment, and one figure with regard to another figure ; 
and though this be done, a practical application will 
also require the numerals of arithmetic, thus proving 
that the rational formula of geometry is in reality the 
arithmetical formula. 

Indeed Geometry, though apparently ab-numeral, 
employs the symbols of arithmetic. These symbols, 
+, — , x, -f-, :,>,<,==, &c, are of constant and 
necessary use in geometry — yea, even in abstract and 
ab-numeral geometry. Thus we see that arithmetic 
finds application independently of numbers ; and if 
we are attentive we will see, over and over again, that 
these signs are the true maeks of all the acts and re- 



220 HUMANICS. 

suits of thought, whether in abstract, moral, physical, 
or concrete Science. Geometry, like every other 
branch of knowledge, is a science of units, quantities, 
differences, equalities, and ratios, whether of phenom- 
ena, force, law, time, or space. 

Most all the facts or theorems of elementary Geom- 
etry are ab-numeral. They are the laws of the meas- 
urement of magnitude — not the measurement itself ; 
and though ab-numeral, they are units, as positive and 
determinate as if they were expressed in numbers. 
Yet they are nothing till subjected to the Jwe processes 
of arithmetic, whether numeral or ab-numeral. 1°, 
Enumeration ; 2°, Addition and Multiplication ; 3°, Sub- 
traction and Division ; 4°, Reduction ; and 5°, Ratio, 
must lend their light to resolve the problems contained 
in the points, the lines, the surfaces, and the forms. 
Of the many kinds of pure units known to Geometry, 
under distinct names and definitions — centre, intersec- 
tion, perpendicular, diagonal, square, circle, cone, 
sphere, &c, — no reasoning can be framed till the laws 
of numerical computation helps. Number, with her 
standards, her axioms, and her signs, must help Meas- 
ure ; Number must come forward, with her formulas 
and laws, to enable Measure to distinguish the greater 
from the less ; identify the equal with the equal ; give 
the common elements of various figures and magni- 
tudes, and show the ratios of force and law which ex- 
ist in the entire synthesis and its parts. 



THOUGHT. 221 

Then it is that Geometry becomes a science. 
Though her quantities have no digital numbers, they 
are defined, units of computation, (enumeration ;) they 
are elements to distinguish one line or form from 
another, (subtraction;) they are sums by joining one 
line or form to another, (addition ;) they are denomi- 
nate by the applicability of the same theorems to the 
same forms, regardless of size, (reduction;) and they 
are proportional by the very fact that they are the ra- 
tional, not concrete, parts of a totality, (Ratio.) This 
totality is Space, or Extension, which thought has dis- 
sected not merely according to tangible and direct phe- 
nomena, but according to the laws of thought itself, or 
what is the same thing, according to the laws of arith- 
metic. 

Hence Geometry is, after all, purely a physical sci- 
ence ; a knowledge of space acquired by the aid of 
number ; for, geometry begins by ideating portions of 
space as units or integers, and then seeks for propor- 
tions of lines composing each figure, for the ratios of 
the contents or of the distances from point to point. 

In fact, Geometry ought not strictly to be considered 
as a part of Mathematics, but as Space analyzed by 
means of the laws of number ; and we may apply the 
same remark to Mechanics, which treats of the mathe- 
matical analysis of Force. 

Thus as we proceed, logic is more and more identi- 



222 HUMANICS. 

fiecl with mathematics ; for Mathematics is, as Davies 
defines it, " the science of quantity / that is, the sci- 
ence which treats of the measures of quantities, and 
their relations to each other ; " and all the logicians 
declare that their science Logic, is also a science of 
" quantity ; " and that it all turns upon the measured 
relation between the major and minor terms of the syl- 
logism. 

It is fashionable to consider all the indirect facts in 
Geometry as being " deduced" from the smaller num- 
ber of direct facts ; and hence Geometry has been 
called a " deductive science. 1 ' The definitions and ax- 
ioms are given as the major premises from which every 
subsequent proposition is deduced by successive dem- 
onstrations. 

This theory looks very plausible, but it is liable to 
obvious objections. 

In Geometry we rarely meet with a proposition 
which is immediately deducible from any single pre- 
vious definition or axiom. ]STow, if there is any differ- 
ence between deductive and inductive reasoning, it is 
that in the first consequences are extracted from a sin- 
gle premiss, on the principle that the major includes 
the minor ; but in the second, the consequence is ne- 
cessarily determined from several surrounding circum- 
stances, cotemporaneous forces, and co-existent laws ; 
and this last is no other than the method employed for 
geometrical demonstration. The truths of the proposi- 
tions are made apparent by calling attention to a mul- 



THOUGHT. 223 

tiplicity of facts, which concur in pointing to the ne- 
cessary existence of a certain state of things, but each 
of which is insufficient, per se, to authorize the conclu- 
sion. Herein we recognize the mark of the inductive 
method, or the process of ideation I have described 
above. Open Euclid at any page, and the correctness 
of this remark will be verified. 

True it is, Geometry proceeds step by step ; and, as 
it were, by " sorties ; " but why? Simply because the 
fabric of the science has been thoroughly surveyed, its 
order of elevation discovered, and its most comprehen- 
sive facts or laws set down at the foundation of the ed- 
ifice. The propositions now seem to grow out of one 
another ; but centuries of study were required for the 
evolution of this classification ; and as yet no continu- 
ous and unbroken, regular and real sorites has been 
found linking the propositions of Geometry as in a 
chain. !No such chain is possible. "What has been 
constructed is a beautiful temple of truth, with its prin- 
cipal walls, its several columns, its span of arches, its 
towers, and its dome, all dependent upon each other ; 
but no one piece includes or supports the whole. 

If we want to prove the truth of any geometrical 
proposition, the proposition immediately preceding it 
is seldom sufficient, notwithstanding the artful manner 
in which the science is arrayed. "We must call to our 
aid other propositions, and hedge up the fact we wish 
to appropriate — we must erect barriers on every side, 
and occupy every point of surrounding space. "When 



224 HUMANICS. 

thus encompassed, the hunted truth cannot escape, and 
is found in its proper place ; but a straight chase, by 
syllogisms and sorties, would not have found it on the 
track, and could not have secured it. 

Take, for instance, the theorem : " In every trian- 
gle the sum of the three angles is equal to two right 
angles," and see how many different facts must be 
brought to bear, and how many distinct definitions, ax- 
ioms, corollaries, and scholiums must be noted and sta- 
tioned before the demonstration can be completed. 
"No such thing as a chain of deductions is here dis- 
played, but as in the spider's web the many threads of 
a net-work of facts converge to a common centre. This 
is induction, not deduction. It is like the circumstan- 
tial evidence of the courts ; it is the ideation of which 
we have spoken — the forming of the picture of a pre- 
viously unknown condition of things, out of parts of 
those already known and fixed. 

To teach geometry by deduction alone, it would be 
necessary to find one (and only one) self-evident fact, 
including or effusing all other instances of the laws and 
phenomena of magnitude. 

FORCE AND LAW. 

The same reason which prevented us from discours- 
ing on Phenomena, apart from Time and Space, pre- 
vents also any rational separation of the ideas of Force 
and Law. 



THOUGHT. 225 

Force may be regarded as being " in itself" a fact ; 
but man ideates it as implying degrees of strength ; 
and tliese degrees as implying Laws of cause and ef- 
fect. 

The nearest notion science has formed of absolute 
Force is : Inertia, but Inertia itself as involving laws. 

The mathematic nature of the human mind compels 
us to conceive all force as measured and seriated ; as 
having value as a cause, and as producing effects ade- 
quate to that valued causation. 

The origin of our ideas of causation is fourfold ; for 
they find a starting point — 

1°. In the feeling of vitality itself, or of the innate 
power of action we instinctively use. 

2°. In the consensihility of primary impulses and 
motives. 

3°. In the consciousness of the activity and influence 
of the forces of objective nature. 

4°. In the internal knowledge we have of the crea- 
tive and formative operations of thought ; and of the 
dominion reason exercises over our conduct. 

Force and Law are those two essential co-ordinates 
of phenomena, which the logicians of the syllogistic 
school have found it impossible to work into their frag- 
ment of the art of thinking. The logic of Aristotle 
makes a good appearance as long as it deals with real 
or figurative extension ; but when called to assist the 
15 



226 HUMAHICS. 

thinker in the world of Mechanics, Hydrostatics, Hy- 
draulics, Pneumatics, Ceraunics, Optics, Calorics, Me- 
teorology, Chemistry, and Physiology, the queen Syl- 
logism is forced to give precedence to king Reckoning. 

Having evolved the unit, our archeus of thought 
proceeds to posit other units with the first ; and having 

said one, one, one, it is able to say one, two, 

three, four, and having said four, &c, it finds 

that two and two make four — create four — are the cause 
of four ; and thus the true and primary idea of causa- 
tion is evolved, and runs all through mathematics, 
gathering complexity as the science progresses. In no 
other way than on this lasis of mathematical reck- 
oning, can we have any rational idea or initial standard 
of Cause and Effect. It is out of and from that first 
principle of thought, the ideation of the unit, that all 
science proceeds. Hence the mind seeks for numbers 
in every thing ; nor is it disappointed, for since, in 
modern time, number and measure have been sought 
for in God's works, all the wonderful sciences and arts 
which are the glory of humanity have arisen ; for God 
has created all things in numeral proportion and meas- 
ured harmony. 

!No person who has a distinct knowledge of any 
branch of natural science, can deny the proposition 
just stated ; and therefore I will not stop to cite exam- 
ples ; but I simply appeal to the facts, and refer the 
reader to my witnesses : the text-books on any and 
every branch of Physics. 



THOUGHT. 227 

All the great originators of science were mathema- 
ticians, who carried into the investigation of nature the 
primary principles and axioms and methods of mathe- 
matics — men who understood the spirit of mathematics 
enough to know that until they had found the numeral 
units the Grand Archeus of the Universe had formed 
for the phenomena they were studying, they could work 
by undeterminate quantities, signs of greater, less, 
equal, &c, applied to names of various phenomena, 
that could seek for common denominators by means of 
direct and experimental redaction : that they could at 
once begin — 1°, to add one phenomenon to another, to 
find sums of force adequate to given effects ; 2°, to sub- 
tract one phenomenon from another, to find residual 
elements as ultimate terms of computation ; 3°, to mul- 
tiply and divide phenomena and phenomena, for classes 
and orders ; 4°, to rate the progressive and proportional 
processes of phenomena, in order to find the laws of 
nature, the connection of forces and entities, the move- 
ment of cause and effect. 

Thus, all discoverers have viewed every phenome- 
non, at any moment of time, as an effect and as a cause. 
As long as it was reducible by any means into parts, or 
convertible into other forms or aspects, they have never 
been willing to conceive it as beginning with itself, and 
invariably seek for its initial unit — a something of ade- 
quate power as an antecedent ; and as long as they find 
a complex sum of forces as the immediate cause, they 



228 HUMANICS. 

continue their work of research and reckoning. This 
is the law of science, and being the law of thought it- 
self it is even the warrant of superstition, for supersti- 
tion is only the ignorant supposition of an adequate 
cause. 

Thus, too, have discoverers always been unable to 
admit of an eternal permanency of present effects ; 
for having found that forces, properties have values of 
constant persistency in volume and modus, sum and 
proportion, they predicate that effects must necessarily 
be also causes ; and that changes produced by causes, 
to which consecutive and everlasting quantities can be 
assigned, will continue to produce equal and propor- 
tionate changes. 

Hence it is that any reasoning upon cause and ef- 
fect is a computation of forces, and the ideation of their 
measurable power and action, course and relation, in 
any given event, or phenomenon. 

The preceding remarks on Ideation may be 
summed up in this proposition : 

The pivotal function of thought is — 

THE IDEATION OF THE UNIT. 

The tendency of the mind to frame the unit is so 
essentially its primal and universal law, that it does not 
stop short of all nature. 

In the beginning of human consciousness, the facts it 



THOUGHT. 229 

noted were necessarily without apparent links, and stood 
therefore isolated and disconnected in memory; but 
every instant of experience in the history of the race or 
the life of the individual must have, does now, and ever 
will furnish new points of contact and homogeneity in 
all things. 

In the beginning, for instance, no unity was known 
to exist between the gushing fountain, the broad ocean, 
the wind- wafted clouds, and the falling rain ; but these 
facts which at present to us are mentally inseparable, 
were once so disunited in thought, were each considered 
as so circumscribed in their scope, that they were per- 
sonified as distinct deities, entitled each to a special 
worship : Naides, Neptune, Eolus, Pluvius, &c. Still 
more disconnected w T ere the lightnings of the clouds and 
terrestrial electricity. 

Yet the human mind, by virtue of its syncretical 
function, could not stop short of these scattered units ; 
but ideated all facts as one, and called the whole Nature 
—the Universe, &c. 

So rapid was this summing up of all consciousness 
as a single entity, that it was in fact the starting point 
of philosophy, as the traditions we have of Thales, 
Pythagoras, &c, abundantly show. So immediate must 
have been the unital conception of nature, that the 
rudest languages of primitive men have words to ex- 
press the ideal totality of nature, however incoherent 
its contents may have seemed at first. 

In fact, as each of us progresses from infancy to- 



230 HUMANICS. 

wards age, every impression on consciousness is added 
to its predecessors, and conceived as increasing the sum 
of all things, as augmenting our capital of experience, 
as a mere fraction of that entirety we call self, or as 
an extension of the ever-spreading circle we call the 
Kosmos. 

But while, on the one hand, first the law of mind in- 
duces the formation of this great unit, or macrocosm, 
the same law of unity prompts us to frame other and 
minor units, whenever it is possible either de facto or 
conceptually. "Whenever two or more facts are found 
together, or to fit each other, or to be homogeneous, in 
time, place, force, or law, they are ideated as one or as 
a sum. Of such units all our knowledge of Nature is 
composed. 

Thus adding forever one perception to another we 
obtain the great unit of the " one and all" with the 
myriads of integers of which it is composed. 

But subtracting, dividing, commeasuring, &c, we 
never cease to combine and invent new units and inte- 
gers, denominators and ratios, of motion and mechan- 
ism, fact and art. 

In these data the processes of abtraction, association, 
suggestion, imagination, comparison, analysis, general- 
ization and the like, display themselves with a light so 
clear that it is hardly necessary to enter into illustrative 
details. 

Every idea considered as a unit is but a fraction 
of the all-embracing denominator, the Universe. An 



THOUGHT. 231 

idea may be conceived as a point to which a multitude 
of other ideas send their rays of light, and from which 
at once new rays arise, to increase the general illumi- 
nation, and generate other centres. 

I present this comparison of the intellectual with 
the physical — this analogy between thought and light — 
not as a direct and tangible fact, but only as a figure 
or image serving to aid the reader instantly to under- 
stand my meaning, when asserting the simultaneous 
unity and multiplicity, division and community, which 
the numeral function of the mind finds in conscious- 
ness. 

Hence association and suggestion develop them- 
selves intelligibly, and in their legitimate connection 
with analysis and synthesis ; and as arising simply from 
the interconnection of one and all in the process of idea- 
tion. 

Thus suppose we should," as an example of ideation, 
suggest " an atom" Instantly, from the units of num- 
ber, space, time, form, color, weight, order, substance — 
beauty, motion, place, force, law, cause, effect, &c, &c, 
converge, and, as it were, offer themselves to co-operate 
in the construction of the idea of this atom ; and the 
fractions or contributions we accept and put into our 
conception of the unit thus formed, ever retain their 
connection and identity with their several sources, so 
that one cannot be present to the mind without the 
others being also present ; and the mental phenomena 
of suggestion, association, and endless re-suggestion, 
necessarily take place. 



232 HUMANICS. 

In proportion to the scope of the macrocosm known 
to an individual, in proportion to the multiplicity of 
distinct units, of which his sum of knowledge is com- 
posed, does any one of the units of thought suggest a 
greater number of others. Thus the fall of an apple 
presented many associate facts to the people of the 
middle ages, but now it presents many more, for by 
]STewton's great discovery this fact also suggests all the 
wonders of astronomy, even to the boys and girls of our 
common schools. 

Over this process number and its laws necessarily 
preside, else all would be confusion ; would be con- 
sciousness and memory, without reflection and inven- 
tion, without unity and construction of units. 

Hence we may now say that Ideation is in fact con- 
sciousness, aided ~by Thought — consciousness of sensa- 
tions and emotions past and present, assisted and en- 
lightened by the mathematical powers. 

But, says the reader to me, Where are these math- 
ematical powers to be placed? located? to what as- 
signed? matter or spirit? You refuse to the phreno- 
logical organ of number, the power of counting — and 
condescend to admit only its faculty of perceiving 
plurality. You push back Comparison and Causality 
to a place among the perceptive organs of men and 
beasts. You treat them as mere perceptions and 
memories of direct differences and connections. Where 
shall we seek for the mathematical powers of man — 
where shall we find Thought ? 



THOUGHT. 233 

Postponing my answer to this question until I have 
more fully prepared the ground, I therefore proceed to 

a BRIEF EEVIEW OF LOGIC. 

It is now well settled, practically at least, that the 
Aristotelian system of logic does not embrace the most 
important processes or acts of the mind in reasoning. 
It treats only the laws of the final and easiest evolution 
of thought, immediately subsequent to the finding of the 
main truth, whereas it was all important to determine 
the laws by which the main truth itself might be sought 
and demonstrated. Few disputes arise about the con- 
sequences to be deduced from admitted principles and 
facts. The debates between philosophers, politicians, 
theologians, physicians, &c, turn generally upon the 
premises major or minor. The moment the facts are 
ascertained and generalized beyond cavil, there is al- 
ways an end of disputation ; for the immediate conse- 
quences which the third term of a premiss might 
serve to express, are at once apparent to all. Hence 
it is that the logic of Aristotle was so sterile ; hence its 
exclusive use retarded human progress ; hence it was 
finally considered as futile, and its study is now generally 
abandoned ; while, on the other hand, the fruitfulness 
and progressive powers of the Baconian system of in- 
duction has gained it not only the admiration of every 
great mind, but also entitles its first expounder to the 
gratitude of the human race. 



234 HUMANICS. 

Logic is the science of the laws of thought ; it in- 
cludes Method, which is the art of applying those laws 
to the discovery or demonstration of Truth. 

If, therefore, Induction be one of the grand laws of 
the process of thought, it ought to be carefully 'and 
amply exposited in every treatise on Logic or Method. 
In fact, the logicians of the present century have shown 
their full appreciation of this necessity, and have con- 
ceded a place to investigation, analysis, analogy, and 
elimination alongside of grandmother Syllogism. The 
Aristotelians have striven to show that their system 
really contains the elements of Induction, and that 
Bacon owes his merit to the Stagyrite ; while the Bacon- 
ians treat this pretension with ridicule and contempt. 
Certain it is that the world of practical reasoners not 
only are fast forgetting many of the terms, but pay no 
regard to the formulas of the Antique school. 

These extremes are unjustifiable on both sides ; and 
I. S. Mill, in his admirable " System of Logic," has 
shown how they may be made to meet and work to- 
gether, as the essential parts of one science. 

Let him, therefore, be our guide in this review of 
the science, for which he has so ably reconstructed a 
single temple, out of the parts of two distinct shrines 
intolerant votaries had erected, one to the generator 
Induction, and the other to the parturitive Deduction. 

Our guide begins his system by an examination of 
Language. 



THOUGHT. 235 

u Language," says lie, " is evidently, and by the 
admission of all philosophers, one of the principal in- 
struments or helps of thought ; " and he might have 
added expressly, as it is evident he tacitly held, that a 
human language (words and grammar) hear the impress 
of the laws and processes of the mind, which has pro- 
duced that language. 

What is the object of Language ? Is it not the ex- 
pression of Emotion, Sensation, and Thought ? Does 
not language, therefore, necessarily reflect the feelings, 
impressions, and ideas of the mind, as exactly as it is 
possible for the expression to do so? Does not the 
speaker strive to convey to the hearer, to reproduce his 
own sentiments and reflections in the mind of the 
hearer ? 

What is the origin of language ? Is it a divine 
revelation, or a natural gift ? What matters it whether 
it is the one or the other ? for in both cases would it 
not be from God ? and as being the gift of a first cause, 
must it not bear within itself the primary laws of an 
intellectual origin ? In fine, must not the instrument 
of thought be conformable to the thought that created 
it, as well as to the thought it was made to serve ? 

The works of De Bonald, Des Brosses, Herder, Geb- 
ilin, and Degerand, directly, and those of Leibnitz, De 
Biran, Eeid, Stewart, and Locke, incidentally show the 
absolute connection between the development of lan- 
guage and that of thought ; the dependency of the 
form of language upon the mental matrix. 



236 HUMANICS, 

Thus: 

1. In the history of language we find man begin- 
ning, in order to express his primary sensations and 
emotions, by giving utterance to rude interjections, and 
making pantomimic gestures. 

2. Then we hear him give utterance to these sensa- 
tions and emotions, by means of imitative sounds. He 
strives to reproduce to the ear, the impressions of his 
consciousness ; and when, as in the case of emotions, 
this is impossible, he does it by analogy and personifi- 
cation. Our English word " Spit " is imitative; 
" Hate "is derived by analogy from heat; "Hope" 
originally meant reaching forward ; and I might give 
hundreds of examples ; but I think it suffices to refer 
to the authors above mentioned, and to that wonderful 
work of human industry and science, Webster's In- 
troduction, wherein the symbolic formation of words, 
expressive of emotions, &c, is fully illustrated. 

3. Next to this we may trace the process of forming 
words declarative of a reasoning power ; and we will 
generally detect in them an arithmetical or geometrical 
type. Thus, says Webster, " for example, all nations, 
as far as my researches extend, agree in expressing the 
sense of justice and right by straightness ; and sin, ini- 
quity, and wrong, by a deviation from a straight line or 
course." He adds many other examples. 

What was, after the first cry of feeling, the first thing 
man had to communicate to his fellow-man ? Was it 
the names of objects ? Assuredly not ; for, if man 



THOUGHT. 237 

never had had any wants to satisfy, or desires to grat- 
ify, the names of objects would have been indifferent to 
him. If objects had not been the mediums among 
which and by which events occurred to man, he would 
have neglected to name any object. Webster, in his 
Introduction, sustains this view ; he says : " it is dem- 
onstrated that the verb is the radix or stock from which 
have sprung most of the nouns, adjectives, and other 
parts of speech belonging to each family." Indeed, 
speech would not exist at all, were it not for the pur- 
pose of 1, affirming ; 2, questioning ; 3, petitioning ; 
4, commanding ; and 5, discussing. Hence the verb 
was first required ; and nouns, adjectives, &c, grew 
immediately from them, and took the features of their 
parent. Things were named from the actions or move- 
ments of mind or body with which they had become 
associated. 

The intervention of the rational element induced 
man to convert the terms given by emotion, and it was 
not till they had been fashioned to suit the laws of num- 
ber, that they became thinkable. 

Thus, it was necessary — 

1. To obtain units ; and hence the article, demon- 
strative pronoun, proper noun, and words of like im- 
port. 

2. To add and multiply ; and hence the collective 
nouns, cardinal adjectives, conjunctions, plurals, &c. 

3. To subtract and divide, state fractional parts ; and 
hence the adjective, abstract substantive, &c. 



238 HUMANICS. 

4. To reduce or classify, according to a common 
measure ; and hence the distinctions of gender, com- 
mon substantive, &c. 

5. To determine ratio or relation ; and hence ordi- 
nal and comparative adjectives and adverbs, tense, 
mode, case, auxiliary verbs, adverbs, prepositions, &c. 

At the centre of all is the verb — the germ and life 
of all assertion, declaration, &c. Even in the sponta- 
neous interjection the verb is implied. No expression 
of existence, sensation, emotion, consciousness, action, 
or thought, can be pronounced without it. It is the 
pivot or fulcrum of every proposition or argument — 
the motor power of the machinery of thought. 

Words are so evidently the units and integers of 
thought, that even the scholastic logicians seem to have 
perceived the fact. "Witness the earnestness they dis- 
play at the outset, in urging the use of words in their 
exact signification ; the necessity of selecting words of 
precise import ; the advantage of ascertaining the con- 
notation or contents of words ; the dangers of vague 
and ambiguous terms. They complain emphatically 
of the perversion of language, as preventing the philos- 
opher from classing and demonstrating truth, and as en- 
abling the sophist, by means of equivocal " names " and 
metaphors, to obtain the triumph of error. Now, what 
does all this amount to ? When properly interpreted, 
it turns out to be a periphrase of the first law of arith- 
metic, which requires us to determine the value of the 
unit of computation. We must have, says Davies, 



THOUGHT. 239 

" a clear apprehension of the single thing which forms 
the basis of number." Thus, at the threshold, we find 
logic to be really ab-numeral Arithmetic. Logic hypo- 
critically disguises her true personality, by using a dif- 
ferent nomenclature. If she had said unit instead of 
" name," she would not have lost sight of her parent- 
age, and might have proved herself worthy of her le- 
gitimate filiation. 

Names are distinguished by logicians into several 
kinds or classes. 

1. The distinction of names into General and Par- 
ticular, is more clearly understood by the definitions 
of general terms and particular integrals, or of compo- 
site and prime numbers, in mathematics. The simple 
distinction of common and proper nouns given in 
Grammar, comes much nearer to the real meaning of 
the logicians, in defining general and particular names ; 
and by frankly adopting these they might have avoided 
much perplexity, for the syllogism is useless and 
impossible, whenever the matter to be reasoned does 
not afford a divisible common noun for a major pre- 
miss. 

2. The distinction of names into Concrete and Ab- 
stract, is taken from Arithmetic, which defines these 
two kinds of units or quantities ; and in accordance 
thereto, the grammarians have found that in the forma- 
tion of language, mankind, under the direction of their 
faculty of subtracting, have been able to adopt " ab- 
stract nouns " for ideas and qualities ; and to separate 



240 HUMANICS. 

this class of nouns from the common, proper, and col- 
lective. 

3. The distinction of Connotative and Non-conno- 
tative names, was necessarily suggested by that of 
concrete and denominate units on the one hand, and 
" indeterminate " and " independent " quantities on the 
other : the one being suggestive of attributes or stand- 
ard parts ; and the other being a quantity without a 
known value or relative measure. 

4. The distinction of Positive and Negative names 
is also derived from the arithmetical and geometrical 
nature of thought, which furnishes the idea of plus, 
equal, and minus. Plus is positive, minus is negative. 
In algebra they are so recognized and treated, and the 
sign of addition, +, is applied to the one ; the sign of 
subtraction, — , to the other. In grammar the prefixes 
and suffixes are given in lieu of these signs. As to 
" privitive " names, they are the expression of remain- 
ders. 

Thus : Activity — Activity = ^activity. 
Sight— Sight— Sightless or Blind. 
Lady -f Beauty = Beautiful Lady. 

5. The distinction between Absolute and Eelative 
names, is also noted by authors on logic ; but it would 
be very difficult for them to carry out any such divi- 
sion practically. In mathematics there are absolute 
terms ; but they are only so accidentally, as being com- 
plete though present in the problem under solution. 



THOUGHT. 241 

Such a distinction might be admitted in ab-numeral 
arithmetic or logic, and denoting conceded data or 
points needing no discussion. To carry the idea of ab- 
solute terms as distinguished from relative any further 
than this, does not appear possible, and must be vain 
and serve no useful purpose. Even single and isolated 
words have rarely if ever an " absolute " meaning ; 
that is to say, a meaning independent of any relation ; 
for it is only by relations that any term can be defined. 
Hence in grammar the absolute substantive is unknown, 
and in mathematics it is synonymous with " complete." 

Thus it is evident that the distinction of names, as es- 
tablished in the logic of the schools, is, as far as it goes, 
borrowed from mathematics and grammar, but that the 
appropriation has not been thorough or well adapted. 
Had the logicians applied the formulas of mathematics 
to grammar and philology, I am confident they would 
have been much more successful in finding a good clas- 
sification of names. The simple division of substan- 
tives into — 1, proper ; 2, common ; 3, collective ; 4, 
abstract, as given by grammarians, is unobjectionable 
and sufficient. 

Geammae shows, by its analysis, that language was 
framed by the mathematical attributes of mind. 

1. The Yeeb is, as we have already proved, the mo- 
tive power of language ; and therefore verbs are sub- 
jected to the laws of quantity, in time and force, in 
space and direction, by virtue of which motion itself is 

thinkable. A movement must have place where, time 
16 



242 ' HUMANICS. 

when : it must have a force, a figure, a beginning, a 
course, and an end ; and a verb to be a verb, must im- 
ply all these elements of number and measure. Our 
inability to compute by numeric values, or delineate 
by exact lines, every action expressed by a verb, does 
not affect the mathematical nature of the conception 
they declare. If we have not found a standard of 
value for the intensity or velocity of the act, we supply 
the want of the exact measure by the use of approximate 
and graduated terms : thus we say creep, crawl, hobble, 
limp, linger, loiter, trudge, saunter, walk, march, haste, 
hurry, canter, trot, rush, gallop, run, fly, &c, &c. " To 
love," is an act of emotion ; and even in its infinitive 
mood this verb implies a degree of intensity ; and it may 
be ranked in the scale of affection thus : to fancy, to 
admire, to like, to cherish, to love, to adore. But the 
workings of computation in the creation of verbs is not 
confined to its root ; for all the variations of the verb 
are due to the same influence. 

Thus: 

— One of the termini of the act is always indicated 
by the agreement of the verb with its Nominative. 

— If the end or object of the act is first given, this 
inversion of order is indicated by the Passive Yoice. 

— Variations and gradations of time are marked into 
periods by the Tenses. 

— The intensity of the act as positive, hypothetical, 
possible, probable or necessary, is rated by an Auxiliary 
verb or a change of Mode : will, may, can, might, 
must. 



THOUGHT. 243 

— And even the acting unit is exhibited in the verb 
itself; for it varies with the Person and Number of the 
subject. 

A Noun, we have already seen, is an ab-numeral unit 
or sum : 1, proper or concrete ; 2, common or standard ; 
3, collective or composite ; 4, abstract or pure. "What- 
ever may be individualized, and thus become an object 
of numeration, may be represented by a noun. What- 
ever cannot be counted cannot be expressed by this 
part of speech. Hence the verbs " to be," " to have," 
" to clo,"cannot become substantive without personifica 
tion or integration, so that naming is unquestionably 
quantitative — the determination of a whole, a sum, an 
integer ; and quantity is of the essence of nouns ; they 
are the objects of every mathematical process ; they may 
be increased, diminished, or limited by other words 
implying something plus, minus, equal, or proportional. 
Not only is the given noun thus augmented, reduced, or 
determined by the article, adjective, pronoun, but a 
super-addition or sub-elimination is made by other 
words appended to the adjective itself. Moreover, by 
means of changes in the signs, or modifications of the 
noun or of its representative the pronoun, it is made to 
exhibit not only the plurality of Number, but also divi- 
sions and classes in Gender and Person, or the relations 
of Case, of exclusion and inclusion ; distribution, 
identity, and generalization. A glance at the personal, 
demonstrative, distributive, indefinite, and relative peo- 
nouns, will satisfy the read erhow man, in giving names, 



244 HUMANICS. 

was applying to practice those primary types of thought, 
number and measure, was presenting notations of 
identity and equality, difference and multiplicity, order 
and relation. 

But verbs and nouns could not supply all the neces- 
sary symbols of that branch of ab-numeral mathematics 
treated of in Grammar. Hence the other parts of speech, 
Adjectives, Adverbs, Articles, Participles, Prepositions, 
and Conjunctions. 

3. Adjectives, Aeticles, Peonominal- Adjectives, 
Adveebs, and Paeticiples, indicate that the unit of 
thought, whether verb or noun, has some plus or minus 
value which must be computed, included or excluded. 
Thus : a good man, is Man+good ; a lifeless body, is 
Body — Life. This class of words can be arranged in 
positive and relative categories of Number, Order, Place, 
Time, Quantity, Force, Form, Course, and Value. We 
find this or a like classification of the Adverbs already 
made in every grammar, and it is therefore unnecessary 
to give examples. 

4. Peepositions supply the place of geometrical 
lines and diagrams of movement or position, the direc- 
tion, course, or circumscription of units of action or of 
phenomena. 

" Of" marks the source, author, initial, or agent: it 
represents a line directed lack from a principal to the 
element or object. 

"To" marks the end, object, or recipient: it repre- 
sents a line directed forwards towards the element or 
object. 



THOUGHT. 245 

u j? 0Y » sometimes means " in the place of : " it rep- 
resents an algebraic or geometrical substitution, or the 
movement of something into a place and of another out 
of it. " For," sometimes means " towards." It has 
other meanings, but they all delineate some recip- 
rocal or opposite motion in the double sense of " of" 
and " to." 

" By " points out the line, the guide, the route, the 
standard, or measure, which was, is, or to be conformed 
to. 

As to the other prepositions I need only say, they 
have evidently no other function than to fix a point or 
trace a line. It suffices to glance at the list of this 
class of words in order to verify this fact. 

5. Conjunctions. — Conjunctions have no other func- 
tion than that of noting some mathematical process. 

" And " requires adding together. 

" Although " implies a plus force overcoming a 
minus ; and so does " but," " notwithstanding," &c. 

" Because " or " For " indicates value adequate to 
the cause or effect stated ; and so does " as," " since," 
" therefore," &c. 

" Or " announces division, substitution, and the sep- 
aration of quantities. 

And so I might continue to the end of the list. 

The values of words are not only defined by their 
isolated meaning, but also by auxiliary signs or nota- 
tions. I have already shown the use of etymological 
modifications in determining the value of words ; but 



246 HUMANICS. 

there are other variations which should not be over- 
looked. 

Thus we have — 

The prefixes, which generally declare a total sub- 
duction or a diminution. 

The suffixes, which generally declare an accretion 
or equivalence. 

The curious student may, by looking over the defini- 
tions in " Town's Analysis," satisfy himself that the of- 
fice of all these particles is to note some operation of 
which the type is in mathematics. 

The signs of Comparison exhibit at once their 
arithmetical origin. Good, letter, best, is a Ratio. 

Synonyms are often terms of equal value ; yet their 
main use is to state, with greater nicety, variations of 
value in similar conceptions. There is generally grad- 
uation, degree, 'progression, ratio, in any group of syn- 
onyms. Ex. : Feel, perceive, heed, notice, view ; im- 
agine, suppose, conjecture, surmise, guess, assume, pre- 
sume, believe, cognize, observe, consider, examine, col- 
late, investigate, scrutinize, analyze, compare, test, 
identify, verify, know, discriminate, deliberate, calcu- 
late, think, ponder, muse, meditate, reflect, cogitate, 
speculate, reason, generalize, infer, theorize, synthe- 
tize, apprehend, deem, conceive, comprehend, under- 
stand, deduce, value, grant, admit, concede, assent, 
concur, conclude, decide, resolve. Similar groups to 
this might be formed of other classes of words, thus 
showing how the entire language is made up in the 



THOUGHT. 247 

same way ; how tlie mathematical element of mind is 
always afferent in the creation of words ; and how 
when numbers cannot be used, for want of an exact 
standard of unity, scales of approximate values are 
provisionally invented. 

Syntax and Prosody teach us how to state the 
problems we have to work out, or the solutions we have 
found. They teach us how to set forth propositions, 
demonstrations, theorems, lemmas, corollaries, scholi- 
ums, hypothesis, and postulates, with correctness, pre 
cision, and perspicuity. In the narratives and descrip- 
tions, discourses and orations, of ab -numeral thought, 
the object is either the disclosure of facts or the en- 
forcement of argument, and to accomplish this prop- 
erly the methods of mathematics must be observed, or 
a medley will be produced. Hence in Rhetoric, the 
care with which we are taught to divide and arrange 
every discourse, according to the best plan of demon- 
stration. Methinks the study of mathematics, and the 
application of its laws of exposition, would remove 
many impediments, and aid the cause of truth. It 
would lead me too far from my direct object, if I en- 
tered into details in order to sustain this remark ; and 
I must be content with alluding to the construction of 
Sentences. First the verb is posited as the soul of the 
sentence, (its quantum of existence or force ;) and then, 
rules are given — ioY placing \he subject and object ; for 
regulating the concord of the different words, so that 
their functions may be apparent ; for positing the ad- 



248 HUMANICS. 

jectives, adverbs, &c, in connexity with the terms 
they serve to limit, augment, or diminish ; for employ- 
ing and varying the equivalent signs, such as personal 
pronouns ; for making a sum of several terms by 
means of conjunctions ; for exhibiting with precision 
all the relations, and adjusting the unity of the sen- 
tence. 

What else is done by mathematicians with the dig- 
its and diagrams of their language, when they use it 
to give or demonstrate a fact reducible to exact num- 
ber or figure ? The signs, digits, &c, or mathematics, 
are really words, simple instruments used by thought 
in noting its own operations. Hence, as the words 
treated of in grammar fulfil the same office as those 
treated of in mathematics, there is no essential differ- 
ence between them. In mathematics the words and 
syntax are more definite, as standards of exact value ex- 
ist for every term or phrase ; but as science advances, 
even this difference may disappear. For instance, if 
phrenology be grounded in fact, the language even of 
Ethics, like that of Chemistry, or that of Mechanics, 
may admit of numbers. 

In time, Pythagoras will be understood ; and it will 
be seen that his mystic adepts have concealed and 
travestied the profound truths their master taught. So 
it has been with the moral philosophy of Jesus. For 
ages it was distorted by superstition and priestcraft ; But 
it may yet cease to be the password of idolatry, to be- 
come a criterion of Science. 



THOUGHT. 249 

Having discoursed of Language, Logic turns its at- 
tention to the " things denotedby names ; " but becomes 
at once embarrassed to frame categories, and the like. 
Aristotle, Kant, and others, have vainly tried to classify 
things in general, but their work could not be perfect, 
because they had not exact terms at their disposal. 
Their attempts, nevertheless, show they were fully im- 
pressed with the utility of subjecting the objects of 
thought to a process of direct division. 

Their list of the quotients of this direct division, is 
identical with the matters upon which mathematics 
performs her operations : 1, Substance ; 2, Quantity ; 
3, Quality ; 4, Eelation ; 5, Acts ; 6, Passions ; 7, Space ; 
8, Time ; 9, Epoch ; and 10, Place ; all of which are 
thinkable only by virtue of one of them, viz. : Quan- 
tity y for, what rational import could Substance, Qual- 
ity, &c, have, unless they be referable to some stand- 
ard of quantity — some process of computation, how- 
ever imperfect it may be ? 

Thus, again, are we forced to conclude that Quan- 
tity is the basis of thought, and Mathematics is the law 
of thought. 

Definitions and Propositions naturally follow the 
consideration of words and things. 

1. A definition should describe a unit of thought 
by stating all its parts or constituents ; but most gen- 
erally it is found so difficult to gather and state all, 
that we are content with those indicia which serve to 



250 HUMANICS. 

distinguish the unit from any other. This is conven- 
ient, but it is dangerous; for it leads to the habitual 
omission of values, which may be important to correct 
computations and solutions. Hence the defining terms 
should, when added together, be equal to the defined 
integer. Brevity is, however, always desirable ; and 
therefore the most comprehensive constituents or frac- 
tions of the object of the definition should be used, 
whenever the problem can be solved without a minuter 
analysis. Logicians give an excellent method of fram- 
ing a definition, with a view to comprehensiveness 
and brevity ; they say : " A correct definition must 
state the next higher genus (i. e. term of progression 
or ratio) within the extent of which the given definable 
lies, and then add the essential attributes (i. e. sub- 
tractable term) by which it is accurately distinguished 
from all collaterals or subordinates" The collaterals 
or subordinates must not contain the stated subtracta- 
ble term. This method is evidently borrowed from 
the mathematical process of forming denominate quan- 
tities and scales. 

Hence logicians, in order to frame definitions bv 
this rule, must comply with the true and only laws of 
thought, viz. : the formulas of mathematics. Their 
rule for defining requires -divisions into class, order, 
genus, species, variety, and individual, disposed in due 
progression and ratio. Without this recourse and sub- 
jection to mathematics, they could not have given a 
rule for definition, answering to the requisites of Mani- 



THOUGHT. 251 

festness, Adequacy, Unity, and Brevity. Hence it is 
unnecessary to follow them in their classification of 
definitions, into — 1, thorough ; 2, complete ; 3, descrip- 
tive ; 4, explicative ; and 5, locative definitions ; for, by 
a single view of this classification, as it stands in the 
books, it may be seen that these distinctions amount 
merely to another way of saying that definitions may 
proceed by integers, additions, remainders, or may be 
based upon the lowest and other proportionate divisors 
or quotients. 

2. Pro2?ositions come next. Logicians consider 
them to be " assertions of a phenomena, as being al- 
ways accompanied by another ; " or the declaration of 
a judgment " affirming a relation between two objects 
of thought ; " and out of this an endless and compli- 
cated system of nominal differences among propositions 
is devised. Having attached themselves more to the 
concept of words, than to the realities words are made 
to represent, the logicians were greatly embarrassed 
when they attempted to classify propositions ; for lan- 
guage presents myriads of intricate combinations of 
meaning in words and sentences ; and the labors of lo- 
gicians to parcel them out was of necessity limited to 
what Gkammae, had done for them. Unfortunately the 
real ownership of the analysis is disguised and lost 
under another nomenclature. A Verb is the copula ; 
Mood is Modality ; Inversion and Transposition of Sen- 
tences is Mood ; the several grammatical moods are 
not the Indicative, &c, but Assertive, Problematic, 



252 HUMANICS. 

Apoditic, &c. ; Common or Multiple Nouns are " Uni- 
versals ; " Proper and Abstract Nouns are " Particu- 
lars ; " Adjectives and Adverbs are Exposita or Mod- 
als. Thus might we go through all the details. True 
it is that many of the terms of Grammar are preserved ; 
and indeed sometimes the nomenclature the logicians 
apply to propositions, might be advantageously adopted 
by grammarians ; but after all, the analysis of proposi- 
tions given in Logic, belongs to Etymology and Syn- 
tax, and should be frankly surrendered to those branches 
of learning. 

Now, if we accept without reservation the defini- 
tion of Propositions as given in Mathematics, the true 
course of procedure will at once appear. The logi- 
cians call their propositions "judgments;" and seem 
to think that judgments depend more upon the frame- 
work of exposition or of expression than upon facts ; 
but in Mathematics a proposition " is a proposal to 
prove something ; it is a theorem to be verified or 
demonstrated." This points at once to the business on 
hand, and demands a fruit-bearing analysis. Attend- 
ing to the fact that nothing is thinkable, that no reason- 
ing can take place in any category unless Quantity 
(absolute or indefinite, moral or physical, positive or 
negative, concrete or abstract) be considered, that all 
ratiocination depends upon computation, that even 
quality does not escape this necessity — it follows that 
it is not BArBArA or BArOkO, but the formula of 
Number and Measure, as found in works on Mathe- 



THOUGHT. 253 

matics, which should be applied to propositions. Thus 
would the battles between deduction and induction 
cease, to give place to the generation and summation 
of increasing and decreasing series. 

The Syllogism or Deduction is an illustration of 
the correctness of my position. The logicians admit 
that reasoning " is the comparison of two or more con- 
ceptions with each other." This should have instantly 
suggested that reasoning had its type in number and 
measure ; and that since its object was to ascertain 
equality or difference, its laws were of necessity given 
by mathematics. Neglecting this truth, which was so 
apparent from the very definition of reasoning, Aristo- 
tle went on and invented the syllogism as the type of 
thought ; but the syllogism itself, though Aristotle may 
not have been conscious of the fact, imposed itself (as 
a model for thinking) by virtue of its mathematical na- 
ture. It is a mere periphrase of the axiom : " An equal 
to one of several equals is equal to the other equals," 
or " the equals of equals are equal." 

Aristotle's dictum is : " Whatever is predicated 
universally of any class of things, may be predicated 
in like manner of any thing comprehended in that 
class." This is what the logicians call the dictum de 
omni et nullo, which Mr. John S. Mill has already 
converted very nearly into its true signification, by re- 
marking that " if we generalize this process, (the syl- 
logism,) and look out for the principle or law involved 



254 HUMAMCS. 

in every such inference, and presupposed in every syl- 
logism, we find not the Unmeaning dictum de orrmi et 
nullo, but a fundamental principle, or rather two prin- 
ciples strikingly, resembling the axioms of mathemat- 
ics ; the first which is the principle of affirmative syl- 
logisms, and is to the effect that things which co-exist 
with the same thing, co-exist with one another," &c. 

When we have proceeded a little further, it will be 
seen why Mr. Mill failed to perceive that Mathemat 
ics is the only logic. He certainly was on the right 
track for discovering that Logic, instead of being the 
governor was a mere parasite of Mathematics. So, too, 
Professor Davies, of West Point, was on the road, and 
if, instead of attempting to write the " Logic of Math- 
ematics," he had reversed the problem, and shown the 
Mathematics of Zogic, he would have produced a work 
of incalculable importance ; for his great knowledge 
of the first of sciences, would have enabled him to 
strip Logic of all its borrowed plumes. 

Aristotle's dictum is really a self-evident truth ; but 
it was turned into a sophism by the use of the word 
" universally," instead of " every unit or part." 

The proposition should have been thus: "What- 
ever is predicable of every unit or part of any class, 
may be predicated of any one of the units or parts 
comprehended in that class." Or, in other words, the 
great dictum, stripped of all its useless and vague 
words, and boldly stated, amounts to this trivial tautol- 
ogy : What is true of every one of a class, is true of 
each one of the class. 



THOUGHT. 255 

If any logician contests the accuracy of my resto- 
ration of " every one " to the place of " universally," 
I will ask him to adduce any valid syllogism in which 
" all " cannot be properly changed into " every," or 
" each." Indeed, this is ex necessitate rei ; for we 
learn that the major term is the " principle," the minor 
is " the case," " instance," or " example," coming un- 
der it ; and that the minor or middle term must be dis- 
tributed or included in the premises. The major is a 
class, the minor a genus, the conclusion an individual. 
"Now, how can there be cases, instances, examples, ge- 
nus, and individuals, in principles and classes, unless 
these be composed of separable or divisible units ? In- 
deed, the whole doctrine of the syllogism depends upon 
certain laws of what the logicians call " disteibtjtable 
quantity," which presuppose the divisibility of the sub- 
ject into units or integers, and necessarily comport 
" every " and " each." Yet the students of logic have 
been so blinded by the words " all " and " universal," 
that they have even gone further than Aristotle. I 
have a work on logic before me, which puts the dic- 
tum thus : " Whatever may be predicated of the whole 
may be predicated of the parts." The master was too 
wise and cunning to have uttered such a proposition. 
The earth, for instance, may be termed " a whole ; " 
could we reason thus : the earth is globular, America 
is a part of the earth, therefore America is globular ? 
Evidently the term whole will not do here, and the 
fact that it does not fit the syllogism, shows clearly 



256 HUMANICS. 

that the major must comprise two equal parts, each 
equal to a third posited by the minor. 

The eternal example of a syllogism given in every 
book on logic is : 

All men are mortal, 
Socrates is a man, 
Therefore : Socrates is mortal. 

Is it not plain that " all " men really means every 
man • and that the argument may be symbolized by : 

a=x 

b=a 

Therefore : b=x. 

What then was it that estopped Mr. John S. Mill 
from at once adopting mathematics as logic, in lieu of 
trying to unite the scholastic syllogism with the Ba- 
conian organon? It was the apparent obstacle pre- 
sented by " Quality." Mr. Mill thus states the dif- 
ficulty he encountered : " These truths, though af- 
firmable of all things whatever, of course apply to 
them only in respect to their quantity ; " and further 
down he says : " In these various transformations the 
propositions of the science of number do not fulfil the 
functions proper to all propositions forming a train of 
reasoning : " viz., that of enabling us to arrive in an 
indirect method by marks at each of the properties 
(qualities) of objects as we cannot directly ascertain 
(or not so conveniently) by experiment." 



THOUGHT. 257 

The fact, however, is, that if any of the objects of 
thought be more than the rest dependent upon mathe- 
matics, its axioms and rules, in order to become think- 
able, it is quality. No reasoning can take place with 
regard to properties and qualities, till they become 
quantitative, whether they become so directly, indirectly, 
or arbitrarily. Every logician is bound to admit this, 
as deducible from the primary definitions of the rea- 
soning process itself. It is therefore of the quantity of 
quality, the quantity of force in properties or qualities, 
the quantitative ratios of the laws of properties and 
qualities, the quantity of duration in time of properties 
and qualities, the quantitative dimensions or space oc- 
cupied by properties and qualities, that we may reason. 
It is only through quantity that we can understand 
quality in itself, or can argue and conclude upon any 
quality. If it were otherwise, we could never go be- 
yond such propositions as these : white is white, or 
black is black ; but the moment we say, black is not 
w T hite, we begin to determine those units which are re- 
ducible to the common denominator known as color, 
and then may proceed to value and seriate according 
to the formula of ratio, &c. ; thus, by means of the 
laws of number, disclosing the science of optics. With- 
out this quantitative process of determining units of 
value, this subsequent reduction, &c, we never could 
have drawn a single inference about colors, &c. Hence 
when we say : " Snow is white," we assign a value, a 
computable value, to snow, determining not only its 
IT 



258 HUMANICS. 

proportionality with the color of other things, but also 
include all the subsidiary values and ratios of whiteness 
itself. [Rationality is therefore in quantity alone, and 
logic, which professes to teach the laws of rationality, 
is a science of quantity, and has nothing to do with 
quality apart from quantity. 

Let us look at all the sciences which are concerned 
with quality or properties. They all owe their very 
existence to the mathematical elements of thought. 
Every student must be aware of this. Chemistry 
since Dalton, Optics since ]STewton, Mechanics since 
Archimedes, Acoustics since Sauveur, have become 
strictly mathematical; and every other science con- 
cerning quality, even ethics, is tending that way. 
Phrenology even attempts to settle the partnership ac- 
counts among propensities, sentiments, and faculties. 
Statistics is daily furnishing data for moralists to reason 
upon ; and Jesus, centuries ago, gave the great practi- 
cal equation, by which every application of these data 
may be determined : " Love thy neighbor as thyself." 

Whenever and whereinever exact numbers and 
measures cannot be used, ab-numeral quantity is ap- 
plied, according to the axioms. The terms commonly 
used for the purposes of argument, show how impossi- 
ble it is to think, that is to say, put two things together 
so as to extract or compose a third, without the aid of 
number. For instance, the words based, dependent, 
arising, adequate, included, parallel, equivalent, posi- 
tion, hence, therefore, because, possible, contradictory, 



THOUGHT. 259 

and a thousand others, refer to mathematics for the key 
of their meaning. The fact is there is not a word in 
the dictionary which is not indebted to quantity for its 
rational value ; and in order to test this, let us take the 
most absolute imaginable, and then see whether its 
meaning does not suggest a variety of units : differ- 
ences and adequacies of phenomena, force, law, time, 
and space ? 

Take, for instance, even the moral qualities. Have 
they not each their degree ? Do not their powers act 
and react, according to values of intensity ? Are they 
not influenced by attractions and repulsions, intercom- 
pensable ? Are not our motives weak or strong ; and 
do they not alternately yield, overpower, or become 
balanced ? 

Induction is the last branch of logic which it is 
necessary to notice. The logicians, since the days of 
Bacon and Descartes, have endeavored to ignore it ; 
but it has invaded every department of science, and 
has conquered so many mysteries, that the logicians 
have at last condescended to give it a place in their 
books, but only a secondary place, in what is called 
" Method," thus trying to make it pass for the servant 
of deduction and of the syllogism. But the effort is 
vain, for the verdict of mankind is rendered ; and if 
it were possible to dispense with either deduction or 
induction, the world would prefer surrendering the 
former. "Why ? Because induction has borrowed all 



260 HUMANICS. 

the rules and axioms of mathematics, except the one 
previously taken for a model to the syllogism ; and 
hence induction has for its share all the instruments 
which serve to discover the unknown, while deduction 
can only exposit the known. 

"Invention," says Mill, "though it can be culti- 
vated, cannot be reduced to a rule ; there is no science 
which will enable a man to bethink himself of that 
which will suit his purpose." I quote this sentence 
because it is illustrative of the consequences which 
flowed from the failure to see that, for all purposes of 
thinking, quality is secondary to and dependent upon 
quantity. 

If Mr. Mill means that to perceive direct facts, im- 
mediate facts, as a dog, a horse, an elephant, we must 
depend upon our senses, so that if we have never seen 
or heard of a horse, we would never " bethink " our- 
selves of riding one, he is right. But there is an im- 
mense gap between this bethinking and the bethinking 
of invention. The one depends upon the accidents of 
sensation, which are, at every instant, casting precious 
but too often unnoticed means in our way. The other 
obeys the laws of thought ; for there is unquestionably 
a code which ordains how we are to bethink ourselves 
of what will suit our purpose. This code is in the rules 
of number and measure, governed by that archeus 
which commands us to numerate, add, subtract, reduce, 
and rate. Thus whenever we want to bethink our- 
selves of what will suit our purpose, we begin at once 



THOUGHT. 261 

to number and compute, weigh and measure, equate 
and seriate, the things within our previous experience 
or standing before us. 

It was obedience to this code of bethinking, that 
enabled Copernicus and the long train of discoverers 
and inventors who descended from him, to change the 
status of the world. A detailed review of the history 
of science would show that the world owes its progress 
of the last three hundred years to mathematical be- 
thinking. Before Bacon published any thing, Kepler, 
Tycho Brahe, and Galileo were continuing the work 
of Copernicus; and before the Novum Organon had 
obtained any celebrity, Harvey and Torricelli were 
announcing the result of their investigations. The 
good ground of science had been found ; for from the 
moment the Copernican system was published, the 
splendid results of mathematical science astonished the 
world ; and the number of votaries and adepts of that 
science were increased. We have the fruits. The 
glory of Bacon is in the fact that he was the first to 
show that every science, as well as Astronomy, might 
proceed from particulars to generals. Bacon, though 
not conscious of it, really introduced ab-numeral nu- 
meration, addition, subtraction, and reduction, to aid 
the isolated, and therefore inoperative, equation of 
Aristotle. 

The canons of induction, as stated by Mr. Mill, and 
which are similar to those found in other books on this 
subject, bear witness to this proposition. 



262 HUMANICS. 

1. Method of Agreement. 

First Canon. — If two or more instances of the phe- 
nomenon under investigation, have only one circum- 
stance in common, the circumstance in which alone all 
the instances agree, is the cause (or effect) of the given 
phenomenon. 

2. Method of Difference. 

Second Canon. — If an instance in which the phe- 
nomenon under investigation occurs, and an instance in 
which it does not occur, have every circumstance, save 
one, in common, that one occurring only in the former ; 
the circumstance in which alone the two instances dif- 
fer, is the effect or cause, or a necessary part of the 
cause of the phenomenon. 

3. Joint Method of Agreement and Difference. 

Third Canon. — If two or more instances, in which 
the phenomenon occurs, have only one circumstance in 
common, while two or more instances, in which it does 
not occur, have nothing in common save the absence 
of that circumstance ; the circumstance in which alone 
the two sets of instances differ, is the effect or cause, 
or a necessary part of the cause of the phenomenon. 

4. Method of Residues. 

Fourth Canon. — Subduct from any phenomenon, 
such part as is known by previous inductions to be the 



THOUGHT. 263 

effect of certain antecedents, and the residue of the 
phenomenon is the effect of the remaining antecedents. 

Method of Concomitant Variations. 

Fifth Canon. — "Whatever phenomenon varies in 
any manner, whenever mother phenomenon varies in 
some (one) particular manner, it is either a cause or an 
effect of that other phenomenon, or is connected with 
it through some fact of causation. 

That these few rules of inductive investigation are 
borrowed from mathematics, is too plain to need any 
comment. They are the mere synonyms of some of 
the Axioms or rules of Arithmetic or Algebra ; and, as 
this is apparent as soon as the parity is suggested, it 
would be idle to dwell upon details. Let me, however, 
suggest that if he had simply taken the axioms and 
rules of arithmetic, geometry, and algebra, as they 
are, and in their original succession, and had extended 
their phraseology without altering their sense, he 
would have succeeded a great deal better, and might 
have given all the laws and canons of both deductive 
and inductive reasoning, instead of the few instances 
he has been able to hit upon. In a subsequent work I 
shall endeavor to supply this desideratum. 

A great number of other instances might be ad- 
duced to show how entirely both deduction and induc- 
tion are derived from number and its laws ; and I am 



264 HUMANIGS. 

confident that in time some abler mind than mine will 
frame a new logic, based upon the application of the 
whole of mathematics to ab-numeral quantity. 

In the mean time the progressive neglect into which 
the logic of the schools is falling, will allow more time 
for the study of the logic of nature, the science of 
number and measure. 



I now resume the task of connecting 



THOUGHT AND THE SOUL. 

Yainly have the sensationalists endeavored to ex- 
plain thought, by the effect of objects upon the senses. 
Yainly have they tried to reduce reason to objectivity ; 
and to explain all the phases of analysis and synthesis 
by impressions, upon a tabula rasa. The ingenious 
explanations of Hume and Condillac, in the effort to 
show how a statue, by being endowed with organs of 
sense, imparted to it in a certain supposed natural suc- 
cession, would, by the acquisition of sense alone, and 
the mere necessary action and reaction, and consequent 
transformation of impressions, dependent upon outward 
pressure, would evolve and use, not only language, 
but also induction and deduction. The example of the 
imaginary statue owes whatever plausibility it seems 
to contain, to the incidental and unauthorized assump- 
tion of computation, as the matter of course effect of 
the impressions of direct identity and variety, direct 



THOUGHT. 265 

connection and severance, made upon sensation. How 
and why passive sensation, by its own laws, can ac- 
tively transform itself into computation, invent the ab- 
stract unit and make it the standard of mental opera- 
tions, is a question the sensualists have left entirely un- 
touched. They use their assumption without even 
marking when and where it comes into their argu- 
ment ; so that having thus unconsciously assumed it as 
tacitly conceded to them, they proceeded onward,, and 
the rest was easy. It happens, however, that the ob- 
jections to sensationalism begin precisely at this point, 
thus taken for granted. Man does compute ; but by 
virtue of what does he do so ? To what principle or 
force, laws or properties, does the mind owe the power 
of positing the abstract and arbitrary unit, and of cal- 
culating by it and with it ? It is said that the statue 
after receiving this, that and the other impression, will 
do so and so. But that is the very matter in dispute, 
and it has not been shown how the statue could do any 
thing more with the impressions, than a daguerreotype 
plate could have done. In vain are various sensations 
detailed, and the assertion made, that different impres- 
sions must produce different states of consciousness, 
and that these states being present in memory, are ne- 
cessarily compared with each other. It is precisely 
this necessity which cannot be made evident, without 
the aid of an initial and specific power of the mind to 
perform the operation. 

True it is that man's mind instantly, upon any sen- 



266 HUMANICS. 

sation, connects an idea of quantity, intensity, degree, 
proportion, or distribution, with that sensation ; but the 
idea thus annexed can only be due to some property or 
power in the man himself, for if ideas were only copies 
of pictures and of feelings perceived, as they must be 
if produced by sensation only, how could they be di- 
vided into parts, and new ideas be built up with the 
severed materials; how could ideas ever be conven- 
tional or arbitrary, as often they are ? Assuredly sen- 
sationalism never answered this objection, without 
evoking some innate archeus to do the work, 

It is very certain that there is nothing in the ob- 
jective or sensational pictures themselves, to divulge 
the mathematical unit. Nature does not furnish us 
with a ready-made multiplication table, or with fore- 
settled common divisors. The real is one thing, the 
standard of measure is another ; one is given to con- 
sciousness, the other is the product of an operation of 
the mind. How often is reality exhibited to conscious- 
ness without any mark of divisibility, as, for instance, 
time and space ; but the mind will not tolerate this, 
and arbitrarily supplies the conditions of computation. 

If sensations were sufficient to impress ideas of 
value or quantity, whether absolute or relative, then all 
other animals would necessarily be as wise as man is, 
in the science of numbers ; for brutes also have the five 
senses. Sensation in brutes is as perfect, and often 
more active and intense than in man ; but it is, at the 
same time, certain that brutes are totally destitute of 



THOUGHT. 267 

mathematical ideas. Now, that the unit not only 
evolves, but presupposes all mathematics, no one who 
understands the rationale of numbers will deny. Hence 
if we were to grant, for an instant, that any sub-human 
animal numerates, we would be obliged to concede 
that they do perform every subsidiary process. It is 
impossible to separate the act of positing and counting 
the unit, from any part or from the whole of the sci- 
ence of numbers ; for, let me repeat it, the conception 
of the unit imports the conception of addition, sub- 
traction, &c. Prof. Davies says : " Since all numbers, 
whether integer or fractional, must come fbom, and 
-hence be connected with, the unit one, it follows : that 
there is but one purely elementary idea in the science 
of numbers ; that the idea of every number, regarded 
as made up of units, is necessarily complex ; that all 
numbers, except one, must be so regarded when we ana- 
lyze them ; that since the number arises from the addi- 
tion of ones, the apprehension of it is incomplete until 
we understand how those additions are made," &c. 

I now put a simple and indubitable fact before the 
reader — a fact which, with all its simplicity, is fraught 
with consequences of the utmost value. v 

It is this : 

Physically, the inferior animals have every organ 
or faculty possessed by man. 

Every thing that matter, vitality, and sensation can 
impart, they have in a degree sometimes even superior 



268 HUMANICS. 

to man. Brutes are materially equal to man. They 
are made of the same materials, have the same osseous, 
fleshy, vascular, and nervous organs. In vain have 
anatomists labored to find a single fibre of the brain, 
in man, which is not to be found in other mammals. 

The Mathematical Potentiality or attribute is the 
only essential thing which man can assert as belonging 
exclusively to him / as his alo?ie / as not held in com- 
mon with brutes / and therefore it cannot be due to any 
physiological property or organ. 

This must be so, for otherwise the axioms and laws 
of induction (the canons of which I have quoted above) 
would be lies ; but they are imperturbable truths, and 
they imperatively sanction my argument. 

The residual or distinctive circumstance in which 
man differs from brutes, is that of having the idea or 
archeus of number and measure, and of being able to 
apply it to substance and quality, form and force, time 
and space, action and passion, motion and law. 

Hence it is to this " residual circumstance " that 
man owes all his ideations of Truth, Utility, Morality, 
Beauty, and Art. 

What is Truth ? It is the ratio of Substantive Ke- 
ality ; the adaptation of number and measure to fact. 

What is Utility ? It is the ratio of Action ; the 
adaptation of means to ends, by the measure of physi- 
cal laws. 

What is Morality ? It is the ratio of Keason and 
Passion — of flesh and spirit, individual and society. 



THOUGHT. 269 

What is Beauty ? It is the ratio of Quality : form, 
dimension, distribution, color, sound, &c. ? proportion- 
ate and complete, in variegated unity. 

What is Art ? It is the adaptation of number and 
measure to the reproduction, by man, of Truth, Util- 
ity, Morality, and Beauty : it is realized Thought. 

Thus, it seems, truth, utility, morality, beauty, art, 
arise from number ; and hence if brutes could ideate 
the unit, they would — - 

1°. Have with it the ability to add, subtract, &c, 
for the unit presupposes mathematics. 

2°. Have with it languages as copious as those of 
human kind ; for speech is made up of words expres- 
sive of integers of quantity. 

3°. Have with it arts of their own invention ; for 
computation is the bethinking instrument which ena- 
bles man to invent. 

But to be certain that thought (which I have now 
identified with man's power to numerate and measure) 
is hot physical, let us cast a glance upon objective na- 
ture. 

The Elements of matter (as every student knows) 
are governed by mathematical laws. These laws are 
applied to a multitude of substances and properties, 
and display themselves in an infinite variety of forms, 
so that there evidently exists a computer, distributor, 
or artist. The Grand Archeus of the Universe, there- 



270 HUMANICS. 

fore, necessarily exists ; for mathematics is thought, not 
substance. Variety of adaptation implies — a selection 
of appropriate materials, a modification of the mate- 
rials themselves, to suit the work ; and that this must be 
done, and each adaptation be realized, in the midst of 
countless substances, qualities, and properties, of which 
only a portion are fit and the rest unfit, in each in- 
stance of formation ; and therefore rationality and de- 
sign must preside over nature. A choosing and deter- 
mining Thought must exist. 

Plants, though they possess vitality, have not in 
themselves any power of thought ; but since their acts 
are rationally ordained, (as I have abundantly proved,) 
those acts must be determined by a rational archeus out 
of themselves. 

Bkutes (as I have shown) possess mere physical 
sensation and consciousness ; their impressions are pas- 
sive^ and their action instinctive or thoughtZm; but 
since the acts are rationally ordained, while the actors 
are themselves incapable of thought, the power that 
thinks for them and predetermines their instinct, is not 
only rational but out of them. 

Man (as I have also shown in the preceding parts 
of this study) is endowed with Thought ; and hence 
the archeus which did not dwell in the brute, dwells in 
man ; becomes a part of man, identifies itself with, or 
adopts his organism ; and thus, according to the decla- 
ration of Jesus, human beings are the children of God, 
for his seed (which is Thought) is sown in our body - T 



THOUGHT. 271 

and while in that body may bear fruits of Thought. 
Truly has it been said : " Man is an intellect making 
use of an organism." 

Thus we have also found the link of 

CONSCIOUSNESS AND THE SOUL. 

Consciousness is physiological ; but it is the surface 
upon which thought or the soul operates from its zenith 
within. It is upon the objective world, as given in 
consciousness, through sensation, that Thought or the 
soul throws its light ; and creates, by the union of the 
outer with the inner light, that intellectual conscious- 
ness of which man alone on earth is the depositary. 

We may now easily understand how man may know 
himself, and perceive the connection of 

SELF-KNOWLEDGE AND THE SOUL. 

All ethics are based upon the assumption that man 
may know himself; and therefore the precept "Know 
thyself," — or the proposition, " The proper study of man- 
kind is man," is the initial point of wisdom and virtue. 

To know himself man must have the faculty of self- 
examination. This is so self-evident that it looks trivial. 
Cooks say that the first thing necessary to make a dish 
of baked turbot is to have a turbot ; and we say that in 
order to know ourselves we mast possess the inherent 
power or faculty of self examination. In this truism, 



272 HUMANICS. 

however, we find matter for serious meditation ; and 
ground for important deductions. 

A machine may be extremely complicated, the steam 
engine for instance — it may operate with the greatest 
precision, and seem to be gifted with volition — move as 
a thing of life ; but with all its co-ordinate complication, 
and moving forces, it is dead to itself, and though doing 
the work of mind it has no mind. 

A beast is endowed with life, but all its actions are 
passive or fatal, being dictated by that class of motives 
with which reflection and judgment have no concern. 
Their acts are determined, like the movements of a. 
machine, by a sort of propelling power known as " in- 
stinct" Whatever variability or versatility we may 
observe in brutes must be attributed to outward pres- 
sure alone. A complex and circumstantial coercion, 
determines the acts ; and a careful study of the facts 
has always shown it to be so. 

Man alone observes himself, attends to the processes 
of his own mind and feelings, reviews and corrects his 
own reasonings, examines and defines his own motives, 
puts himself as it were on trial before himself — he the 
accused and he the judge. This is or can be done by 
no other animal. All the labored arguments of ma- 
terialists to show thai dogs, horses^ elephants, or mon- 
keys have ever evinced even the semblance of this facul- 
ty, are clear failures. 

In this distinctive trait we find the first mark of 
man's separation from brute creation, the first link 



THOUGHT. 273 

which connects him with divinity ; and it is because 
this capacity of self-examination is & jpre-requisite of all 
moral and mental science, that it is placed immediately 
after those in which man 1st, becomes conscious of life, 
and of material good and evil ; 2d, learns the necessity 
of labor and principle ; 3d, witnesses death and con- 
ceives the hope of regeneration. 

Yes, man is capable of knowing himself; and now 
let us mark the consequences of this primary truth. It 
is pregnant with evidence of the duality of man — 
proves that man is body and soul. The observed and 
the observer are necessarily two. The eye cannot see 
itself — a mirror cannot reflect itself. 

These two examples are sufficient to show the ne- 
cessity of there being two to do the act of self-observa- 
tion. Mechanics, chemistry, &c, might furnish us 
with other examples, but the detail would require more 
space than we can afford. The seen requires a seer — 
the heard, a hearer— the reflected, a reflector ; and 
thus, man must possess, within and distinct from him- 
self, the image of himself in which he may recognize 
and commune with himself. 

Kemove that other self, and all power of " reflec- 
tion" must immediately cease. If any man says the 
contrary, let me see him lift himself and carry himself 
upon his own shoulders. 

Instead of cavilling with, resisting or wilfully closing 
our eyes to the undeniable fact of the duality of man, 
we had better receive this truth at once, with cordiality, 
18 



274 HUMANICS. 

and proceed sincerely to find its harmony with all other 
truth. It is suicidal to struggle against truth, for she is 
powerful and must prevail. To deny a truth is to con- 
cede that its demonstration would impeach our religion 
and philosophy. Let us rather accept it with frankness, 
and having, once for all, posited the fact that man is 
double — let us see if this duality is not the body and 
the soul — the animal body and the spiritual body — the 
flesh and the spirit — the beast and the angel ? 

The moment we concede as we are bound to do the 
duality of man, we may clearly understand how the 
mind may look upon itself for all the purposes of recogni- 
tion, revision, and correction. Then we may compre- 
hend how man does hold intercourse with himself, and 
improve in self-knowledge. Then, too, we may realize 
a rational and consistent idea of the real differentia be- 
tween men and beasts ; for observation, comparison, and 
reason will show that the reflector, the other self, the 
internal mirror — mast be the soul. 

Call it by any other name if you choose — the thing 
itself will not, thereby, be changed ; for what we call 
the soul is the distinct type of the mortal man — a 
type which has a superior and specific existence of its 
own. 

You may ask why we accord, not only a specific 
and distinct, but also a " superior " existence to this 
type. We answer simply : that because they are two 
there must be a differentia to distinguish them ; that 
because they are two, they must be either equal, or one 



THOUGHT. 275 

must be superior and the other inferior, but their equality 
would require us to admit that we have two equal 
bodies, which we know is not the fact ; that because 
they are two, one must be the animal nature we hold 
in common with brutes, and that therefore the other 
contains the differentia which distinguishes us from 
them ; that because they are two, and one must be the 
animal which cannot reflect, the other is therefore our 
intellectual element — the spirit of Love and Truth ; 
that because they are two, and one being animal, the 
other, from the necessity of differentia, must have some 
property not animal ; and finally, that because all the 
works of God are seriated and progressive, he has when 
he added unto man that which entitled him to a higher 
place in the scale of being, necessarily added some su- 
perior element or essence. 

Thus, by means of the palpable truism with which 
we commenced this argument, the existence of the soul 
of man is demonstrated. 

So also is the fact that there must be an affinity — 
common properties of union — and reciprocity of action 
between the mortal body and thinking soul ; for how 
else could the soul become, even temporarily, identified 
with the body, feel and suffer with it, think and act 
congenially to it, and bear, as it does, the penalties of 
its conduct ; and how could the body be affected, as 
it is at all times, by the merits and demerits of the soul? 

It is therefore certain that the soul is the type of the 
body, as God is the archetype of the soul; and the text: 



276 HUMANICS. 

is verified : " God created man in his own image." And 
another truth becomes also apparent. It is that man 
has a real conscience, subject, as every other manifesta- 
tion of Divine wisdom, to fixed laws. Hence when the 
animal creature infringes any of those laws, the soul 
must suffer ; and revolt against every feeling or act not 
congenial to its own essence. 

We may now proceed to a study of the 

EXISTENCE AND ATTRIBUTES OF GOD. 

I. In the early days of History there appeared men 
of Wisdom and Inspiration, Philosophers and Apostles, 
who, contemplating nature — the Stars, the planets, the 
course of the Sun, and the changes of the seasons — dimly 
perceived the first of causes, and the destiny of man be- 
yond the grave. 

Since those days, many pages of the book of nature, 
to the ancient sages unknown, have been unrolled to 
the eyes of mankind. In each successive generation, 
great men of science and genius have appeared and 
lighted new beacons to guide mankind to a knowledge 
of God. 

Yet, with air the lights of science, with all the ef- 
forts of theorists, God is now proved by the same pro- 
cess of reasoning as in the first days of history. The 
philosopher who discovers the most hidden secrets of 
nature, only brings new witnesses — new facts, to illus- 
trate and fortify the first dictates of natural reason. 



THOUGHT. 277 

The savage and the sage, both reason alike ; and viewing 
the mysteries of creation — struck with wonder at the 
order, beauty, and wise combination of minute atoms and 
stupendous w r orlds, they exclaim — Behold ! can it be 
true that there is no God ? 

The Materialist answers — " abandon matter and 
choose God, and you only exchange one mystery for 
another. You put back by one degree the great cause, 
but creation is not thereby rendered intelligible. Like 
the world of the idolater, supported by a mighty tortoise, 
it remains for him to learn the foothold of the supporter. 
Is it not as easy to believe that the universe itself is 
eternal, as that God, the all wise, the all powerful, 
existeth uncreated from all eternity ? " 

And now behold, Skepticism arises, and laughs with 
scorn at the presumption of all who pretend to divine 
the undiscoverable secrets of nature. 

" In these theories," says she, " our reason is con- 
founded by equal mysteries ; and the finite mind, when 
at last it counts the real riches of this treasury, finds 
itself the owner of three words ; invented by itself, yet 
beyond its own comprehension : Eternity, Infinity, 
God ! Who knows, says the skeptic, that matter had, 
or had not, a beginning ? Who knows that there is a 
God, or that no God existeth ? There may be one God, 
or three Gods, or tens, or hundreds, or thousands of Gods, 
or no God ; but of all this we Jcnow nothing, and must 
remain content with our ignorance." 

Let it be then, that I must choose between three 



278 HUMANICS. 

things — the Eternity of God — the Eternity of material 
order — and the blind, the deaf, the mute, the death- 
like mystery of Skepticism. How, between these, can 
I hesitate ? 

Shall I suspend or smother thought, and be satisfied 
with ignorant Skepticism? Shall my mind be as the 
bird of the deluge, ever on the wing, without a resting 
place, over the boundless waters of a world submerged ? 
Shall I. be content that the waves of doubt shall cover 
all the works of nature ? Shall I be content not to infer 
and judge, or not even to guess? Nay, Skepticism is 
contrary to the nature of man. We all feel the necessity 
of believing something ; and the most radical doubter 
has always a cosmogony of his own, and is not satisfied 
until he has, in his own way, built up the universe. If 
man thinks of his own existence, his mind will ever be 
asking, How ? Why ? Whence ? E or will it ever let 
him rest or sleep until an answer is found, plausible at 
least to itself. 

We are therefore, all, either believers in God or ma- 
terialists ; and he who in argument asserts that he is a 
pure skeptic, content with ignorance, or without a theory 
of creation, is a liar or an idiot. 

Materialism is unsatisfactory to me. That word is 
almost as cold, as dead and as dark as skepticism. It 
lacks the sanction of ages, it smothers the first prompt- 
ings of natural reason, it speaks not to the soul ; and 
leaves man, in the midst of Chaos .... ignorant of the 
materials, and ignorant of their laws . . to build the 



THOUGHT. 279 

universe. Materialism allows no communion of thought 
among men ; for, every materialist has a system of his 
own, understood by none but himself. He affects to 
despise the dreams of the Theist ; and yet, none more 
than himself yields to the allurements of imagination ; 
for, all his theories of matter, and of the formation of 
worlds, are pure inventions of a mind which will not 
brook ignorance of the birth of nature, and which 
strains its ideal powers to invent the laws of an unknown 
necessity. 

And, now, since our nature pushes us to imagine ; 
and, in the absence of demonstration, to divine — since 
we must find a word for the enigma, or live unhappy — 
let that word be .... " God ; " and in that word let us 
rejoice. 

Who can shake off the thought that word conveys 
— who will consent to forget its meaning — who does not 
understand it — to whom does it not express a sublime 
idea % Grandeur, perfection, infinity, power, wisdom, 
justice, unbounded benevolence, charity, foresight, and 
knowledge .... the author of creation, the preserver 
of all, from the insect to the sun. If that word fell not 
upon our soul, as well as upon our ear, eloquence 
would lose its warmth, history become a blank, truth 
lack her holiest witness, and poetry weep her brightest 
inspiration. 

If Theism is but a theory — it is the most sublime 
and the most perfect, the most pleasing and the most 
moral — it is not inconsistent with any positive knowl- 



280 HUMANICS. 

edge — but indeed it adorns and crowns all knowledge. 
It points science to a great and glorious origin and end 
— gives a soul and a voice to nature — and tells the 
traveller on the way of time, that there is a goal to his 
path, and a hope for his journey. If among theories I 
must choose, I will adopt the most beautiful ; and if 
the mind seeks a point of immensity, for a resting place, 
let that point, for me, be a belief in the existence of 
God. 

Let me illustrate this. 

II. A traveller is cast upon an unknown coast, and 
after scrambling in darkness, along the shore, at the 
dawn of the day he finds himself suddenly on a broad 
and winding highway, where everchanging prospects 
meet his eye at every step, and where he sees thousands 
of travellers journeying along like himself, all in the 
same direction. Will he ask none where that road 
doth lead ? and if he meets no one w T ho can answer that 
question, will he then content himself with passive and 
absolute ignorance, and frame no supposition, the most 
plausible and probable he can, as to the object and ter- 
mination of that road ? If the road is well paved and 
bridged, if each stage is marked, if every mile-post 
points onward, if well-ordered grounds and symmetrical 
palaces present themselves at every turn, will he not 
admit the presence of intellect and power ? and if he is 
made like a man, and has a mind like that of his fellow 
creatures, will he not look forward to an end analogous 



THOUGHT. 281 

to the means employed to enable him to reach it ? Will 
he not picture to himself a magnificent palace, or a 
great city ; for why this road, whence all these tokens 
of design ? Yes, the picture of that great city or palace 
will grow upon his imagination, and each step will con- 
firm its existence, until, convinced of its reality, he will 
walk forward with more alacrity, more hope and con- 
fidence. The narrow-minded reasoner may think him- 
self extremely wise, and laugh at what he calls the 
phantasies and dreams of this traveller who expects an 
adequate term to such a beginning ; but while the doubt- 
er scoffs and loiters amidst present and unfruitful enjoy- 
ments, the child of nature, he who listens to the free 
promptings of his reason (and believes the eternal pro- 
duction of intellectual effects, must depend upon the 
eternal existence of an intellectual cause) — would go 
on, w T ith a glad heart, cheered by brilliant hopes ; and 
when the darkness of night would descend upon both 
the travellers, one would lie down in despair, while 
the other would yet look forward to the City of Immor- 
tality. 

t 
III. The idea of a God is so natural, and so conform- 
able to the plainest reason, that it suggests itself early 
to the human mind — it is so forcible, so irresistible, 
that it takes hold of and commands all the intellectual 
faculties of man — so clear and satisfactory, that it pro- 
duces more than conviction, and assumes the character 
of enthusiasm and religion. By the proper use of his 



282 HUMANICS. 

faculties man with difficulty reached the arts and sci- 
ences of civilization, while the ignorant savage already 
for ages had possessed a full conception of the divinity. 
It required the sublimest efforts of genius and study, 
by men of superior minds and deep investigation, to 
discover the order of the Solar System, the rotundity 
of the earth, the principles of Gravitation, the laws of 
electricity — while the aboriginal, of the great prairies 
of the West, not possessing sufficient perfection of 
intellect to discover the hidden laws of matter, had con- 
ceived, in the spirit of nature, a pure and correct idea 
of the Deity. 

Yet let us not contend that the idea of a God is simply 
innate, independent of and unsupported by our reason, 
apart from our feeling. 

Innate ideas are inherent feelings of the mind which 
develop themselves, by their own force, in a certain 
and invariable form. These are different from the facul- 
ties of the mind, which are those qualities or properties 
of the cerebral mass, that appear when acted upon 
through the senses. The first are the spontaneous 
combustion brought on by the natural changes of mat- 
ter ; the latter are the latent sparks of the flint which 
dwell quiescent, till stricken by a steel-armed hand. 
The instinct is like the natural whisper of the conch- 
shell ; but the faculties are like the strings of a harp, 
pregnant with music, yet silent, till played upon by the 
proper musician. They are the instrument, nature the 
performer, our senses the hand, and reason the Music. 



THOUGHT. 283 

To maintain, then, that we have merely an innate 
idea of God, is to degrade a sublime thought and dis- 
covery of the human mind into the mere operation of 
instinct. It would then be, indeed, not a compound, 
but a simple sensation which would require no reflection, 
no combination, no reasoning (however plain) to bring 
it forth. 

Let us cherish a more elevated opinion of the source 
of our ideas of divinity ; and contend that the experience 
of all — the hooks of the sage and the talk of the savage 
— prove that humanity's belief in God is deduction, 
and not the mere growth of instinct ; for it is only by 
the combination and computation of preceptions we call 
" reasoning," that both the philosopher and the simplest 
child of nature have been impressed with a faith in the 
Divine Existence. 

IV. It matters not if we fail to find the rigorous 
mathematical demonstration required by the atheist, 
who does not admit the "belief which is based upon 
strong rational deductions. There is a medium between 
absolute knowledge and total denial. It suffices that 
Deism responds, with thrilling harmony, to the most 
melodious tones of that music of thought .... the Rea- 
son of Man. 

To test this accordance, the first thing necessary is 
to define the idea or subject we seek to examine. 

"What is " God » ? 

The answer requires an example. 



284 HUMANICS. 

A mathematical philosopher observed the falling of 
bodies, the laws of weight, the attraction of all things, 
to a common centre, and the revolutions of the planets 
around the sun ; and finding that all these things were 
governed by a single and invariable principle, he gave 
that principle (though itself impalpable and invisible) a 
name, and called it Gravitation. The Theist does the 
same — he observes the perfect order, immense life, and 
infinite intellect, which fills the universe ; and seeing 
that these are governed by certain immutable rules, 
which indicate a common origin or cause, — he calls it 
" God ! " In fact, to the mind, the word God is nothing 
more than the unit expression of the attributes of a 
great essence, (in itself unknown ;) but which acts 
everywhere, from the centre of the Sun to the utmost 
travels of the Comet, with the force of omnipotent wis- 
dom. 

As of Gravitation, men know nothing of this essence 
except by the Phenomena it produces. These phe- 
nomena proclaim its presence everywhere, and appear 
in modes so multiple and varied, as to equal infinity. 
Man observes them by the sensation they create within 
him, through the senses ; and thus it seems, that the 
preceptions and sentiments by which man becomes 
acquainted with matter and its laws, are also his means 
of knowing God ; for, ask the theologian how he knows, 
or rather why he believes there is a God, and he will 
appeal to the material world, to the wonderful order 
and life which pervade it, and to the operations of 
intellect which we see around us, and feel within us. 



THOUGHT. 285 

Behold order in every formation of matter from the 
crystal to revolving worlds — behold life in the reed 
and the oak, in the crawling insect and in man — behold 
intellect in every operation of nature's laws, behold it 
in our own souls, and. in the wonderful design which 
governs all planets and suns, and pervades the immensity 
of space. 

The presence of God is necessarily connected with 
the Phenomena of order, life, and intellect. They are 
only modes in which he appears, and is made evident 
to man — the only means by which man is conscious of 
him, has proof of him, and finds authority to believe in 
his existence. These Phenomena are produced by his 
presence as inevitably as Electricity by Friction, Weight 
by Gravitation, Expansion by Heat, and Light by the 
Sun. 

I may therefore conclude that God is the principle 
of Order, Life and Intellect, in the universe. In other 
words, there is a principle which pervades all nature, 
the essence of which is order, life, and intellect ; and that 
principle I call God. 

Y. These attributes may be considered as only one 
which may be called, and which necessarily is the 
organizing power / that is to say, the . power which 
arranges, combines, and regulates all things, so as to 
produce harmony and all its consequences. Order, life, 
and intellect may be considered as modes, effects, or 
higher grades of one great and all-pervading principle. 



286 HUMANICS. 

Stones possess order, plants order and life, man or- 
der, life, and intellect. The order possessed by the 
plants is more perfect and complicated than that pos- 
sessed by stones, and the order which appears in the 
organization of man is still more complete and wonder- 
ful than that of plants and stones. 

Life, when combined with order, seems to depend 
upon it, and appears (in the vegetable world for exam- 
ple) to be nothing more than the operation or action of 
a more perfect arrangement of the particles of matter. 

To this combination add a set of nerves, unite them 
together in the brain — develop that brain with ven- 
tricles and cineritious matter and intellect appears. 
So that it would seem that in intellect, as well as life, 
we have but a more perfect phenomenon of the princi- 
ple of order. 

I do not stop here to show (as I might) how this 
apparent dependence of intellect upon a more perfect 
order is a mere illusion, how this illusion arises by mis- 
taking effect for cause, and how organic order and life 
are subordinate to the causative force of a powerful, 
independent, and designing will. This theme is re- 
served for another place ; and as it does not directly 
affect the present argument, I refrain from the tempt* 
ing digression. 

VI. Order, life, and intellect are the trinity of na- 
ture, one and indivisible. 

Air may be decomposed into original elements, 



THOUGHT. 287 

hydrogen, oxygen &c, which are often found totally 
separate from each other. These elements of air have 
no necessary connection with each other, they may exist 
isolated, they may combine, separately or jointly, with 
other substances — they are therefore recognized as dis- 
tinct gases or original atoms of matter. On the other 
hand, light is known as a single element, though it may 
affect our senses in different ways, though its rays may 
produce different colors to the eye. yet they are all rays 
of light; for notwithstanding their different colors 
which melt into, and combine with each other, in 
shades of infinite gradation and mixture, still all these 
grades possess the one characteristic, a degree of white- 
ness, or transparency, which is properly called light. 
The different rays are merely regarded as different 
kinds, or rather grades of light ; and these either com- 
bined or separated (whatever be the proportion) always 
produce .... light ; or rather, always appear to be the 
light. They are therefore considered as one and the 
same element. If order, life, and intellect, like the ele- 
ments of the air, were different essences or principles, 
we would sometimes find them separate — sometimes 
entirely isolated from each other ; but their union (as I 
will show) is, like that of colors and light, inseparable 
and co-existent : and they may well be designated by 
the single appellation I have already used, to wit: " the 
organizing power." 

VII. In the Physical world, when atoms of matter 



288 HUMANICS. 

can no longer be divided into others of a simpler nature, 
the atoms so found to defy all further analysis, are con- 
sidered as elements of matter. In the spiritual world, 
when attributes cannot be conceived as distinct from 
each other, but absolutely require a simultaneous pres- 
ence to constitute a unity, these attributes must be 
considered as manifestations of the same entity. 

1. I am not unconscious of the fact that the house 
we live in, the furniture it contains, the clothes which 
cover us — and in fact every work of art, (viewed apart,) 
possesses order without life and intellect, that the vege- 
table kingdom possesses order and life without intellect ; 
but it is this apparent contradiction of fact with my 
theory, which, when explained and conciliated, will 
form its clearest demonstration and insure its triumph. 

Take the palace we live in as an example. How 
does it exist, with its beautiful proportions and judicious 
divisions ? Was it not intellect that planned, and life 
that executed the work ? Without the living intellectual 
man who did the work, where would be these walls, 
these chambers, these columns ? This order could not 
exist without the life and intellect which devised and 
arranged it ; nor could it be preserved without the action 
of the same principles which brought it into existence. 
Let life and intellect cease to inhabit this dome, how 
soon will it rot, how soon crumble into dust. The mo- 
ment life and intellect completed their work, it com 
menced the process of decay ; and its total ruin is only 
retarded by the care of the keepers. The separation 



THOUGHT. 289 

of life and intellect from the order they created was the 
first step towards total decomposition. This building 
now rots like the body of a dead man. The work of 
destruction may be sometimes slow, but it is always 
certain. 

But I do not speak with sufficient precision. There 
is a distinction to be drawn between Material and 
tangible order, and the principle or essence of order. 
This last is evidently a cause, the other is nothing but 
an effect- The material order of this palace did not 
exist of itself or by chance ; it had, therefore, a cause, 
which {judging from its effects) we may properly 
name the principle of order, or the organizing power. 
Now we know that the palace was built by an architect 
possessing life and intellect, which he applied to the 
materials — we know also from experience that decay 
is going on in every part of the building — however 
slow the operation, however apparent the duration. 
While the architect performed his labor, order was pro- 
duced ; now that he has left, the formation of order 
has ceased, and ruin has commenced. Is it not evident, 
therefore, that though material order appears to continue, 
yet the principle of order is gone ; — that this principle 
was contained in the man who formed the work ; that 
is to say in a being endowed with life and intellect ? 
In fact, what else than these could it be ? Do we not 
all know from experience that life and intellect are 
the only powers within us which enable us to produce 
order ? 

19 



290 HUMANICS. 

2. Is not intellect in man the principle of the ma- 
terial order he produces? Experience answers, yea. 
Can there exist in nature two principles or essences of 
the same things % Experience and Philosophy answer, 
nay ! I therefore conclude, there cannot exist two 
principles of order ; and that the organizing cause which 
brings forth the material order of stones and plants, is 
the same as that cause, in the mind of man, which 
when it acts, creates the order of art, literature, and sci- 
ence. 

In proportion to the excellence of the exertion of his 
intellect, does man produce that which is excellent in 
his works. If the mental operation be a perfectly in- 
tellectual one, useful plans are executed, beautiful de- 
signs are embodied, and sublime discoveries are made. 
Such is the action of intellect, such are the indications 
by which the presence of mind is known. "We are con- 
scious of no other cause, we can conceive of no other 
origin of material order, than an intellectual cause ; 
for we see that order is only an intellectual eifect pro- 
duced upon matter. But we know T that life cannot 
exist without this intellectual effect, this order, which 
is heaven's first law ; and without which the vital force, 
if it were distinct, and did not necessarily comprise the 
organizing and intellectual forces, would forever float 
inertly and uselessly in the midst of chaos. 

3. If we contend that it is the vital principle that 
develops by its force the beatiful symmetry of vegetable 
and animal nature, we give to it the same function as 



THOUGHT. 291 

intellect, and acknowledge it as an intellectual power. 
Tf we assume that order or arrangement determines life 
— still, as intellect is the essential principle of order, no 
arrangement, adapted to the design of receiving and 
sustaining life, can exist without mind, to conceive and 
determine the form it shall assume as well as the modes 
and means of its duration. 

VIII. I have shown the identity of order, life, and 
intellect. I have shown that they are qualities, phenom- 
ena, or modes of one great principle or essence — let me 
now demonstrate that this principle or essence is GOD ! 

IX. Let us recapitulate. 

1°. We have endeavored to show the existence of 
a universal organizing power. 

2°. We have argued that this power is single — though 
it appears in three modes to the organs of sense. 

X. It remains for us to meet the objection of ma- 
terialism ; and then, to demonstrate this organizing 
power to be the Divinity. 

XI. The materialists contend : 
That order is necessity : 

That life and intellect are phenomena produced by 
the action of the component parts of matter upon each 
other : 

That order, life, and intellect are effects of many 



292 HUMANICS. 

causes, and that these causes are certain qualities or 
properties of material elements. 

Let them give the utmost range to imagination, 
and call up the whole arcana of supposition, and they 
will find only two alternatives consistent with material- 
ism. 

The first : that order, life, and intellect have no dis- 
tinct existence of their own, but are mere chemical 
results produced by the combination of matter with 
matter. 

The second : that order, life, and intellect are one or 
more distinct substances acting chemically upon other 
substances, and producing certain effects. 

Both these suppositions can be shown to be erro- 
neous. 

XII. I argue thus : 

I. If we treated the assertion of the sufficiency of 
mere chemical action to produce order, life, and intellect 
in the same spirit as the materialist treats a belief in 
God — if we examined the doctrines of the materialist 
with the same rigor — what would become of his philoso- 
phy ? Let us call upon him for proof. How does he 
know that the mere combination of various particles of 
matter, arranged in a certain way, will produce order, 
life, and intellect ? How does he know it I say ? Does 
he not deal in mere hypothesis ? I ask. 

Reasoning from analogy does not satisfy him — it 
leads to mere probabilities or possibilities — the ma- 



THOUGHT. 293 

terialist does not admit evidence which tends to mere 
belief — he contends for absolute mathematical proof — 
otherwise he would be forced to admit the beauty, the 
force, the plausibility of the arguments of Theistical 
sages, poets, and orators ; and confess that, if mere 
probability or analogy were sufficient, he would be 
forced to admit the existence of God. No, says he, 
when the order of the heavens and the earth are shown 
— it does not suffice that you should conclude, because 
man makes a watch, that the heavens and the earth 
were made also ; for if all order must have a maker, 
who made the maker ? Well, then, mere analogy, mere 
approximative evidence, is not enough, proof positive 
must be given, so that man may say — u I know." 

Where is there such proof as this in favor of the 
proposition, that order, life, and intellect are merely 
combinations of matter ? Such is the proof the ma- 
terialist requires from the Theist ; and such is the proof 
materialism, to be consistent with itself, is bound to 
produce. Thus would the advocate of the self-sufficiency 
of matter — thus would he who asserts the eternity and 
necessity of order, resulting from the properties of mat- 
ter alone, be silenced by his owm favorite phrase — " How 
do you know f " 

II. The premises upon which the materialist builds 
his theory, are his ignorance. He has no knowledge of 
any thing but matter — therefore he concludes there is 
in nature nothing but matter. What logic ! to derive 
from ignorance a theory which presumes to explain 



294 HUMANICS. 

the profoundest secret of nature : a theory which pre- 
tends to explain eternal and universal order. As well 
might the chief of some savage isle — ignorant of lands 
beyond the ocean that surrounds his narrow dominion 
— assert the title of — "King of the World." Ignorance 
is proof of nothing : it can only hope to learn, but never 
to teach. 

III. And can it be pretended that we know enough 
of the chemical properties of matter to say that a chem- 
ical combination, apart from an organizing power or 
essence, suffices to produce order, life, and intellect ? 
If the materialist denies his ignorance, and presumes 
to say that he reasons affirmatively from affirmative 
factSj then let him tell us the ingredients wherewith 
an organized being may be formed, and endowed with 
the faculties of mincl. If he possesses the knowledge 
let him show us the creature his science has produced, 
without the use of agents to him mysterious, intangible, 
and unknown ; but if he cannot tell, not only the 
component parts, but the proportions and process of the 
chemical composition to which he attributes such won- 
derful effects, then let him stand mute when the organiz- 
ing, vivifying, and thinking action, in nature, is sought 
to be explained. 

IV. The materialist, wdien he undertakes to de- 
monstrate his propositions, must prove them by our 
knowledge of matter, its properties and laws. Indeed, 
from the very nature of materialism, these are the only 
evidences its followers have a right to advance. To 



THOUGHT. 295 

tliem the phenomena of order, life, and intellect can 
only present questions purely chemical, involving the 
analyses and synthesis of mineral and vegetable sub- 
stances. Within this circle they must solve the problem 
of organization, vitality, and thought. Science (for in 
science alone they have faith) will admit of no chance- 
ful hypothesis which cannot be tested by experiment ; 
and science refuses to grant them a favorable solution. 
But let us deal with liberality ; let us take the theories 
of materialism as they are, and see if (apart from exact 
demonstration) they even command the secondary trib- 
ute of belief. I say they do not ; and all nature is 
my witness. 

Y. From the innumerable facts to be found in 
natural history, and which rebut entirely the opinion 
that a mere combination of matter is sufficient to explain 
the trine phenomena — order, life, and intellect, let us 
take one or two examples : 

1. The egg, when in its natural state, is composed of 
certain elements. The quality and character of each 
of these are exactly ascertained by chemistry ; and it 
is known that the analysis of the body of any bird will 
produce precisely the same elements, without any dif- 
ference in the proportionate quantities, as an egg of the 
same species before incubation. 

2. Nothing is more certain that if an egg is cut 
across into two equal parts the analysis of each half 
will produce precisely the same chemical result ; and 
yet, when incubation takes place, it will be found that 



296 HUMANICS. 

one of the halves has been formed into the head and neck 
and breast and wings, while the other has been trans- 
formed into legs, abdomen, and tail ; and this is accom- 
plished without the addition of materials different from 
those composing the egg, or even a change of their pro- 
portions ; for, as I have already said, the analysis of the 
flesh, blood, fibres, and feathers of the bird show their 
component parts to be the same as the yolk and albumen 
of the egg. 

3. In the human body, notwithstanding the differ- 
ence of the shape of the several parts — head, breast, 
abdomen, arms, legs, hands, and feet, it is found that 
these parts are composed of precisely the same elemen- 
tary particles of matter, without difference of propor- 
tions. 

4. It is also observed that the flesh, blood, and fibres 
of the beast of the field, are made of the same gaseous 
compounds as in man. That the egg of the domestic 
fowl is composed of the same chemical atoms as the 
body of a human being ; and, finally, that blood is the 
same, in material, as flesh ; and all the fibres and other 
tissues of the body have the same basis as the flesh and 
blood. Form and adaptation vary infinitely, but the 
elements of construction are ever the same ; and, what 
is more extraordinary, always in substantially the same 
proportion throughout. 

5. In fact, this uniformity of material continues even 
into the vegetable kingdoms. A great proportion of 
the plants and fruit which supply animal nature with 



THOUGHT. 297 

food, are of the same composition as the bodies which 
they nourish ; and yet, in other forms, these same com- 
pounds are sometimes fatal to life. 

6. The basis of all organic nature consists of four 
gases, well known to chemists as the material out of 
which all things (vegetable and animal) endowed with 
life, are formed : yet these elements may be combined 
in every imaginable proportion (in the same proportion 
in which they are found in the living animal or vegeta- 
ble) without developing the phenomena of vitality. 
The boiled egg, the cooked meat, the plucked grain or 
fruit, the dead man who expired yesterday, all contain 
the same elements of matter as when throbbing with 
life. 

7. The absence of life, however, it seems, leaves 
these materials without any formative power. Decom- 
position and disorganization (the separation and dis- 
persement of the elementary particles) follow, as if the 
power which had bound them and arranged them, had 
departed. 

~Now take these facts and ponder upon them. 

VI. It is a law of the material world that like causes 
always produce like effects. This is the principle 
which is at the foundation of all physical science ; and 
if it did not hold good, there could be no such things 
as knowledge and reason. "Without this principle no 
one, on seeing an act or phenomenon, could attribute it 
to any definite cause. All would be confusi on and 
doubt ; and man could never have trusted to, or have 



298 HUMANICS. 

been served by, that inductive philosophy, which judg- 
ing of cause by effect, and reposing confidence in the 
uniformity and consistency of nature, has been so useful 
and so sure a guide to natural science and physical art. 
If, then, the mere combination of matter be the cause of 
organization and life, whence such varied effects so 
totally dissimilar, from so definite and single a cause as 
the union of four elements in one certain proportion ? 
The plants of the earth, the birds of the air, the brute 
and the man, in all their infinite varieties of form and 
character, from the mushroom to the oak, from the 
worm to the eagle, from the polypus to man, all possess 
the same organic elements. Thus teaches philosophy ; 
and therefore philosophy must also teach that these 
manifold and different effects cannot be produced by 
the same identical composition of matter. The matter 
may serve as the material ; but the appearance of the 
same material shaped into frames so totally unlike one 
another, must be attributed to something else than the 
mere chemical affinity ; for the same chemical affinities, 
independent of other operative causes, would always pro- 
duce the same result. 

VII. Two or more chemical ingredients mixed to- 
gether, in precisely the same proportions, are frequent- 
ly found to compose substances totally different, in col- 
or, form, taste, and other properties: in one form poi- 
sonous and in another perfectly innoxious. What then 
is the cause of these different characters in these iden- 
tical mixtures ? The inherent properties of the com- 



THOUGHT. 299 

pound are certainly not sufficient to explain why it 
takes now one action and then another. To say that 
the power resides in the material, is to assert that mat- 
ter may determine its own form and modify its own 
properties ; and thus to award it a power of volition 
and choice, which no knowledge will allow us to admit ; 
and which if acknowledged would, at any rate, lead to 
consequences entirely inconsistent with the doctrines 
of materialism ; for if we admitted this power of volition 
in matter, we would have to say that the substances at 
one end of an egg choose to form themselves into head, 
wings, &c, and at the other end they choose to take the 
shape of legs, tail, &c, and that the choices of these sev- 
eral parts were so connected and prescient, so adapted 
to useful purposes, that they conceived and organized 
a living body, wisely adapted to the great fabric of na- 
ture, and to the observance of nature's laws. Thus 
would the materialist be compelled to endow a com- 
position of matter, with that sublime power and design, 
superior to the intellect of man, which the Theist ac- 
knowledges to belong to God alone. 

VIII. If the material itself were endowed with this 
power, then man by putting the same combination to- 
gether would produce the same result as nature ; but 
he finds the compounds he arranges totally inert so far 
as the production of organization, life, and intellect are 
concerned. Pure physical effects are all that he can at- 
tain, combustion by the union of such and such things, 
an electric current by this and that fermentation, mois- 



300 HUMANICS. 

ture, &c, but never life and intellect, where they did not. 
already exist ; and even if he could create or develop 
these by an artful arrangement and mixture of matter, 
still would it be the intellect within himself using the 
properties of bodies as the instrument of knowledge and 
reason. If with the crucible, the alembic, certain parts 
of matter, and the electric current, man may bring forth 
an organism, (though I deny his ability to do it,) we 
would still have to credit his mind with the result, and 
consider the elements and other means employed as 
the passive instrument of a power not belonging to 
them, but to a being capable of exercising an action 
similar to the infinite wisdom which controls the uni- 
verse. 

IX. But as if to show how completely matter is only 
the instrument of some great cause, it appears that life, 
in the vegetable kingdom, acts in a form totally different 
from the animal. Vegetables generate oxygen and 
animals consume it ; and it seems that this generating 
on one hand, and this consumption on the other, are 
necessary to the maintenance of life in the respective 
organisms. The action which maintains life in the vege- 
table would destroy it in the animal ; the fish and the 
beast require different elements ; other animals exist 
indifferently in air or water ; some feed on grass alone, 
others devour only flesh ; while many eat flesh and grass 
together : — so that organization and life do not depend 
upon any peculiar process of action ; for, the process 
varies, and yet organization and life are produced. 



THOUGHT. 301 

Nor does any one process always develop the same form 
of action or existence ; for, aquatic animals differ as 
in the crab and whale ; those that require the aerial 
fluid differ, as the bird, the beast, the man ; and these 
again when every process and condition of life seems 
to be identical, differ in their form and mode of exist- 
ence — among the herbivora we find the sheep and the 
horse — the carnivora include the eagle and the tiger — 
the omnivora, the swine and the man. 

X. Indeed, physics and chemistry do not afford, by 
the compounds, combinations, or processes of matter, 
any solution to the phenomena of life. The same 
ingredients and proportions of matter are found to com- 
pose inanimate as well as animate bodies. The same 
process and conditions of matter are found to belong to 
different forms and modes of life. 

XI. To show how utterly absurd it is to suppose 
that all physical order or organization might be the 
blind and unintelligent action of matter upon matter, 
I will adduce one more instance. I find it in the dis- 
tinction of the sexes, and in the adaptation of the sexes 
to each other. What formative force is there in mat- 
ter itself to produce not only two sexes, but to adapt 
one to the other, so beautifully and wonclrously ? The 
materialists in this case would vainly urge their favorite 
examples : showing, for instance, that, by dint of use 
and in the course of time, organs and members adapt 
themselves to the things and influences by which they 
are surrounded — the reindeer, they say, gradually be- 



302 HUMANICS. 

comes adapted to the arctic cold and moss food— -the 
camel's foot and his ability to resist thirst, they say, is 
not produced by divine intention, but by the continued 
action of desert sands and heat — one moulding itself 
(ex necessitate rei) to the influence of the other. But 
how would their absurd argument apply to the com- 
bined difference and accord of the sexes? Two indi- 
viduals are born at different times, and from different 
wombs : there they are, separate and independent 
organisms, never before in contact, and yet when they 
do meet, it becomes evident that one is made for the 
other, and that the two (though so distinct) are but the 
components of one idea — the harmonious instruments 
of a preconceived and unital design. * * * 

The laws of matter are, therefore, not the laws of 
life ; but the vivifying principle evidently acts upon 
and governs matter, imparting properties and power 
unpossessed before. The elements of matter do not 
produce organization, for they are passive to organiza- 
tion. 

XII. If, therefore, the living organization is not the 
effect of a combination of matter, we may conclude that 
it belongs to an independent cause or principle ; but 
before inquiring into the nature of this cause or prin- 
ciple, I will again revert to the laws of physics to sup- 
port this conclusion. 

a. "When the Naturalist sees the same phenomena 
appearing within dissimilar bodies, he attributes (for 
reasons already alluded to) differences to distinct causes, 



THOUGHT. 303 

and similarities to similar causes. Light, heat, gravi- 
tation, electricity, appear in bodies which seem to have, 
in other respects, nothing else but these phenomena in 
common. Light shines in the Sun, in the lamp, in the 
flame of gas, in the volcanic lava, in the heated metal; 
yet no philosopher presumes for an instant to suppose 
that the light which appears in one form is different 
from that which appears in another. Heat is found in 
a thousand forms and in bodies having no affinities 
with each other — fire, water, sunshine, friction, chemi- 
cal mixtures, iron, wood, gas, — all contain heat ; and 
none will seek in compounds having no elements in 
common, the cause of anidentical effect produced with- 
in them all ; but will rather attribute the common phe- 
nomena to a common principle, having properties of 
its own, and imparting these properties to all bodies 
simple and compound without distinction. The same 
may be said of gravitation and electricity; for who will 
pretend that these do not exist independently of the 
atoms upon which they act? Electricity can be con- 
veyed from one substance to the other — from the clouds 
to the earth, with instantaneous rapidity ; and gravita- 
tion throws her eternal chain from suns to planets, 
through the immensity of space. If, then, we are guided 
by the rules of natural philosophy we are bound to con- 
clude that organization, life, and intellect (which do not 
appear to belong more than light, heat, gravitation, and 
electricity, to the substances, combinations, forms, or 
processes in which they act) are a distinct substance 
m spirit, having an action and properties of its own. 



304 HUMANICS. 

o. Substance or spirit? Here is the difficulty. The 
materialist will find, after all, no great obstacle in at- 
tributing organization, life, and intellect to the opera- 
tions of a single substance ; but the word spirit, has for 
him no meaning — it shocks his understanding. Becon- 
cile him with this word, and the difficulty between him 
and religion is settled. Show him the word spirit to 
be the most appropriate to describe the principle of 
order, life, and intellect, and he is converted. Substance 
or matter implies something corporeal, and directly 
perceptible to the senses or to any one of them. To 
affect the senses is not enough ; the thing must be also 
corporeal to be entitled to the appellation of matter. 
For instance, sound is a thing which affects the senses, 
and it certainly is not itself matter, but an effect pro- 
duced by a certain action upon matter. It also remains 
doubtful if attraction is a material cause ; for its being 
perceptible merely by the weight of all things, is not 
of itself sufficient to stamp it with that corporeal quality 
which distinguishes matter. The weight produced by 
gravitation is not gravitation itself, no more than sound 
is the body from wdience it proceeds. If, then, we can- 
not w^ith propriety call gravitation a substance, how 
then shall we call it ? We cannot say that it is an ef- 
fect, for we perceive it always acting as a cause ; and 
therefore we may class it among the primitive essences 
or spirits of nature. In fact, the word spirit is under- 
stood even in a more extended sense than this. It is 
frequently applied to things which are volatile, and 



THOUGHT. 305 

active. In religion it is only used in a negative sense, 
to describe the nature of God as not partaking of the 
known qualities of matter ; and to express how imper- 
ceptible the divinity must be to our senses of sight, hear- 
ing, taste, odor, and touch. In this acception, the gas 
called nitrogen might be called a spirit / for it is not 
cognizable by any of the senses ; and its presence is 
only known by induction. When we say that God is 
an immaterial being we only express a negative idea, 
which is that the qualities of matter are not embraced 
in his being. He exists — he is a being — but his mode 
of existence we do not, we cannot know. We speak of 
him as a blind man does speak of light, as the deaf of 
sound. The blind know that something exists which 
is called light ; which serves to guide those who lead 
the blind. The blind experience daily this important 
difference between them and other men, and they are 
forced to acknowledge that there exists a means of 
perceiving, of which they can form no conception. 
The deaf know nothing of sound, yet they constantly 
see its powers exerted: they see only effects; and 
though they cannot define the cause, and though it is 
beyond the direct powers of their sensorium, they must 
admit its existence. In the same way, persons may be 
born without the sense of smell and taste, and ascertain 
clearly by induction, that others have natural means, 
which they have not, to discover certain qualities and 
existences. They find that others can tell, not only 

that unseen flowers are near \' but also they find that 
20 



306 HUMANICS. 

the name of those flowers, by some mysterious agency, 
is divulged. "Wine is distinguished from water, though 
darkness pervades around ; and the man who has never 
been endowed with the faculty of taste must acknowl- 
edge, in his fellow-being, the presence of a faculty to 
him refused by nature. In these examples, colors or 
light, the aroma of plants or the pestilential exhalations 
of dead bodies, the flavor of rich viands or the bitter 
properties of gall, might be looked upon as having no 
material existence with regard to those thus deprived 
of all power to perceive them, as parts or properties of 
matter. ISTow in the same way, if we give the most 
extensive sense to the word " immaterial" and define 
it to embrace all things, not corporeal, beyond the di- 
rect cognizance of the five senses of man, and all things 
which he knows to exist only by induction, then we 
will no longer be shocked at the idea conveyed by the 
word spirit, in contradistinction with substance or mat- 
ter as explained above. 

c. But if aught immaterial can exist, may there not 
be a spirit, an entity, existing as a being, and endowed 
with faculties even greater than those of man ? May 
we not call this being God ; and by observing the 
operations of this being upon nature, may we not ascer- 
tain what attributes to him appertain ? A sixth sense, 
if given to us, for that purpose, might enable us to be- 
hold the beauty and glory of the divine existence, 
spreading its ethereal essence throughout the universe, 
and working the celestial machinery of heaven ; but 



THOUGHT. 307 

until this sixth sense is imparted, or until it disencum- 
bers itself of the thick veil of earth which obscures it, 
we must content ourselves with the inductions afforded 
by our present powers of observation ; and bless the 
faculty of reason which enables us to infer a God, and 
which connects us with HIS nature. 

d. If, however, these ivords — mere words are they 
— " immaterial," " spiritual," &c, are still offensive to 
the ears of the materialist, let us for a moment argue 
without them ; and see what conclusion we may reach, 
from the facts ascertained. We have already shown 
that neither combination, form, nor process of matter 
are sufficient to explain the existence of organization, 
vitality, and mind. We have concluded that these 
must depend upon a separate cause, acting upon the 
materials used, and determinating their form and action. 
Well, for the sake of argument, let the separate cause 
be considered as material ; and then let us inquire what 
consequences will follow ? 

1. The cause of order must be universal, it must per- 
vade immensity ; the unbounded regions which are filled 
with myriads upon myriads of suns and planets, rolling 
harmoniously in tracks assigned to each, and wisely 
combined to prevent collision and confusion, proclaim 
the presence of the principle of order throughout all 
space. 

2. The cause of order must be a unit ; for, its 
operations are not diverse, as the operations of separate 
units. It tends to a single object, and produces a sin- 



308 HUMANICS. 

gle effect : — order. Different and separate agents of 
order would probably clash in their operations, unless 
we suppose them to consult and concert with each other, 
as so many distinct divinities, always agreeing, never 
dissenting, and having one purpose in view. This, in 
fact, would constitute a mental unity. We could not 
know of its parts, or apportion each to itself, no more 
than conceive of the existence and life of a man's head 
apart from his body ; and we thus find, after all, that it 
would not aid the cause of materialism, to admit a 
theory which would constitute a physical organizing 
cause, acting by a union of many parts, as essential to 
each other as the heart, the lungs, the sensorium of the 
human body, are to the individual they compose. The 
forms of order are infinite ; but the idea of order is one. 
"We might rather separate gravitation into separate en- 
tities, than divide order (the first law or principle of 
nature) into more existences than one. We see a single 
effect and a single purpose — we therefore infer a single 
cause. 

3. The cause of order must be powerful. And here 
need I stop to observe that the agent which governs the 
circuit of worlds, organizes the insect, and illumines the 
sun, must be infinitely powerful ? 

4. The cause of order must be intellectual. This is 
the plainest and most important part of my argument. 
It seems almost self-evident that none but an intellectual 
agent or power could arrange, adapt, and move the 
universe, in all its immensity, in all its details. But 



THOUGHT. 309 

let ns follow the method we have hitherto pursued, and 
see if the fair inference and the inductive reasoning of 
natural philosophy, do not establish the proposition I 
advance. Like causes produce like effects. Intellect 
in man, when it acts, produces order. Here, then, 
is a positive cause, within our certain knowledge, pro- 
ducing certain definite effects : adaptation and useful 
arrangement — effects indicating a rational plan in the 
operator. A house, an engine, a book are produced 
from conception and design in man. Why then should 
we look for a different cause, in the works of nature, as 
producing results essentially similar to these ? Do they 
not equally appear to arise from conception and design ? 
Not only it is a correct principle of natural philosophy 
to say that like causes produce like results ; but it is 
also correct and philosophical to hold that nature does 
not employ different powers to produce similar effects, 
and that she does not capriciously use now one power, 
now another, for identical purposes, but that she is 
economical and constant in the agent she employs. 
This is established by experience, and is proved by the 
known consistency and simplicity of the laws of nature ; 
and therefore, when we know that the intellect within 
us is the conceiver and disposer of order, we may fairly 
contend that intellect is the universal principle of or- 
der, wherever order appears. Is intellect confined to 
the animal organism — to the brain of man ? Let each 
of us ask himself if intellect is confined to his own 
brain % we all answer no ; as regards ourselves, each of 



310 HUMANICS. 

us has long ago ascertained (however great and wise 
he may be) that he is not alone the depository of the 
intellectual power. How do we judge our fellow- 
creatures possess thought? Other men perform the 
same acts that we do, the effects they produce are applied 
to similar uses, we understand them when they reason 
and base conclusion upon facts. We see plainly that 
their acts are determined from mental operations, and 
that when they do any thing they observe, they think, 
they form a design, and in the ratio of the perfection 
of their observations, thoughts, and plans, s*o is the per- 
fection of their work — this we observe to be the case 
with ourselves ; and we conclude, that all men are en- 
dowed with the same intellectual faculties which gov- 
ern us. And why not carry this inductive process fur- 
ther ; and if we see intellectual effects throughout na- 
ture, what reason can we allege for not attributing those 
effects to an intellectual cause ? But when we find in 
nature a cause or power that observes better than we 
do, that foresees better than we do, how can we (frail 
and transient depositories of the limited and obscure 
spark of human reason) strut with pride as the sole 
possessors of mind, and assign the infinitely superior 
operations we behold around us, to blind combinations 
of matter ? In the power which governs the formation 
of the animal organism, the wonders of earth, water, 
air, and fire — in the equilibrium and motion of planetary 
systems, can we refuse to behold the action and purposes 
of infinite reason ? We allow reason to the inventor 



THOUGHT. 311 

of the bow, .to the discoverer of alphabetic writing, how 
can we deny it to the formative power of worlds — to 
the principle or spirit of universal order ? 

XIII. Thus do we see that even if the cause of or- 
der, life, and intellect, be material, that cause is 

1°. Universal. 

2°. Single. 

3°. Powerful. 

4°. Intellectual. 
Infinity, unity, omnipotence, and wisdom — these 
are the attributes of God, be he spirit or matter ; and 
now, presumptuous materialist, bow down thy head with 
humiliation while I raise my hands and voice in adora- 
tion. Let this being be for you a material essence or 
principle, yet remember that it is the fountain of 
thought — the MIND which governs all. Such a being 
I prefer to distinguish from the grovelling creatures 
and things perceptible to sense ; and I call it or HIM 
a spirit ; and thus shall I name him, and adore him, 
until he can be bottled like gas, or decomposed like air* 

XIY. But let us suppose that the atheist or ma- 
terialist is right in asserting that order, life, and intellect 
are but the effects of matter — the result of certain 
combinations which occur of necessity, and act in a cer- 
tain rotation — still would I contend that such combi- 
nations (if they exist to produce the phenomena of 
organization, vitality, and thought) must necessarily 



312 HUMANICS. 

constitute a single, infinite, eternal, intellectual, and 
powerful existence or body ; and that, therefore, he who 
rejects a spiritual God is compelled to accept a material 
one. 

1. Is it single and infinite? If the order of the 
universe be the effect of a material compound, that 
compound must either be co-extensive with nature, or 
spread its influence (by some medium or other) through- 
out the universe. The materialist cannot himself sup- 
pose more than one great physical motor of the universe, 
more than one universal compound controlling all 
others ; for, if there existed many such combinations or 
motors capable of producing and moving worlds, then 
accident or necessity might develop new systems, in 
the midst of the present infinite harmony of nature, so 
as to destroy the existing order of things — new and 
disturbing effects might be indefinitely multiplied ; and 
confusion, collision, and chaos would take place. The 
concordance of all things to one great plan or design 
displays the action of a single power, superior to all 
others, and preventing all others from interrupting, 
changing, or destroying its course. That its influence 
is not limited by space, but extends to the most distant 
of stars and embraces all nature, is evident when we 
consider that the physical power which (controls the 
fixed stars, shining millions and millions of distances 
beyond the reach of human vision or telescope) exists 
in an absolute and continued agreement, not only with 
the physical power of the planet we inhabit, but also 



THOUGHT. 313 

with the power acting upon all other systems and 
planets, so as to produce the most beautiful and com- 
plete harmony. To apportion these effects among va- 
rious and distinct powers, is to suppose that which can- 
not be proved ; is to admit that which is contrary to 
philosophical experience and to the plainest laws of 
reason and consistency. "We might with as much plausi- 
bility suppose that the movements of the different parts 
and members of the human body are each under the 
influence and regulation of a different and distinct brain. 
2. Is this combination of matter which the ma- 
terialist assumes, eternal f It is ; for it may be traced 
back by geology and astronomy to countless ages, and 
naught seems to threaten its continued duration. The 
geologists have hardly pierced the rind of the earth, 
and yet counting the formation, one above the other, 
of the few strata as yet discovered, they may count 
ages upon ages of past duration ; but they remain con- 
scious that they have plunged only the tips of their 
fingers into the fathomless depth of time ; and that 
countless periods of the history of suns and stars must 
ever remain unnumbered, and beyond the scope of 
human conception. Nor can the materialist conceive 
an end to the compound of elements which he supposes 
to have done this work. He cannot suppose that the 
cause which has operated so uniformly and continually 
for millions of centuries, without derangement, and 
which has followed in all its changes a progressive 
chain of cause and effect, should have been the result 



314 HUMANICS. 

of accident — of accident which In its nature is transient, 
versatile, incongruous, and unconnected. The ma- 
terialist supposes, on the contrary, that the order of the 
universe is the necessary effect of the elements of mat- 
ter ; and therefore, to suppose an end of this order, is to 
suppose a cessation of the necessary consequences of 
the essential properties of matter — or the annihilation 
of matter itself — neither of which hypotheses any atheist 
or materialist can possibly admit. The eternity, there- 
fore, of the cause of oi'der (be it matter, combination, 
action, or spirit) must remain undisputed, by men of 
all colors and shades of opinion. 

3. That the cause of order, though it be a material 
compound, must be intellectual and power/id, may be 
demonstrated by the reason, already given, to show 
that a spiritual cause of order must be endowed with 
the properties of mind. 

* If I call the building of an engine an intellectual 
operation, performed through physical means, I must, 
from the very nature of things, call the formation of a 
planetary system an intellectual work. The works of 
man and the works of nature bear, both of them, 
unequivocal signs of derivation from a similar origin. 

* The presence of mind is known by the phenomena 
its action produces. "We possess mind within ourselves, 
we see its operation around us, in the action and words 
of other men ; and in the same w T ay that we recognize 
its presence in men, do we recognize its presence in 
nature. 



THOUGHT. 315 

* We know that mind possesses certain properties, 
which belong to no other process or thing. These 
properties are, principally, computation and design. 
It is by the appearance of these properties that we 
ascertain the presence of mind, just as we discover the 
presence of Heat, Electricity, or Gravitation, by the pe- 
culiar nature of its action. 

* Mind is the only cause, within out experience, 
which we know is capable of conceiving and producing 
continued links of intelligent and useful order and de- 
sign ; and therefore, when we perceive this conception 
and these effects to be universal, we must admit the 
existence of the. mind of nature, just as we admit the 
existence of the mind of man. 

* Reason can commune with, and understand only, 
that which is reasonable ; . . . that which acts by rules 
and motors similar to its own ; and therefore, if an act 
or effect be produced by other laws, it appears to rea- 
son only as creative of disorder and destruction ; if 
language is spoken otherwise than according to the 
laws of reason, it is unintelligible to the reason of all 
men, and appears to be confused and erroneous. The 
course of nature appears to reason to be consistent, or- 
derly, and correct : it therefore acts according to, and is 
administered by, the laws of reason. 

* The madman seems governed by an incorrect 
knowledge of things — false impression, defective pow- 
er of comparison, and a consequent inability to form a 
design of action consistent with nature and experience : 



316 HUMANICS. 

we say, therefore, that he is bereft of reason. If thus 
we conclude that the madman is divested of intellect, 
in the same way must we argue that nature is not de- 
prived of reason. 

* If the works of reason alone appear rational to 
reason, it follows that the works of nature are performed 
by a rational power ; for, if it were not so, it is evident, 
from the nature of things, that these works would be 
unintelligible to the human mind : unless we suppose 
that that which is reasonable may continuously and 
forever be performed by a reasonless power. 

* If the works of nature are not rational works, then 
they are irrational ; but if they are irrational, we could 
not comprehend them ; yet we do comprehend them, 
therefore they are not irrational — therefore they are 
rational — therefore they are derived from a reasoning 
power. 

* Though the materialist considers thought, in man, 
not to be a distinct thing like heat, electricity, or gravi- 
tation ; though he contends that the mind of man is but 
an effect of a compound of elements ; still the existence 
of that mind, as an entity in each individual, must be 
admitted ; and, therefore, by an analogous and consist- 
ent reason, must he admit (though as a result of a 
composition of matter) the existence of the mind of na- 
ture — which must last, as a unit, as long as its ele- 
ments remain together and continue their healthy 
action. 

* But we have shown, even according to the dogmas 



THOUGHT. 317 

of atheism or materialism, the order of nature to be 
eternal and infinite — that the materialist cannot sup- 
pose the harmony of the universe to be dissolved, un- 
less he admits the annihilation of matter or its proper- 
ties. We therefore say that the mind of nature, though 
it be an effect of matter, is immortal, and cannot dis- 
appear, like the limited mind of an individual, by asep 
aration of atoms ; for matter, according to the material- 
ists, doth Jill all space, and its action upon itself can- 
not cease, unless these chemical affinities, of which ma- 
terialism doth boast so much, doth also cease to exist. 

* If the properties of matter were distinct from 
the substance itself, then the materialist or atheist 
could no more deny that reason (which he considers 
the property of a certain compound of matter) would 
also be distinct from that compound of which it would 
be a property ; so he contends not only that matter or 
the compound of matter fills all space, but that the 
properties of matter are not distinct, but identical 
with the material particles themselves. It follows that 
the action of the properties of matter must continue as 
long as matter exists, and that no separation can ever 
take place ; for, if matter or its effect fills all space, 
where will one portion go to escape the influence of 
the other ? And thus, though infinite reason be but a 
property or effect, it cannot die until the infinity of 
matter endeth also. 

* The materialist may seek if he chooses the com- 
ponent elements of this infinite reason which is co- 



318 HUMANICS. 

equal with infinite time, space, and matter 3 and show 
how it is produced. "We bid him speed in his work ; 
but while he labors, the Theist remains satisfied with 
the fact that the mind of nature doth live. The form 
and mode of that life is a mystery, which the heated 
and distorted imagination of atheism may attempt to 
solve; but this very attempt is an admission of ITS 
EXISTENCE. 

XV. 1. Not being able to deny the existence of 
this all-pervading and rational power, it remains for 
the consistent materialist to explain, how the power 
which controls all matter was produced by matter — 
how the effect can govern and control its cause — how, 
before reason existed, (for if reason be but an effect, it 
once did not exist, for its cause must have produced it,) 
how, before reason existed, I say, blind and reasonless 
matter could have produced so perfect and rational an 
existence as the governing power of the universe must 
be — how rational effects could precede a rational cause 
— how the force was created by the object it directs 
and moves — how a rational existence, bearing all the 
outward marks of design which a physical God must 
bear, could have been before reason itself existed ; and 
how the most wonderful results of design may be pro- 
duced by the blind constituents of matter, and how a 
power inferior to the intellect of man (mere minerals 
and gases) may act according to the most perfect dic- 
tates of reason ? 



THOUGHT. 319 

2. The Theist has nothing to clo with all these diffi- 
culties, or with the other objections, already mentioned, 
which meet the doctrines of materialism at every step. 
The Theist considers that things which are evidently 
effects, that is to say, passive to some force or action, 
must have a cause ; he considers that there is a vital 
force in nature ; that the vital force is " a peculiar 
force, because it exhibits manifestations which are 
formed in no other known force ; " * that the vivifying 
and organizing principle are identical ; that they pro- 
duce effects indicating design and a concordance with 
the infinite and unital design of the universe, and are 
consequently endowed with an intellectual principle ; 
that matter and mind, the material and the organizing 
power, the substance and its vivifyer, have existed in 
all eternity — one active, the other passive, one neutraliz- 
ing, the other moving. The past eternity of God 
proves the past eternity of his manifestation, however 
varied may have been the modes and forms of those 
manifestations ; for God is cause, and cause implies ef- 
fect, and hence at no time has God been other than 
manifest and acting. A specific display of his power 
and wisdom, such as this solar system, those stars, suns 
&c, may have had a beginning, but no starting point 
of time can in the abstract be assigned to the glorious 
and phenomenal deeds of the Eteknal Archeus. In 
this ORGANIZING POWER, which he studies and 

* See Liebig's Animal Chemistry — last paragraph of Chapter 
I. of Part III. 



320 HUMANICS. 

contemplates, with all the lights of science and reason, 
the Theist beholds all the attributes of Divinity ; and 
he exhults with joy when he linds that he knows his 
GOD. In vain does the obdurate, the infatuated ma- 
terialist, pushed to the last resort, endeavor to degrade 
the idea of this organizing power, by calling it the 
" Formative Instinct of nature." If it is instinct, then 
the intellect of man is lower than instinct. No ! it is 
not instinct — it is infinite Wisdom. It is a perversion 
of words to call it instinct — it is the power and will 
of the ruler of all, lighting suns, driving worlds through 
space, building the minute fabrics of the invisible 
animalculse, it is the intellect that understandeth (for it 
fills) immensity and eternity. 

XYI. Now that we know our God, let us endeavor 
to perceive his purpose : the object of his design. 

Behold the lessons of geology and astronomy. 

The earth was once an ignited mass, — it cooled — 
strata upon strata of inorganic matter was deposited — 
water and air were then formed, and vegetation made 
its appearance — then gross aquatic and amphibious 
animals came forth ; but as layer upon layer was added 
to the shell of the globe, organization, both animal and 
vegetable, became more complex and perfect, until man, 
the most admirable of all, was created. These strata of 
the earth, as they rise from the depth below, each new 
strata adding new and more perfect organization to 
those which precede, present almost the same progres- 



, THOUGHT. 321 

sive chain of beings, as the natural history of the pres- 
ent surface would give. The zoophite, the shell, the 
fish, the reptile, the bird, the mammalia, the man, each 
made their appearance, in turn, and when the earth 
was prepared to receive them, by a similar improve- 
ment of mineral and vegetable nature. The sandy and 
marshy plains rose through the gradual work of ages 
into green and irrigated hills and dales ; the soft reed, 
scanty bush, yielded a place to the bread-tree and the 
oak ; and a fit habitation was prepared for a superior 
order of beings. And has this progress been stopped 
forever ? ISTo, unless the great motor has also ceased 
to act. 

Look at the planets that course around the sun. 
They increase in perfection as they rise from the source 
or primitive elements from which they come. The 
first and second planets have atmospheres suited only 
to aquatic and amphibious animals ; they present the 
same features as the earth must have presented when 
naught but fish and reptiles inhabited its surface. The 
clouds which totally cover the first planet, and which 
form a ragged veil over the second, proclaim the one 
to be a watery globe, while the land of the other hardly 
emerges from the deep. Our earth as next in order, 
presents clearer skies, higher lands, more complicated 
phenomena, seasons more temperate, and a moon whose 
influence is immense. The fourth planet shows its fair 
face undimmed by watery vapors, and wrapped in a 

lighter and purer atmosphere. The fifth, sixth, and 
21 



322 HUMANICS. 

seventh show wants and conditions still more active 
and complete. Though stupendous in size, they whirl 
around their axes in ten hours' time ; and though their 
nights are so short, luminous rings and moons shine 
upon them with a constant light, and produce the most 
admirable effects. Of the gradation of the planets we 
possess with certainty the first links ; those beyond the 
earth have received improvements and modifications, 
of which we can form no idea ; but the certainty we 
have, that there is a regular scale of improvement in 
the three first planets, gives us the glimpse of a law of 
nature which indictates improvement to continue to 
the utmost bounds of the planetary group. If the earth 
came from the sun, it must have been once a molten 
and blazing ball ; if the earth were put in the place of 
the first planet, its waters would rise at once into a del- 
uge ; if put in the place of the second, the waters would 
partially subside, and humid lands, reed-covered plains 
and rocks, and amphibious animals, would appear be- 
neath cloudy skies and superabundant rains. If ad- 
vanced a link further, the habitation of man would be 
formed. What need we go further into the depths of 
time and space to know what has been, and divine 
what will be ? Does not geology show that the very 
changes this advance of the earth, flight by flight from 
the sun, would produce, have actually taken place ? 
First a comet, the seed of worlds, catches the generating 
flame of the sun, and forms by combustion a fiery globe ; 
then, consolidated and cooled, it is covered by water ; 



THOUGHT. 323 

then ascending, it becomes the fit dominion of the lower 
order of animals ; then, behold it rises again, and man 
takes possesssion of the garden prepared (through ages) 
for his use. 

Is not, thus, the eternal purpose of the spirit of na- 
ture made manifest to all ? Blessed sciences of geology 
and astronomy, what a magnificent lesson do you teach ! 
You divulge the advances of the works of the great 
artificer of heaven and earth. You show that his task 
and his pleasure is to act upon matter with a view to 
improvement and perfection. In this chain of progres- 
sive beings which dwell on earth, and advance with 
the planetary scale, we find new evidence of the exist- 
ence of an organizing power which gradually over- 
comes the inert and rebellious properties of matter, 
moulds and modifies the material to serve the high 
purposes of intellectual life and pleasure ; and at last, 
emboldened by the glorious promise all nature seems 
to make, — our soul, that vivifying spark of the divine 
essence, hopes — nay looks with confidence, for those 
successive periods and transitions of happinese and bliss, 
which mount to the regions of transcendent Wisdom 
and Joy. 

We may now easily solve the question of 

LIBERTY AND NECESSITY. 

The following proposition will of itself suggest a 
direct and conclusive solution of the supposed dilemma 



324 HUMANICS. 

of liberty and necessity: Humanity is subject to that 
necessity God has ordained as the Code of physical 
and vital animal Nature ; but Humanity is at liberty, 
by means of thought, to apply those laws in modes of 
infinite variety. 

Let it be noted that there is an interval of time 
between temptation and choice / and that this interval 
is made by the action of thought, in considering the va- 
rious and contradictory motives, ideas, &c, which oc- 
cur to or are evoked by the mind. During this inter- 
val man, it must be admitted, is undoubtedly free. 

The use of the term " free-will " for this subject- 
matter, misdirects the mind ; for the word " will " in 
itself implies a determination brought about by affec- 
tion and thought ; implies a cause, which is either 
feeling or judgment. The will is not the arena of free 
agency, for it is only the voice proclaiming the victor 
in the contest of ideas ; the will is the expression of a 
conclusion delivered by sentiment or reason. It is the 
solution of a question, apart from the process by which 
it was revolved. 

To put the question fairly, we should ask : Does 
man possess a free mind, a liberty to choose ? That he 
has this faculty is apparent from the fact itself; he ex- 
ercises it. Nor is he under a delusion, when he recog- 
nizes this fact ; for while he is conscious of the interval 
of reflection between suggestion and determination, he 
also finds that one of the attributes of reason in itself 
is freedom. 



THOUGHT. 325 

Hence it is erroneous to consider judgment as simi- 
lar to motive. A judgment is the will itself; and, as 
such, is an end, not a motive — the deliverance of thought, 
not its generation and parturition. It is the finality 
(not the activity) of the mind ; the fulcrum or dead 
point at which thought and motives terminate, and the 
action of body begins. 

But while the will may be the expression in one in- 
stance of pure feeling, or in another instance of pure 
reason, or more frequently of the two united, yet it is 
only as a rational being that man is free. If he does 
not stop to weigh and measure motives, compute expe- 
rience, study the present state of things, and ideate the 
future, he is the mere instrument of impulse, instinct, 
habit, or prejudice, and has no right to consider him- 
self as actually enjoying the only free element of his 
nature. 

Reason is the only area of freedom. The rational 
mind in itself does not obey ; it deliberates and com- 
mands. Reason cannot be a slave. If not free, it 
ceases to act at all ; for if not free, it would not be rea- 
son, but something else, a kind of instinct. Hence 
Kant lucidly says : " The very existence of reason de- 
pends upon its freedom." So that, if we are ever able 
to demonstrate free agency, it will be out of the attri- 
butes of reason, considered as a human power, distin- 
guishable from affection ; and importing impartiality, 
investigation, choice, &c. 

"When those who argue against free agency say that 



326 HUMANICS. 

man acts from motive, and when they show that he is 
the puppet of passions, desires, education, and the like, 
they are in one view right. Man may be entirely sub- 
ject to such influences, and in that condition may cease 
to be a free agent ; but if he ever falls into such a 
state, he also ceases to be truly man ; since, to be thus 
controlled by feeling only, he must have abdicated the 
essential attribute of humanity, and retained the charac- 
teristics of animality alone. 

It is vain to say that, on the other hand, he would 
become the instrument of reason — that reason would 
control him just as motives, affections, &c, sometimes 
do. This objection could not stand for an instant, for 
reason, in itself, is freedom, and man is therefore a free 
agent to the full extent of his exercise of the reasoning 
power or spiritus. 

Thus, by reason, he often divorces with characteris- 
tics imparted by birth, habit, or prejudice, and puts on 
a new personality of opinions, conduct, &c. 

You may say, if you please, that man is the slave 
of his judgments ; but a judgment is the terminus of 
deliberation, reflection, &c. While the judgment is 
forming, and until the mind's internal debate is ended, 
we are in a state of equilibration or freedom, and so 
we continue till our mind is " made up." Even then 
we may, at any time, reconsider the vote, and seek a 
new design. Hence, when reason sinks the scale on 
one side or the other, and will is evolved, the act that 
follows is the act of a slave to judgment, indeed; but 
the judgment itself is the fiat of a free agent, for it is 



THOUGHT. 327 

the fiat of that reason which is man's spiritual self, and 
which, because it is reason, is essentially free. 

Taking the magnet of thought as his guide, he may 
find his way all over the physical world ; study it by 
measuring rule and graduated compass, and instruct 
himself. 

Taking the scales of thought, he may weigh and 
calculate the equation of right and duty, justice and 
love, and control himself. 

Sitting in judgment upon his own emotions, motives, 
and powers, upon the things, forces, and laws surrounding 
him, man is at every instant of existence left to select 
among innumerable possibilities of action, as well as 
among a multiplicity of realizable hopes. Far from sub- 
mitting to the first direct motive, knowing that he may 
study the value and bearings of every motive, conscious 
that he may subject it to the jurisdiction of thought, and 
that the secret master within bears the light of Truth, 
he checks himself, examines, and decides. Often, in 
fact, by investigation and thought, he bethinks himself 
of new and better motives, rejects the one and adopts 
the other. Indeed, out of the materials of intellectual 
consciousness, he designs and fashions a state of mind 
of his own invention, so that man makes his own mo- 
tives out of the materials over which his intellectual 
nature has given him authority or jurisdiction. Just 
in proportion as he observes and thinks, instead of 
blindly obeying the crude impetus of feeling, in that 
proportion does he rise above the brute, and widen the 
area of his own liberty. 



V. 

ACTION. 

Having thus far satisfied ourselves of two great 
truths : 1°, that God exists, and that his essential attri- 
bute is what man recognizes as the eternal and infinite 
power and manifestation of Thought ; 2°, that every 
man's soul is an image or iota of the divine Archeus of 
Thought, we come now to consider the application of 
these demonstrated propositions, in the sphere of Hu- 
man Action. 



NATURE AND ART. 

These terms, (nature and art,) in this connection, 
serve to mislead the mind. The word " nature " would 
seem to imply a fatal necessity ; moving, uncontrolled 
by any volition ; operating by virtue of inherent quali- 
ties, or working without the interference of mind. The 
nature of a thing we habitually consider to be its inte- 
gral constitution, which of itself must display certain 



ACTION. 329 

manifestations. This view would relieve us from con- 
sidering the universe and its phenomena, as a product 
of Supreme Thought ; and would, by accustoming us 
to the idea of a natural law, having its germ in matter 
itself, lead us into materialism. 

The idea of nature, which begins with the proper- 
ties of matter, is atheistical ; for it assumes the natural 
law as primarily arising by and in the material sub- 
stance itself, and ignores the necessity of a will to im- 
part and of a thought to invent. 

Short-sighted is he who remains satisfied with the 
sufficiency of a concept of nature, having for its prime 
ratio the properties of matter alone, to explain the evi- 
dences of elective design in the universe. 

They who are disabled by this mental short-sight- 
edness, from perceiving the marks of free thought in 
the cosmos, may most frequently lay their infirmity to 
that undefinable word : " nature." It implies every 
thing, while it means nothing. It includes not only 
the general view of all phenomena, but also implies in 
every thing the indefinite inherence of a something — its 
nature, equivalent to no clear idea whatever. 

The time is past when savans could impudently ex- 
plain nature by nature, and confound mind with mat- 
ter. 

Tt has now become plain, that to explain nature by 
nature, we must recognize supreme thought as an inti- 
mate property of matter itself, and thus concede the 
truth of Pantheism. 



330 HUMANICS. 

Hence, to avoid vagueness and confusion, we should 
endeavor to find expressions in which the definition is 
not confounded with the term — in which cause and ef- 
fect are not posited as one. 

Let " nature," if you please, mean the aspect of the 
universe ; but let the mechanism and motion which the 
universe exhibits, be the operation of Divine Art. 

Who confounds man with his works — who con- 
founds the instrument with the mind which contrives 
it ? Yet some would have it that nature is both uni- 
versal matter and universal mind ; or, still worse, that 
nature (the aspect) shows the indicea of thought, with- 
out there being an existence (ens realissimum) of thought, 
either as property or actor. 

As meaning force or law, property or action, the 
term nature should be discarded, but we should confine 
it to the bodily aspect of the universe, while the force 
which moves it should be the " Divine Will," and the 
laws which control it, the u Divine Art." Let the as- 
spect alone be " nature." 

This distinction is also appropriate to Human Na- 
ture, in which there is a visible and tangible tody — a 
will to resolve, and reflection to design. 

I am instinctively conscious that within me dwells 
an inherent force. 

Independently of all observation of external things, 
I feel the potency of an innate energy for volition and 
action. 






ACTION. 331 

This energy is my own. 

In me and to me it declares the fact of causation ; 
for force cannot he felt as a positive fact, without im- 
parting the immediate and simultaneous certitude of 
causality. 

This is the substantive beginning of philosophy ; 
for, in the certitude of force and causation, the lever of . 
thought obtains a fixed point on which its fulcrum may 
positively rest. 

The new-born infant feels the possession of a causa- 
tive force. It stretches forth its hand to grasp ; and, 
though it has not yet learned how to use its limbs and 
do, it feels the power to catch and to hold. 

On this immutable centre the mythologist and idol- 
ater places the personifications he is wont to worship 
and propitiate as Gods. 

On this positive basis the naturalist relies as the 
substratum of the laws of Matter. 

On this indubitable reality the materialist builds 
his theories of necessary order. 

And from this pivotal truth the theist lifts his men- 
tal vision, to behold the Grand Archeus of the Uni- 
verse. 

The origin of our idea of cause is twofold : 
1°. The direct feeling or consensibility we have of 
internal instincts and emotions, as having power to de- 
termine the will, and, through the impulse of will, to 
evolve action ; 



332 HUMANICS. 

2°. The self-knowledge of thought ; for thought 
knows its own operations ; knows them to be energetic 
processes and a succession of acts, of which the past 
have produced the present, and of which the present 
serve to determine the future. 

In the first category, man feels himself as passive / 
as the passive instrument of forces within himself. 

In the second category, man feels himself as active ; 
as the master to do or not to do, according to his idea 
of what ought to he / and as constantly achieving in- 
dependence of that which is, through the creative and 
progressive changes wrought by his own inventive 
genius. 

In both these categories the idea of energy, power, 
force, cause, is primary, and starts from the. centre of 
self; and the idea of causative force thus delivered 
by self to self, must be taken as one of those initial 
facts at which reasoning begins, and behind which 
reasoning cannot go without suicide, simply because 
there is no higher, deeper, or wider fact from which it 
might be deduced, other than the idea of the Supreme 
One, who reigneth in all space and time. 

Looking out of self we cannot fail to recognize that 
the causative force (as felt in us and evolved by our- 
selves) pervades all nature, and presents itself a direct 
external fact. 

If we were (as the brutes are) only capable of the 
passive instinct or consensibility of a causative force, 



ACTION. 333 

the aspect of nature would never awaken in us aught 
but feelings of immediate necessity ; the full idea of 
causality (as understood in philosophy) could never 
have arisen. 

But while we possess this consciousness of passive- 
ness to force, and while our animal impressions and 
instincts could not go beyond the mere feeling, and 
would directly obey its impulses, we also carry within 
ourselves the archeus or principle of number and meas- 
ure. This Archeus is not only self-active, not only im- 
poses itself as a supreme power, but imparts notions of 
distinct units of force, of values, and purviews of force, 
ratios, and adequacies of force, with which it performs 
operations of mathematical computation. 

Thus, while instinct posits the simple idea of an un- 
intelligent force, thought posits, in and by its own prop- 
erties, the idea of an intelligent force, and the two de- 
rive their title to be considered as forces, from the fact 
that they both answer to the definitions of force, which 
is dynamical energy, producing motion, and known to 
exist by its accomplishing changes. Both move and 
do, both are exerted externally and internally, and both 
accomplish acts and changes. The one is the property 
and movement of the elements of matter, producing 
organic and inorganic effects ; and the other is the 
property and movement of thought upon itself, com- 
puting the data of consciousness and influencing the 
will. 

"Without this double element springing from the 



334 HUMANICS. 

germ-cell of his animal nature, on the one hand, and 
the focal-ligltb of thought on the other, the senses of 
man, like a mirror, might have reflected for ages the 
changes of nature ; but he would never have ideated 
the principle of causality, the laws of connection be- 
tween successive phenomena, or the mutual and meas- 
ured dependency of all things in time and space. 

Hence, by virtue of our self-nature, we conceive 
the universe as subject, in its parts and totality, to 
Causative Force. 

Hence, too, we ideate this force, 1°, as a reality, 
(real existence ;) 2°, as enforcing and fulfilling laws. 

Hence, moreover, (recurring to our previous study 
of the existence and attributes of God,) it is clear that 
we must regard the works of Deity and the works of 
man from a same point of view, to wit : as the products 
of mind : 

1°, of the mind of God, the universal unit of thought ; 

2°, of the mind of man, the atomic particle of 
thought. 

Hence, further, if we regard the works of nature as 
well as those of man, as due to a thinking cause, iden- 
tical in esse, but differing from man to God as a spark 
would differ from a boundless light, we at once have 
an index to a true theory of the Arts ; for then Human 
Art would look to Divine Art for methods and models. 

When we consider Divine Art, we recognize certain 



ACTION. 335 

facts, which language adduces by the adjectives — True, 
Good, Beautiful. 

In the True, we find the immutability of laws — the 
necessity of adequate causes — the consistency of all in 
all — the economy and identity of means — the harmony 
of things with ideas — we find that truth is the adapta- 
tion of Reality to Design. 

In the Good we find a plan and a use, the plan being 
recognized as such only so far as it has a purpose, con- 
sistent with the enjoyment and perpetuation of uni- 
versal harmony — we find that the good is the adapta- 
tion of Use to Design. 

In the Beautiful we find multiplicity woven into 
unity, and hence wherever we meet with variety se- 
riated, proportioned, combined under one idea, it is 
beauty, of which there are many grades more and 
more perfect in the ratio of the number of minor phe- 
nomena as necessarily enter into the grand unit, with- 
out effacing it. Beauty is the adaptation of Variety to 
Design. 

Variety of substance and causes, converging to 
unity, adduces the True. 

Variety of processes and effects, operating in unity, 
adduces the Good. 

Variety of aspects and impressions radiating from 
unity, adduces the Beautiful. 

But these three synthetical unities, as we have here- 
tofore shown, are necessarily merged in a still higher 



336 HUMANICS. 

unity, which is Design — the Divine Mind — the Divine 
Will— the Divine Art. 

And hence, Human Art must be this same Design, 
in a limited sphere, seeking to reduce varieties of 
Cause, Movement, and Impression to units ; such as 
Systems of Science, Schemes of Invention, and Group- 
ings of Taste. 

But here I check myself, deeming it unnecessary to 
bring forward proofs to show that the works of Human 
Art are determined by the same economical and sesthet- 
ical principles as appear in the "Works of Divine Art. 
The illustrations of this fact present themselves on 
every side, and are so palpable and numerous that no 
intelligent reader needs a cicerone to point them out. 
In a future work I may, however, in an artistic mood, 
endeavor to institute the analogy of Human and Divine 
Art ; but in a work like the present one, a mere men- 
tion of that analogy should suffice. 

II. 

SELF-SCIENCE AND ECONOMY. 

Some conceive the precept, " Know thyself," as 
meaning that they should, by self-examination, discover 
their own vices and virtues, defects of knowledge and 
disposition, qualities of feeling and of mind, with a 
view to correction and improvement. 

True, this is self-knowledge, but it is of an inferior 



ACTION. 337 

and imperfect kind. True, this kind of self-knowledge 
has its uses and benefits, but only in a limited and em- 
pirical way. 

Eeal or integral self-knowledge is found only in the 
study of human nature — of the instincts, faculties, 
emotions, and reason of man ; of his physical, social, 
and spiritual destiny. When we clearly understand 
these things, we may then posit terms of comparison, 
first principles, and standards of perfection, by which 
individuals and communities, ourselves and others, may 
be tested and judged. 

ISTor is this self-science exclusively applicable to 
moral and intellectual relations, but it also applies to 
physical conditions and relations. It seeks to discover 
man's wants and tastes ; what they are ; why they ex- 
ist ; and having determined these points, the question 
immediately arises : how ought these wants and tastes 
to be gratified and managed? Hence the laws of 
health, wealth, pleasure, labor, production, exchange, 
commerce, distribution, consumption, demand, <&c. 

Thus arise the Arts of personal, domestic, social, 
and political Economy. 

The limits assigned to this volume forbid the inser- 
tion of extensive observations, to show how a knowl- 
edge of Humanics would have enabled the economists 
Smith, Say, Kicardo, Malthus, Mill, Carey, &c, to 
have solved the intricate problems they studied. 

It is, however, evident that as the economical arts 

seek to provide for man, they must provide for him ac- 
22 



338 HUMANICS. 

cording to his nature, his rational and passional consti- 
tution. His character and destiny should be a law 
unto their art. It should posit man as he is, as he 
ought to be, and as he is becoming singly and socially. 
Such is the condition to which their solutions should 
conform ; for if they do not, the body politic will reject 
their doctrines, just as the stomach rejects repugnant 
aliments and drinks. 

III. 

SOCIETY AND GOVERNMENT. 

Here again is a subject too extended for this vol- 
ume ; but here again let it be noted, that those who 
treat of the art of government, should look carefully 
to the Science of Society, as ftased upon Humanics. 

Too often is government conceived as the art of 
coercing individuals and minorities ; or as the means 
of enabling majorities to realize their caprices and arbi- 
trary decisions. 

It should, on the contrary, be looked upon as the 
refuge of individual liberty, and as the guaranty of 
minority rights ; as a check upon the tyranny of ma- 
jorities and of princes. 

Hence the importance of framing bills of rights and 
liberties, in terms of great scientific precision, and of 
providing barriers against any violation of first princi- 
ples. 



ACTION. 339 

IV. 

THE SOUL AND ETHICS. 

• 

It is the Science of the Soul which discloses the 
true principles of moral action. 

It appears clearly to my mind, that none of the ani- 
mal feelings are either moral or immoral, and that all 
our ethical ideas flow from our thinking spirit, which 
I hold to be identical with the soul. 

"Which one of our instincts, propensities, or senti- 
ments, are in themselves virtues ? If the reader men- 
tions one, let him inquire if it does not involve, in some 
degree, the elements of thought, or some act of reason. 

Are not all our feelings and emotions liable to run 
into excesses, vice, and crime ? If there is one I have 
not been able to discover it ; and if the reader can 
name one, let him see if it is not merely one of the 
terms in a scale, which, as reason increases or dimin- 
ishes in force, rises or falls, from some point of indif- 
ference, to merit on the one side, or guilt on the other. 

Are not our feelings and sentiments multiple, and 
of various tendencies ? Self-love is necessary ; so is 
social love; and between absolute misanthropy and 
maniacal philanthropy, there are passional stages and 
conditions, which may be the prompters of good or 
evil deeds ; one or the other, according to folly or wis- 
dom, use or abuse ; for there is no inherent force in 
these numerous and diverse impulses,- to make them, 



340 HUMANICS. 

singly or collectively, assume the form of virtue rather 
than that of vice, without the tuition of reason. 

In every circumstance, reason or principles, discov- 
ered by reason, must give us the right position and di- 
rection among our conflicting motives. Reason is evi- 
dently the only regulator and arbiter, and therefore 
reason is the true originator of Virtue. Without rea- 
son there can be no rule of conduct, no limit to any 
excess or furor of desire or affection, and therefore Vir- 
tue is rationalized passion. 

GOD AND RELIGION. 

Before man began to study himself, when he was 
yet a savage or an infant, and exclusively attentive to 
the outward world, his mind was unconsciously di- 
rected, in its operations, by the causative force he felt 
as motive and volition. 

This feeling was the sum of his own existence ; so 
that when affected by natural things — fire, thunder, 
water, winds, earth, plants, sun, moon, stars, planets, 
&c. — he at once imagined them to be voluntary causes 
or powers. 

He had not thought of any distinction between or- 
ganic and rational action, and hence could not see 
wherein any active operation of things was distinguish- 
able from the intentional acts of men. 

Thus, he at once presumed all things in nature to 
be individual existences, having like himself the will 
to do what they did ; and finding that they were stronger 



ACTION. 341 

than he was, he yielded to their superior force. By 
prayers and offerings, he solicited their forbearance and 
favor. 

Had man, from the beginning, perceived that there 
was a hierarchy of natural forces — original, mediate, 
and immediate causes — a difference between material 
and voluntary movement — that above the particular 
phenomena were others more and more abstract, and 
of greater and greater scope, and that we may ascend 
to a supreme head of universal unity — he could not 
have made divinities of the material bodies which af- 
fected his senses. 

Had he bethought himself 

— of many forces, 

— of each one of these many beings absolutely dis- 
tinct and special, 

— of each force as possessing properties or laws of 
its own, 

— of the imponderability of these forces, 

— of their permeating one another, 

— of their pervading all material things, 

— of one controlling the other, term beyond term, 
till the final unit of eternal and infinite thought became 
evident ; 

— had man, I say, at the outset bethought himself 
of these possibilities, he could not have fallen into idol- 
atry, or even into mythophilism. 

But in his ignorance (though obedient to a true 



342 HUMANICS. 

principle) lie could not help viewing eacli concrete 
agent of force as a personality, endowed with an indi- 
vidual volition. 

The more we study all the known religions, whether 
we examine them through the medium of history, or 
observe them by means of travel, the more certain will 
we be that the necessary conception of causative force, 
or of adequate power, as producing change, is the 
foundation of all natural theology, and of faith in reve- 
lation. 

Even Atheism sets up the necessity of causative 
force as the pedestal of its argument ; and the only 
difference between materialism and theism, atheism 
and Christianity, is that the one denies and the other 
asserts, an intelligent cause. Both agree in the neces- 
sity of causative force. The materialist thinks the in- 
herent properties of matter are sufficient to explain all 
things, even adaptation, design, and thought ; but the 
theist is no more satisfied to stop at this physical theory, 
than Socrates was to content himself with the embodied 
gods of Greece ; and so the theist goes on, obedient to 
the laws of mind, to seek for, till he finds, a living, in- 
telligent, and universal cause. 

Comte in his positive philosophy strives to discredit 
the use of the idea of cause, and would fain abolish 
even the words " cause " and " force." He denounces 
them as unphilosophical. He was conscious that his 



ACTION. 343 

materialism could not withstand the admitted validity 
of their import. But he could not rid his own mind of 
the ideas expressed by those words. So he found it con- 
stantly and absolutely necessary to bring their meaning 
into his service. He abolished the name but smelt the 
rose. Hence, to gratify his whim of dislike, and yet 
give sense to his language, he hypocritically uses the 
synonyms and equivalents of the discarded words, and 
instead of " force," says " property," and the like ; in- 
stead of " cause," says " influence," and the like. Yet 
such is the irresistible influence of the properties of the 
mind, that in several instances he unwittingly employs 
the very terms he condemns, so that, here and there, 
in his ponderous book, we find " cause " and " force," 
in their legitimate place, under his pen. Indeed, no 
man can frame and write a connected theory of natural, 
mental, and social philosophy, without these words, or 
others, expressing identical ideas. 

The idea of causative force cannot be discarded, 
nor its positiveness denied ; and the error of supersti- 
tion was not in deducing religion from the fact of 
causation, but it was in the personification of apparent 
causes. 

Causative Force, embodied or personified, was the 
first deity naturally conceived by the mind of man ; but 
the idea of the one supreme power was not the first to 
arise, and hence the beginning of natural theology was 
polytheism. 



344 HUMANICS. 

As the idea of causative force presents itself directly 
to thought in four ways, so the gods of polytheism may 
be distinguished into four kinds : 

1°. Gods who were the powerful Aspects of Visible 
and tangible Matter, directly adored as they appeared 
individually, or as they were personified in imagina- 
tion. Thus we have the Heavens or Jupiter, the Air 
or Juno, the Earth or Pan, the Fire or Yulcan, the 
"Waters or Neptune, the Sun or Osiris, Mithra, Apollo, 
&c, the Moon or Isis, Diana, &c, the Morning or 
Aurora. 

2°. Gods who were the representation or personifi- 
cation of the abstract and intangible forces of Matter. 
Thus we have Time or Saturn, Horus, &c, Heat or 
Yesta, Yegetation or Ceres, Health or Hebe, Beauty 
or Yenus, Strength or Hercules, Death or Pluto, Sera- 
pis, &c. 

3°. Gods who were the personification of the Emo- 
tional Forces felt in the human organism. Thus we 
have Courage or Mars, Love or Cupid, Revenge or Ne- 
mesis, Joy or Euphrosine, Remorse or the Fairies, Mirth 
or Momus ; &c, &c. 

4°. Gods who were the personification of the Causa- 
tive Force of Thought. Thus we have Wisdom or 
Minerva, Commerce or Mercury, Justice or Themis, 
Medicine or Esculapius, Science or the Muses, Thought 
or Prometheus, the Soul or Psyche, &c. 

It is not my design to offer any thorough analysis of 
Heathen Mythology, but merely to call attention to 



ACTION. 345 

what I consider as the true origin of the Olympian 
deities. An examination of the Egyptian, Persian, 
Indian, and Scandinavian theogonies, would furnish 
abundant illustrations of the theory just stated. The 
abstract forces and ideas adored as deities might not 
appear so well conceived and personified as in the 
Grecian system ; but they are just as palpable, though 
crude. 

Nor need we be embarrassed by the figures of ani- 
mals, or the chimerical shapes attributed to many 
deities. It is plain that when ignorance and supersti- 
tion assume the Aspects and Forces of Nature, the 
Emotional and Thinking energies of Humanity, as 
personal existences or individuals, exercising their 
power on nature and in man, it was imagination, 
coincidence, accident, analogy, &c, which gave forms 
to these gods. Thus the breeding, invasion, and services 
of certain beasts, the characteristic qualities or appear- 
ance of certain animals, were associated by analogy 
with the myths, and served to represent them. In the 
same way even at the present day the devil is personi- 
fied as a man with horns, a tail, cloven feet, fiery eye- 
balls, smoking nostrils, &c. 

As to the histories or legends of the gods, they are 
evidently allegories arising very naturally out of the 
idea of the gods themselves, as connected with the 
cosmogonical notions of their votaries, the changes of 
seasons, periodical or extraordinary catastrophes, and 
the movements of the heavenly bodies with which the 



346 HUMANICS. 

myths became inevitably associated, from the very 
nature of the case, as the gods were in fact the powers 
of nature, acting in nature as the object of their do- 
minion. 

Now, if we follow superstition through its successive 
stages, we perceive that while it constantly and indis- 
criminately transforms causative agents and forces into 
personal gods, at the same time thought gradually and 
progressively introduces more rational myths, a more 
elevated theogony. 

Always obedient to the innate consciousness of 
causative force as the starting point, and always seek- 
ing a more perfect conception of this force, man ad- 
vances from the idolatry of concrete personifications to 
the mythology of impersonal deities, in the following 
series : the Ormuzed and Ahriman of Zoroaster, the 
Great Totality of the Pantheists, the Soul of the World 
of the Grecian philosophers, the Supreme Generator of 
the Kabbalists, the Grand Architect of the Gnostics. 

But it was only out of the Jewish faith, and finally 
from Jesus, that man obtained a really pure conception 
of the Deity. No identity with matter, no figure, no 
plurality, but the causative force of Thought evolving 
the Spirit of Wisdom, Truth, and Love, eternal and 
infinite. 

And thus all doubt and inconsistency disappears ; 
for we are relieved from considering God as an object 



ACTION. 347 

posited in time and place, and we are permitted to re- 
gard him, not as distinct from, but as identical with, 
that universal causative force which is manifested as 
omnipotent mind; or self-subsistent reason and su- 
preme design, of which our intellect is but a faint re- 
flection. 

I have already, through reason alone, demonstrated 
the positive existence of Deity as proclaimed in the 
Jesuic Dogma ; and now I close this book by a question 
to the churches. 

Do you fully perform your duty to God and his 
children? Is the world improving morally and ra- 
tionally under your administration ? Is not vice and 
sin gaining ground against you ? 

Few of you could truthfully give me an affirmative 
answer. 

Then something remains to be done which you do 
not do, or cannot do under your present discipline. 

Allow me to suggest a programme. 

Introduce your congregations to the study of the 
Apostolic Record according to the following princi- 
ples: 

That whereas the doctrines of Jesus are addressed 
to man's convictions, and intended for man's ob- 
servance, they are not repugnant to human reason, 
and do not transcend the limits of human understand- 
ing. 

That the doctrines of Jesus are founded upon grand 



348 HUMANICS. 

logical premises, which can he shown to be valid and 
true, through processes of natural and scientific reason- 
ing. 

That reason and faith do not necessarily controvert 
each other, and whenever they apparently do so, there 
is error, either in our faith or in our judgment ; and 
the error can only be removed by discovering the point 
at which our pure, just, and enlightened reason on the 
one side and our religious faith on the other, may 
be logically reconciled, and exist in harmony and 
candor. 

That reason must and will finally triumph over any 
sectarian creed which is not conformable to the laws of 
mind, and to the imperative fact that every truth is 
consistent with all truth. 

That the Apostolic Record must be read according 
to the main rational idea of the whole book, and so 
that the interpretation of the texts sectarians contend 
about, should subserve the logical consequences of this 
main rational idea ; and thus obey the warning : " the 
letter killeth but the spirit giveth life." 

But it is not enough to point out the necessity of 
studying the Apostolic Record according to these prin- 
ciples. A method should be devised ; and that method 
should be calculated to take effect among the masses, 
and aiford its benefits to the whole people. It should 
admit the principle that the popular mind is anxious 
for such grounds of belief as will stand the scrutiny of 



ACTION. 349 

reason, and that the church, does not fear the light of 
science, but on the contrary submits to the precept : 
"jprove all things ; hold fast that which is good." 
My plan would be : 

1. Have preachers, of course ; but let them be men 
of large minds, lovers of truth, fearing not argument, 
discussion, evidence ; courteous to hear and answer ; 
understanding philosophy ; and able to expound (in 
popular terms and figures) the Jesuic System in its 
analogy and relation to the Science of Man and the 
process of thought : men able to start from germ-points, 
focal-lights, first principles, initial facts, primary ideas, 
standard criterion® 5 men who know how to demon- 
strate supreme laws, innate properties, necessary limits, 
adequate force, essential design, and generative lib- 
erty. 

2. But (besides the preacher, besides prayer meetings 
and the like) the congregation must assemble in class 
conferences for mutual instruction in all the subjects 
above mentioned ; and this mutual instruction should 
consist in the interchange of ideas by means of ad- 
dresses, lectures, poems, apologues, historical selections, 
scientific illustrations, logical demonstrations, originat- 
ing from the members of the class, and discussed among 
themselves, apart from all personal or partisan interest, 
in a spirit of anti-dogmatic tolerance ; and bringing up 
questions concerning the laws of artistic, economic, 
political, moral, and religious action. 

3. And congenial to this, there should be a religious 



350 HUMANICS. 

press and propaganda, independent of sectarian am- 
bition, harmonizing with human progress and sympa- 
thizing with the intellect and science of the age. The 
several churches should, if possible, have their respec- 
tive periodicals to report or publish the sermons of the 
minister, the intellectual transactions of the class con- 
ference, and the select productions of the members, so 
that all of them might have copies to preserve and 
distribute. 

How this would operate to awaken thought, ad- 
vance true views of religion, and inspire zeal for the 
dissemination of enlightened opinions, I need not ex- 
plain, for it is self-evident. 

I say nothing of the charities of brotherhood, of 
active benevolence, for they necessarily appertain to a 
church organization. I suggest only the points essen- 
tial to my idea of reform. 

That a higher standard of religious education is 
wanting in the United States and in England, to keep 
pace with the state of knowledge and civilization, and 
to satisfy the cravings of a liberal and truthful public 
mind, is plainly to be seen, even in the success of em- 
pirical speculators, on the general desire to greet the 
new lights dawning on the religious world ; and I pre- 
dict that if the church does not move in that direction, 
she will be left behind, among those who have not yet 
advanced beyond the prejudices, superstition, and 
fanaticism of the sixteenth century. 



ACTION. 351 

The highest act of religion is the study of the laws, 
process, and conduct of thought — the culture of mind 
and the development of reason ; for it is thought, rea- 
son, design, that links us to God. The wider and higher 
our thought extends and rises, the nearer we approach 
the throne of Deity. By thought I do not mean vivid 
imagination merely, soaring fancy and the like ; but 
also sure-footed wisdom whose ascent is not only posi- 
tive, but surmounts the loftiest ideality. 

Thought is the true Jacob's ladder. By it alone, 
by the steps it aflPords, we may hope to reach heaven. 

Nor let any one in malice suggest that I forget the 
moral law ; for I have shown and w T ill ever contend, 
that Faith, Hope, and Charity, (in that which makes 
them more and other than Instinct, Desire, and Sym- 
pathy,) are due to thought ; exist only through man's 
rational powers. Take reason away, and a brute inca- 
pable of virtue or merit remains ; while, on the other 
hand, it is certain that, as the light of knowledge and 
the power of reason prevail in society, so do peace, 
order, and love have sway. This is so because thought, 
mind, or reason alone can disclose, and hence bring us 
to — 1°, consciously experience ; 2°, understand ; and 3°, 
cherish the good, truth, and beauty of social love and 
harmony. Without reason man is simply gregarious, a 
hating and envious, or to say the least, a careless denizen 
of society ; but when reason illumines the gregarious 
feeling, this feeling becomes, in the rational light with- 
in us, the reign of God over his children, the fraternity 



352 HTJMANICS. 

of immortal souls, the triumph of perfect liberty, and 
the empire of universal equality. 

I am satisfied that religion may safely relieve her- 
self of bigoted and dogmatic influences, to make 
emancipated and fearless reason her bosom Compan- 
ion. 



RETROSPECT. 



I have had my say, and have tried to present a 
synoptical view of the complex and intricate constitu- 
tion of man. With one retrospective glance, I now bid 
the reader adien. 



1. Man is truly a microcosm of the Universe. He 
comprises the material and the ethereal ; for while he 
asserts a spiritual essence, his body is composed of 
earthy materials, which are borrowed from inorganic 
nature, to constitute a Vital organism. 

2. Man's Vitality presents the same phenomena, 
and fulfils the same functions, as the Vitality of Vege- 
tation. 

3. The correspondence of the functional organism ; 

of man with that of plants, embraces a multitude of 

particulars too generally overlooked, or thoughtlessly 

regarded as animal. 
23 



354 HUMANICS. 



II. 



Animality in man embraces several phases ; viz. : 

1. Instinct, which corresponds with the functional 
action of plants, and the mechanical movement of 
sympathetic nerves. 

2. Sensation, which is the passive sensibility of the 
nerves of external sense. 

3. Emotion, which is the direct action of sympa- 
thetic nerves npon internal feeling, or the reaction of 
the sensuous upon the motor nerves. 

4. Impressibility, or the " concrete image," or un- 
divided picture of entire impressions received by the 
cerebrum, and furnishing the knowledge of qualities and 
facts : the objective materials of thought apart from all 
quantitative ideas. 

5. Memory, which recalls past impressions and 
emotions. 

6. locomotion, enabling animals to obey (in a great 
variety of ways) the direct impulses of instinct, and 
the proximate attractions and repulsions of feeling. 

III. 

1. In the possibility of this variety of action through 
the passive subjection of the organism to many purely 
sensational and animal influences and guides, we find 
a sufficient explanation of the acts of brutes beyond 
the apparent limits of instinct ; and we are enabled to 



RETROSPECT. 355 

understand now the animal which receives proximate 
impressions and feels primitive emotions, acts automa- 
tically, and is always either drawn or driven by mere 
feeling aided by mere perception. 

2. But in man, all the primary feelings and emotions 
are interfered with by thought or reason, which by 
intermixture with the animal desires and affections, 
converts them into the higher sentiments : — the love of 
Truth, Beauty, Morality, and Utility, while it imparts 
the boon of Liberty. 

3. Up to the limit of passive faculties man is the 
puppet of necessity — the mere tool of sensuality and 
egotism / but beyond the passive or animal elements of 
his organism, man is the ruler of his members and the 
fit agent of social feeling and social order. 

IV. 

1. Man thus rises to Society and Freedom, because, 
within the world of mind, and distinct from matter, 
there is an ACTIYE and initial principle which acts 
upon the materials and contents, qualities and facts 
furnished by the instincts, senses, and emotions. 

It is this active principle which Locke (after trying 
to prove that there were no innate ideas) finally recog- 
nizes (B. 2, C. 12, §§ 1 and 2) as a " power of the mind 
to make new complex ideas " — " infinitely beyond what 
sensation or reflection furnished it with." This is the 
active principle which Hume (while trying to reduce 



356 HUMANICS. 

all mental phenomena to sensuous impressions, present 
or remembered) is obliged to do homage to, as " the 
liberty of the imagination to transpose and change its 
ideas." "Nothing," says he in his Inquiry, Sec. V., 
Part 2, " is more free than the imagination of man ; 
and though it cannot exceed the original stock of ideas 
furnished by the internal and eternal senses, it has 
unlimited power of mixing, compounding, separating, 
and dividing these ideas, in all the varieties of fiction 
and vision." " Its effects," says he in his Treatise, Sec. 
IV. and VII. , " are everywhere conspicuous ; but as to 
its causes they are mostly unknown, and must be re- 
solved into original qualities of human nature which I 
pretend not to explain." "It is a magical faculty of 
the soul," — " inexplicable by the utmost efforts of the 
human understanding." It is this magical and active 
principle, which Condillac calls to his aid to animate 
his statue, and designates as " the mind's transformation 
of itself and of its own ideas ; " but Condillac never stops 
to show the possibility of this transforming process, 
without an adequate and specific quality ©r force, to 
produce the effect. . It is this active principle which 
many other philosophers have noticed ; but since Locke, 
Hume, and Condillac are the beginning, middle, and 
end of modern sensationalism, I have preferred to cite 
them as my witnesses against their own one-legged 
philosophy. 

2. Hence I have separated the active principle 
from the passive, proclaimed the non-identity of thought 



RETROSPECT. 357 

and sensation, of subject and object, and have held them 
to be distinct things having a common focus, in con- 
sciousness. 

(Without this duality and this common focus, hu- 
man nature is wholly inexplicable ; since nothing can 
feel itself, or move itself, or lift itself, or see itself, or 
know itself by means of itself alone ; for we are all 
aware, that the nerves and brain do not feel themselves 
but feel all other tilings — that the body "will not go " 
if motive force is not supplied in food — that inertia is 
only overcome by the action of some distinct and other 
force — that the eye cannot see itself, the mirror cannot 
reflect itself; and finally, that consciousness does not 
know itself, but what it does know are the impressions 
of the objective world on the one side, and the dictates 
and movement of the thinking archeus on the other.) 

3. The procedure of this thinking archeus I have 
identified with the ideation of the unit, and the conse- 
quent laws of number ; for if the process of thought 
cannot begin without a quantitative term of compari- 
son, or, in other words, without the unit ; and if a term 
of comparison, whatever it may be, must be dealt with 
as a unit, then number and its laws are indeed the 
beginning and elements of the thinking process. 



V. 

1. With what success I have traced thought back 
to the first principle and law of number, I leave the 



358 HUMANICS. 

reader to judge ; and I call upon philosophers to find, if 
possible, a better demonstration of the nature of the 
active principle of the human mind. This much, how- 
ever, is certain, that the force of this active principle 
(coming from the sphere of eternal order and dwelling 
in man) constitutes the essential distinction between 
men and brutes ; and sets the distinctive mark on man, 
as man. 

2. With this active archeus or causative force of 
mind, Science becomes possible ; and man understands 
Nature, Self, Society, Spirit, and Gocl ; and is capable 
of free artistic, economical, political, ethical, and re- 
ligious action. 

Freedom and inventiveness are essential marks of 
thought. 

3. And one thing more is certain, that no bodily 
root or organ can be assigned to this active principle 
which we must recognize as the only image of God 
within us ; for it is (as he is) spiritual and rational, 
and it may be denominated the finite type of the in- 
finite and eternal archetype of wisdom and power which 
controls the Universe. 



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cleverness, too, in mingling throughout the work, agreeably and unobtrusively, 
so much of the history of India, and yet without ever suffering it to clog tht 
narrative.'' ' — Churchman. 

" This book shows how much can be accomplished by a wide-awake, thought- 
ful man in a six months 1 tour. The literary execution of Mr. Minturn 'a 
book is of a high order, and, altogether, we consider it a timely and importani 
contribution to our stock of meritorious works." — Boston Journal. 

Le Cabinet des Fees ; or, Kecreative Headings. 

Arranged for the Express Use of Students in French. By George 
S. Gerard, A. M., Prof, of French and Literature. 1 vol. 12mo. $1 

u ifter an experience of many years in teaching, we are convinced thai 
*>o-h a-nrks as theAdimit.n'res of Telemachumnd the History of Charles XII. . 
iespite their incontestable beauty of style and richness of material, are tot 
difficult for beginners, even of mature age. Such works, too, consisting of i 
vtMnuous narrative, present to most students the discouraging prospect of a 
'•rmidtble undertaking, which they fear will never be completed." — Extbaoi 
*som Preface. 



D. APPLET ON & CO.'S PUBLICATIONS. 
The History o^ Civilization in England. By Hum 

Tnos. Buckle. Vol. J. 8vo. Cloth. $2.50 

Whoever misses reading this book, will miss reading what is, in various 
respects, to the best of our judgment ^.nd experience, the most remarkable book 
of the day — one, indeed, that no thoughtful, inquiring mind would miss 
rmding for a good deal. Let the reader be as adverse as he may to tht 
writer's philosophy, let him be as devoted to the obstructive as Air Buckle u 
to the progress party, let him be as orthodox in church creed as the other is 
heterodox, as dogmatic as his author is sceptical, — let him, in short, find his 
prejudices shocked at every tur-- of the argument, and all his prepossessions 
whistled doion the wind, — still, there is so much in this extraordinary volume 
to stimulate reflection, and excite to inquiry, and provoke to earned investiga- 
tion, perhaps (to this or that reader) on a track hitherto untrodden, and 
across the virgin soil of untitled fields, fresh woods arid pastures new, — that 
we may fairly defy the most hostile spirit, the most mistrustful and least 
sympathetic, to read it through without being glad of having done so, or, 
having begun it, or even glanced at almost any one of its SoA pages, to pass it 
away unread. — New Monthly (London) Magazine. 

Legends and Lyrics. By Anne Adelaide Proctor, (Daughter 
of the Poet, Barry Cornwall.) One very neat volume, 12mo, 

Second edition. 15 cents. 

This is the charming volume of fresh and tender poems, by the daughter of 
one of England's most honored and popular poets, which has lately been 
received with so hearty a welcome in England and America. Choice portions 
of it, copied by the press with lively praises, have found their way to tht 



The Household Book of Poetry. Collected and Edited by 
Charles A. Dana. 1 vol. 8vo. 793 pages. Third edition. Id 
half morocco. Gilt top. $3.50 

As the New- York correspondent of The Boston Transcript enthusiastic- 
ally writes, ' The elegiac composition, the exquisite sonnet, the genuine pastoral, 
the war-song and rural hymn, whose cadences are as remembered music, and 
the couplets whose chime rings out from the depths of the heart / whatever 
the old English dramatists, the ode writers of the reign of Anne and Charles, 
the purest disciples of heroic verse, the Lakists, the Byronic school — 
Wordsworth and Dryden, Mrs. Remans and Scott, Shakspeare and Hartley 
Coleridge have made precious to soul and, sense, are herein brought together ; 
and more than this — the many isolated single notes, whose lingering harmony 
embalms their authors name, with the numerous fugitive "brilliants" 
heretofore of unknown parentage, cut from newspapers for the last half 
century — the deep, soul full utterances of heroes and mourners, lovers and 
txiles, devotees of nature and worshippers of art — are here elegantly garnered 
and chronicled.'' 

" It is just such a volume as a man may give to a icoman, albeit thai 
woman is his mother, his sister, or his wife, and is richly worth the place U 
H-aims on a lower shelf within ami's length, in the most select library."— 
Chicago Journal. 



D. A PPL ETON'S CO.'S PUBLICATIONS. 
The Coopers ; or, Getting Under "Way. By Alice B. 

Haven, Author of " No Such Word as Fail," "All's Not Gold that 
Glitters," etc., etc. 1 vol. 12mo. 336 pages. 75 cents. 

" To grace and freshness of style, Mrs. Haven adds a genial, cheerfu^ 
philosophy of Life, and Naturalness of Character and Incident, in ih* 
History of the Cooper Family. 

A Text Book of Vegetable and Animal Physiology 

Designed for the use of Schools. Seminaries and Colleges in the 
United States. By Henry Goadby, M. D., Professor of Vegetable 
and Animal Physiology and Entomology, in the State Agricultural 
College of Michigan, &c. A new edition. One handsome vol., 
8vo., embellished with upwards of 450 wood engravings (many of 
them colored,) Price, $2 

" The attempt to teach only Human Physiology, Wee a similar pi'o- 
reeding in regard to Anatomy, can only end in failure ; whereas, if the 
origin (so to speak) of the organic structures m the animal kingdom, he 
sought for and steadily pursued through all the classes, showing their gradual 
complication, and the necessity for the addition of accessory organs, till they 
reach their utmost development and culminate, in man, the study may be ren- 
dered an agreeable and interesting one, and be fruitful in profitable results. 

" Throughout the accompanying pages, this principle has been kept steadily 
in view, and it has been deemed of more importance to impart solid and 
thorough instruction Oil the subjects discussed, rather than embrace the whole 
field of physiology, and, for want of space, fail to do justice to any part of 
it." — Extract erom Preface. 

The Physiology of Common Life. By George Henry 
Lewes, Author of " Seaside Studies," " Life of Goethe," etc. Vol. 1. 
Just Keady. Price $1. 

EXTEACT FEOM PEOSPECTUS. 

No scientific subject can be so important to Man as that of his oion Life. 
No knowledge can be so incessantly appealed to by the incidents of every day, 
as the knowledge of the processes oy which he lives and acts. At every 
moment he is in danger of disobeying laws which, when disobeyed, may bring 
years of suffering, decline of powers, premature deccuy. Sanitary reformers 
preach in vain, because they preach to a public which does not understand the 
laws of life — laws as rigorous as those of Gravitation or Motion. Even the 
sad experience of others yields us no lessons, unless we understand the prin- 
ciples involved. If one Man is seen to suffer from vitiated air, another is 
seen to endure it ivithout apparent harm'; a third concludes that "it is ali 
zhance," and trusts to that chance. Had he understood the principle involvea, 
he would not have been left to chance — his first lesson in swimming would- not 
have been a shipioreck. 

The toork will he illustrated tvith from 20 to 25 woodcuts, to assist tht 
vzpoiition. It will be published in two volumes, uniform with Johawtorts 
* Chcmittry of Common Life.'''' 



D. APPLET UN & CO.'S PUhLICATWNS. 



The Banks of New York; Their Dealers ; The Clear 

ing-House; and the Panic of 1857. With a Financial Chart. By 
J. S. Gibbons. With Thirty Illustrations, by Herrick. 1 vol 

12mo. 400 pages. Cloth, $1.50. 

A book for every Man of Easiness, for the Bank Officer and Clerk; fo* 
the Bank Stockholder and Depositor • and especially for the Merchant and 
his Cash Manager ; also for the Laioye?-, who will here find, the exact Re- 
sponsibilities that exist between the different officers of Banks and the Clerkx, 
and between them and the Dealers. 

The operations of the Clearing -House are described in detail, and illust- 
rated by a financial Chart, which exhibits, in an interesting manner, the 
fluctuations of the Bank Loans. 

The immediate and exact cause of the Panic of 1857 is clearly demon- 
strated by the record* of the Clearing- House, and a scale is presented by 
which the deviation of the volume of Bank Loans from an averaoe standard 
of safety can be ascertained at a single glance. 

History of the State of Rhode Island and Providence 

Plantations. By Samuel Greene Arnold Vol.1. 1636 -1700. 

1 vol. 8vo. 574 pages. $2.50. 

To trace the rise and progress of a State, the offspring of ideas that 
were novel and startling, even amid the jdrilosojjhicul speculations of the 
Seventeenth Century / whose birth was a protest against, whose infancy was 
a struggle with, and whose maturity ivas a triumph over, the retrograde 
tendency of established Puritanism ; a State that was the second-born cf per- 
secution, whose founders had been doubly tried, in the purifying fire ; a State 
which, more than any other, has exerted, by the weight of its example, an in- 
fluence to shape the political ideas of the present day, whose moral power has 
been in the inverse ratio tvith its material importance ; of zohich an eminent 
Historian of the United States has said, that, had its territory " corresponded 
to the importance and singularity of the principles of its early existence, the 
world would have been filled ivith ivonder at the phenomena of its history" 
is a task not to be lightly attempted or hastily performed.'' 7 — Extiiact from 
Preface. 

The Ministry of Life. By Maria Louisa Charlesworth, Author 
of " Ministering Children." 1 vol., 12mo., with Two Eng's., $1. 
Of the " Ministering Children," (the author's previous work,) 
50,000 copies have been sold. 

" The higher walks of life, the blessedness of doing good, and the paths 
of usefulness and enjoyment, are drawn out with beautiful simplicity, and 
made attractive and. easy in the attractive pages of this author To do good, 
to teach others how to do good, to render the home circle and the neighborhood 
glad with the voice and hand of Christian charity, is the aim of the author, 
who has great power of description, a genuine love for evangelical religion, 

trui blends instruction with the story, so as to give charm to all her books.' 1 '-' 

ISi . Y". Observer. 



I). APPLETON & GO: S PUBLICATIONS. 
The Handy-Book on Property Law, in a series of 

Letters. By Lord St. Leonards, (Sir Edward Sugden.) 1 vol., 

16 mo., Cloth, 75 centg. 

" This excellent little work gives the plainest instructions in all matters 
connected with selling, buying, mortgaging, leasing, settling and devising 
t states ; and informs us of oar relations to our pix>perties, our wives, out 
jiililren, and oar liabilities as trustees, executors, &c, c£o." — Tribunf. 

The Manual of CheSS ; Containing the Elementary Principles 
of the Game. Illustrated with numerous Diagrams, recent Games 
and Original Problems. By Charles Kenny. 1 vol. 12mo. 

Price 50 centa 

" Within the compass of this work I have included all that is necessary for 
the beginner to learn. In recommendation of this Manual, lean safely assert 
that it contains more than any publication of the same dimensions. Tli& 
Problems contained herein, as also one of the ' Games actually played? are 
original, and have never been published. 

The Book of CheSS ; Containing the Rudiments of the Game, 
and Elementary Analysis of the most Popular Openings, exempli- 
fied in games actually played by the great masters, including 
Staunton's Analysis of the Kings and Queens, Gambits, numerous 
Positions and Problems on Diagrams, both original and selected ; 
also, a series of Chess Tales, with illustrations from original designs. 
The whole extracted and translated from the best sources. New 
Edition. By H. R. Agnel. $1.25. 

Sixty Years' Gleanings from Life's Harvest, a Genu- 
ine Autobiography. By John Brown. 1 vol. 12mo. Cloth, $1. 

" A remarkable book in every respect, and curiously interesting from be- 
ginning to end. John Brown lived tvith ' all his might,'' and the ' Life ' he 
writes is, in its abundance and variety of tragiG and comic ups-and-downs, 
as good as a play. His experie?ices partook of all the quick changes and bois- 
terous bustle, and rude humor of an old English fair ; and as they are pre- 
sented in this volume they afford a picture of the times he lived and inces- 
santly moved in, which, in much of its bold handling, is not to be surpassed 
by less spirited pencils than those of Fielding and Be Foe. The moral, evm 
as you trace it through the bustling table of contents, is of unmistakable ap- 
plication for every fine young fellow of sound natural principles wleo has to 
shoulder his oivn ivay to good citizenship and a slmre of social influence. 

" As a neglected child, a 'juvenile offender," 1 an ingenious vagabond, a 
shoemaker, a soldier, an actor, a sailor, a publican, a billiard-room keeper, a 
Town Councillor, and an author, Mr. Broivn has seen the world for sixty 
years, and he unhesitatingly describes all that he has seen, with fidelity qj 
viemory and straightforward simplicity of style." 



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